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ABSTRACT
This dissertation presents the design, analysis, and validation of a hierarchical
transactive control system that engages demand response resources to enhance the
integration of renewable electricity generation resources. This control system joins
energy, capacity and regulation markets together in a unified homeostatic and eco-
nomically efficient electricity operation that increases total surplus while improving
reliability and decreasing carbon emissions from fossil-based generation resources.
The work encompasses: (1) the derivation of a short-term demand response model
suitable for transactive control systems and its validation with field demonstration
data; (2) an aggregate load model that enables effective control of large populations
of thermal loads using a new type of thermostat (discrete time with zero deadband);
(3) a methodology for optimally controlling response to frequency deviations while
tracking schedule area exports in areas that have high penetration of both intermittent
renewable resources and fast-acting demand response; and (4) the development of a
system-wide (continental interconnection) scale strategy for optimal power trajectory
and resource dispatch based on a shift from primarily energy cost-based approach to
a primarily ramping cost-based one.
The results show that multi-layer transactive control systems can be constructed,
will enhance renewable resource utilization, and will operate in a coordinated manner
with bulk power systems that include both regions with and without organized power
markets. Estimates of Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) system cost
savings under target renewable energy generation levels resulting from the proposed
system exceed US$150B annually by the year 2024, when compared to the existing
control system.
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COP HVAC system efficiency; unitless (aggregation).
D A cost parameter; unit varies according to context (dispatch).
D Interconnection damping constant; per unit (regulation).
d Disturbance magnitude; in MW (regulation).
d(ktd) Slope of the load demand curve at the dispatch point; in $/MW2h (regulation).
Dq Load diversity at order q; unitless (demand response).
E(t) Energy over the time interval 0 to t; in MWh (dispatch).
E∆ Energy demand parameter; in MWh (dispatch).
ET Energy over T ; in MWh (dispatch).
eta(P ) Demand elasticity at the price P ; unitless (demand response).
F (s) Low-pass ACE control signal filter transfer function (regulation).
f(t) System frequency; in Hz.
Fd Fraction of total load that can be responsive to frequency (regulation).
Fr Fraction of generating units that are ACE-controlled (regulation).
fs Nominal or scheduled system frequency; in Hz.
G The state transition matrix of the population of devices; 2× 2 matrix (aggre-
gation).
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g(k) Load probability function; unitless (demand response).
G(t, Q, Q˙) Cost Lagrangian; in $ (dispatch).
Gd(s) Droop-controlled generation response transfer function (regulation).
Gr(s) ACE-controlled generation resource transfer function (regulation).
Gpd The proportional-derivative control transfer function; unitless (aggregation).
H Shannon entropy of load; unitless (demand response).
h The observer scalar reference input gain; unitless (aggregation).
H(s) Interconnection overall transfer function (regulation).
h1 The net number of devices added to the controlled on population of devices by
a unity input signal; unitless (aggregation).
h2 The net number of devices added to the controlled off population of devices
by a unity input signal; unitless (aggregation).
K Bid comfort control setting; in $/MWh.◦F (demand response).
K The closed-loop proportional control gain; unitless (aggregation).
k Discrete time step; in p.u. ts (dispatch).
k The discrete time index such that t = kts; unitless (aggregation).
k Thermostatic device population count; unitless (demand response).
k1 The derivative gain of the closed-loop proportional-derivative control; in sec-
onds (aggregation).
k2 The proportional gain of the closed-loop proportional-derivative control; unit-
less (aggregation).
Kd Fraction of total load that is armed by 5-minute dispatch (regulation).
Kl Load control recovery time constant; in seconds (regulation).
Kp Load quasi-steady rebound response time constant; in seconds (regulation).
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Kq The observer integral error feedback control gain model scalar; unitess (aggre-
gation).
L(s) Load transfer function (regulation).
M Interconnection inertial constant; in seconds (regulation).
N Number of thermostats under control; unitless (demand response).
NC Number of controllers; unitless (aggregation).
noff Number of devices that are off but not locked; unitless (aggregation).
n∗off Number of devices that are locked off; unitless (aggregation).
non Number of devices that are on but not locked; unitless (aggregation).
n∗on Number of devices that are locked on; unitless (aggregation).
O The system observability matrix; 2× 2 matrix (aggregation).
P (Q) Power price function; in $/MWh (dispatch).
P (t) Regulation energy price; in $/MWh (regulation).
Pd 5-minute dispatch energy price; in $/MWh.
Ps Hourly schedule energy price; in $/MWh.
Q Heating system power demand; in W (aggregation).
Q Load; in MW (demand response).
q The augmented state for integral error feedback control; in J (aggregation).
q The total heat added to the device; in W (aggregation).
Q(t) Actual net exports from a control area; in MW (regulation).
Q(t) Total power; in MW (dispatch).
Q∗ Discrete power; in MW (dispatch).
Q0 Initial load; in MW (dispatch).
xxi
Q∆ Power demand parameter; in MW (dispatch).
QE Scheduled load; in MW (dispatch).
qH Heating system output; in W (aggregation).
qI The heat added from internal, solar and ventilation gains; in W (aggregation).
QR Most probable load; in MW (demand response).
Qs Scheduled net exports from a control area; in MW (regulation).
qS The heat added/removed by the heating/cooling system; in W (aggregation).
QT Terminal load; in MW (dispatch).
QU Unresponsive load; in MW (demand response).
Qz Must-take generation; in MW (dispatch).
R Droop control constant; unitless (regulation).
r Thermstatic state decay rate ; in ◦F/h (demand response).
R(Q, Q˙) Ramping price function; in $/MW (dispatch).
roff The rate at which a device temperature changes when off; in
◦C/s (aggrega-
tion).
ron The rate at which a device temperature changes when on; in
◦C/s (aggrega-
tion).
s Frequency domain complex variable; in h−1 (dispatch).
s The Laplace domain complex variable s; in s−1 (aggregation).
s(ktd) Slope of the generation supply curve at the dispatch point; in $/MW2h (reg-
ulation).
T Interval terminating time; in hours (dispatch).
t Real time variable; in seconds.
t Time domain real variable; in hours (dispatch).
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td Dispatch control discrete-time sampling rate; in minutes (scheduling).
Tf ACE control signal filter time constant in seconds (regulation).
Tg Generation resource governor time constant; in seconds (regulation).
Tl Load control derivative response gain (regulation).
tr Discrete control discrete-time sampling rate; in seconds (scheduling).
ts Discrete control discrete-time sampling rate; in hours (scheduling).
ts The discrete controller sampling time; in seconds (aggregation).
ts Time step; in seconds (dispatch).
Tch Generation resource steam chest time constant; in seconds (regulation).
tmin The minimum control lockout time; in seconds (aggregation).
U The z -domain transformation of the input u (aggregation).
UA The thermal conductivity between indoor and outdoor air; in W/K (aggrega-
tion).
UM The thermal conductivity between indoor air and solid mass; in W/K (aggre-
gation).
W (z) Lambert W-function; unitless (demand response).
x1 The first state of the state vector x, which is the number of devices on, non;
unitless (aggregation).
x2 The first state of the state vector x, which is the number of devices off, noff ;
unitless (aggregation).
Y The z -domain transformation of the output y (aggregation).
y The net load of the population of controlled devices.
z The discrete-time z -domain variable z = e−st; unitless (aggregation).
z1, z2 The desired poles for the integral error feedback control design; in s
−1 (aggre-
gation).
xxiii
zq The desired dominant pole for the integral error feedback ground; in s
−1 (ag-
gregation).
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Introduction
The National Academy of Engineering considers bulk electric power generation and
distribution to be the single most important engineering achievement of the 20th
century [2]. Every part of today’s trans-national economy is supported in some way
by electrification. A myriad power plants convert primary energy sources such as
fossil and nuclear fuels, hydrological cycles, wind and solar radiation to high quality,
reliable, and versatile electric energy that is used to drive an economic engine without
parallel in all of human history. Arguably, not since the discovery of fire or the
invention of writing has a single idea so dramatically affected every aspect of the
human condition.
But the story of electricity is still being written. The 20th century model of
the top-down utility and the interconnected transmission network is being challenged
by 21st century problems. Climate change concerns, environmental impacts, low
natural gas prices and the lack of prospective sites for large reservoirs are driving out
coal plants, nuclear reactors and large-scale hydro-electric facilities as the primary
sources of electric power. In many systems solar and wind resources have become an
increasingly significant share of the generation resource mix.
However, with these new resources come new planning and operation problems. In
particular, prime mover intermittency and the lack of control over their power output
are putting strains on interconnected systems and forcing system operators to either
place limits on intermittent generation resources or engage new kinds of resources in
the control of the system. Over the last few decades extensive research has been con-
ducted on how controllable loads in particular can be engaged in the various planning
and operation processes in bulk power systems. Many solutions to key elements of
the problem have been proposed, some of which have been successfully demonstrated
2in field trials, and a few of which have found their way to full-scale operation by
utilities. Nearly all of these solutions utilize centralized “top-down” control methods,
and most operate in an open-loop control regime. These solutions are often simple,
and are demonstrably sufficient for modest levels of renewable penetration.
But centralized methods can be inflexible and lack robustness to variability and
availability of both renewable supply and controllable demand resources. Decentral-
ized control approaches are already widespread in bulk power systems, as for exam-
ple in the case for regional scheduling using organized energy markets, or control
area generation regulation and bulk system frequency support. Taking decentralized
approaches to their logical limit, fully distributed approaches have been proposed,
particularly for managing local capacity limits and under-frequency load shedding.
This thesis examines the feasibility of scaling-up to an entire interconnection a
particular distributed method of integrating controllable resources called “transac-
tive control”. The problem is considered in the context of deep decarbonization of
the bulk electric power systems, with particular attention to the use of loads as re-
sources in scheduling, dispatch and regulation processes. While the problem involves
regulatory, economic, and policy considerations, the main focus of this thesis is on
the technical problem and solutions that support a flexible approach to regulation,
economic and policy questions. This thesis proposes general methods that might be
used to implement solutions that are widely applicable to the multi-scale approaches
enabled by a transactive control paradigm.
Among the most important drivers in the evolution of modern elecricity infrastruc-
ture is the effect of carbon emissions on the environment. For decades we have been
aware of the effect of power plant emissions on the air quality, rain water acidifica-
tion, and the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Measures to reduce
the effect of soot, nitrogen and sulfur oxides in the atmosphere downwind from fossil
fueled power plants have largely been successful. Clean air policies and regulations
have enabled some recovery of watersheds in the Northeast that were once suffering
from acidification despite some persistent long term effect in certain ecosystems [3, 4].
The 2015 Paris climate accord had raised hopes that a global comprehensive at-
mospheric carbon policy was at hand, and the adoption of the Clean Power Plan by
the United States was a positive sign that together with China, the world’s leading
economies would take effective measures to push toward effective mitigation of the
impact of carbon at global temperatures rise. The recent policy reversals are widely
regarded as a setback in this regard. But many consider the trend toward greater
3dependence on renewable resources irreversable, simply because the social, policy and
market conditions increasingly favor renewable electricity generation resources [5].
Unfortunately, increasing demand for renewable electricity generation resources
does not automatically bring about adoption of technologies that mitigate the climate
impact of fossil-based electricity generation and satisfy ever growing electric system
load. Each class of renewable generation comes with one or more disadvantages that
limit the extent to which it can be integrated in bulk system operation. Hydro-electric
generation has long been employed as a significant renewable source of electricity. But
climate change may jeopardize the magnitude and certainty with which the existing
asset base can meet demand [6, 7], while population displacement, habitat destruction
and fish stock degradation limit the growth of new assets. Shifts in both load and
hydro generation potentially increase uncertainty in long term planning and further
enhance the need for technical approaches that support operational flexibility [8].
Similar issues arise with wind and solar generation resources. Wind power has
seen rapid growth in recent years, but system reliability requirements can limit the
penetration of wind generation without additional mitigation measures such as firm-
ing resources [9]. Solar resources are also becoming increasingly available but have
intermittency challenges similar to those of wind. In addition, residential rooftop
solar resources are challenging the classical utility revenue model [10] and are known
to cause voltage control issues in distribution systems [11].
Finally, the reliable, robust control and optimal operation of an increasingly com-
plex bulk electricity system have become very real concerns [12]. Many see 100%
penetration of renewable generation as the principal objective. But this may only be
possible in certain regions and only if there is a nearby bulk electricity interconnec-
tion on which such a region could rely when renewable intermittency causes shortfalls
in energy supply. There are good reasons why it may not be possible for an entire
interconnection to be supplied 100% by wind and solar energy, leaving open a role
for nuclear, hydro, and natural gas.
The traditional utility approach to renewable intermittency is to allocate ad-
ditional firm generation resources to replace all potentially non-firm renewable re-
sources. These firm resources are often fast-responding thermal fossil resources and
hydro resources when and where available. For new renewable resources the impact
of this approach is quantified as an intermittency factor, which discounts the con-
tribution of wind in addition to its capacity factor and limits the degree to which it
can contribute to meeting peak demand [13]. However, the intermittency factor does
4not account for the ramping requirements created by potentially fast-changing re-
newable resources [14]. The need for fast-ramping resources discourages the dispatch
of slower high-efficiency fossil and nuclear generation assets while promoting faster
low-efficiency fossil and hydro, where available, for regulation and reserve services
[15].
1.1 Motivation
The motivation for this thesis is two-fold. First, the long-term average cost of new
renewables energy resources must be covered by the short-term price volatility in
electricity markets. However, as the penetration of renewables increases, the cleared
energy price is more frequently zero, or even negative as fossil-fired generators attempt
to remain online while waiting for prices to rise. This decline in revenues could place
an economic throttle on the growth of renewables [16] that can only be mitigated
by enabling new sources for the revenues necessary to pay for utility infrastructure,
particularly in the presence of high levels of distributed renewable resources. Fur-
thermore, ramping resource scarcity may induce high price volatility in the ancillary
services markets, which may lead to price shocks to the system overall. This work
seeks to enable mechanisms that significantly reduce costs, stabilize prices, and en-
able new revenues from the coordination of the resources that support efficient system
scheduling, dispatch, and regulation.
Second, although there is an existing mechanism called “transactive control” that
has shown promise in field demonstrations, to date this technology has not been
scaled fully to an entire interconnection. There are many reasons why this has not
yet occurred, but chief among them are the obstacles to modeling, simulating and
evaluating the performance of transactive systems at scale. This work seeks to identify
models and methods that can be used to perform such evaluations.
Market-based mechanisms lie at the heart of transactive control systems. So de-
ploying transactive control at the interconnection scale will require the almost ubiq-
uitous use of markets to allocate any and all scarce resources in the systems. The
long-term barrier to accomplishing such an ambitious goal is that the existing transac-
tive system design is focused almost exclusively on the energy market-based dispatch
of demand-side resources. But the value of demand response alone may be quite small
[17]. The same may be said for energy storage [18]. As a result we must find other
ways to provide incentives for needed resources to participate in market-based solu-
5tions. This includes markets to facilitate shifting costs (or revenues) away from (or to)
non-energy markets, such as power/capacity or ramping/regulation markets. If the
volume of services traded in these three markets were more balanced, then we should
expect a more adaptable, equitable, and stable economic regime. Hence, through
the concept of transactive control we should expect a more adaptable, equitable, and
stable technical operation as well.
Thus we are motivated to understand first how a more balanced transactive system
might function, second how much benefit it provides globally, and finally whether all
concerned parties are better off participating in it than withdrawing from it. This
thesis therefore focuses on how we model and evaluate the performance of key elements
of transactive systems when operated at the interconnection scale.
1.2 Main Contributions
The first major contribution of this thesis develops and assesses the performance of
a short-term demand response (DR) model for utility load control with applications
to resource planning and control design. Long term demand models tend to under
estimate short-term demand response when it is induced by prices. This has two
important consequences. First, planning studies tend to undervalue DR and often
overlook its benefits in utility demand management program development. Second,
when DR is not overlooked, the open-loop DR control gain estimate may be too
low. This can result in overuse of load resources, control instability and excessive
price volatility. Our objective is therefore to develop a more accurate and better
performing short-term demand response model. We construct the model from first
principles about the nature of thermostatic load control and show that the resulting
formulation corresponds exactly to the Random Utility Model employed in economics
to study consumer choice.
The second major contribution of this thesis demonstrates a utility-scale direct
load control problem, where the controlled loads are discrete-time zero-deadband
residential thermostats that allow frequent utility-dispatched micro-adjustments to
the consumer’s heating/cooling setpoints. These new digital thermostats can serve as
the basis for highly accurate and stable closed-loop direct load control systems, as well
as price-based indirect load control systems. A new aggregate load model for discrete-
time zero-deadband thermostats is developed and its fundamental characteristics are
described from first-principles.
6The third major contribution of this thesis develops an H2-optimal power reg-
ulation scheme for balancing authorities to provide regulation services using both
generation and load resources in the presence of a significant amount of intermittent
renewable generation. The optimal controller is designed to minimize the loss of total
economic surplus due to deviations from the schedule and dispatch resulting from
system contingencies.
The fourth major contribution of this thesis considers the optimal resource dis-
patch problem for distribution-level resources that are sensitive to both energy and
ramping prices. Resource aggregators and load-serving entities that use price-based
resource control must solve an economic optimization problem to determine the op-
timal dispatch of distributed generation, storage, and load resources during each
scheduling interval. The solution to this problem provides the basis for significant
cost savings at the interconnection level.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The main elements of this thesis are presented in six parts. Chapter 2 introduces
the challenges of including and optimizing the scheduling, dispatch, and regulation
of aggregated controllable demand resources in the presence of multiple price signals
from the wholesale and retail markets, and the transactive approach to solving this
class of problem. Chapter 3 presents an economic model of demand response under
transactive control. This model focuses on the bid behavior and price responses of the
aggregate load resources that participate in retail energy markets. Chapter 4 develops
a statistical model of aggregate load dynamics. The purpose of this model is to enable
modeling of aggregate dynamics of loads after they receive price signals from retail
energy markets. Chapter 5 examines a new control model of aggregate load and uses
it to design an optimal frequency response control strategy for a control area that in-
cludes fast-acting demand response resources. Chapter 6 derives an optimal dispatch
strategy and evaluates its performance under hour-ahead scheduling from wholesale
markets. The strategy is developed to facilitate economically optimal dispatch when
energy resources are plentiful but ramping resources are scarce. Finally, in Chapter 7
the results of these approaches are discussed and some concepts for future research
are presented.
Supporting material may be found in the appendices. Appendix A and B briefly
present background material on ramping price elasticity and price stability in trans-
7active systems. The remaining appendices provide supporting information to assist
in reproducing and building upon the results of this research. An auxiliary report
is available on arXiv for those who seek background information of power system
operations, demand response and transactive control [19].
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Problem Statement
In 2003 Economics Nobel Laureate Vernon Smith published an editorial with Lynne
Kiesling in the Wall Street Journal [20] summarizing the consensus in the wake of
the California Electricity crisis. In their view the crisis was in part precipitated by
the lack of customer engagement in electricity pricing mechanisms [21]. Reflecting on
the technical and regulatory supply-side response to the crisis, they wrote “What is
inadequately discussed, let alone motivated, is the [other] option – demand response”.
It is now widely accepted that demand-side resources can mitigate the market power of
energy suppliers. More importantly, demand response presents a real opportunity for
improvement in electricity planning and operations. Research on short-term demand-
side resources in particular has increased as the growth of intermittent wind and solar
resources further exacerbates the problem of managing the balance between supply
and demand in power systems [22].
For demand-side resources to serve as a reliable option for utilities to mitigate
the renewable resources intermittency, system operators prefer to control distributed
loads in real-time using strategies similar to those used for generators. This is an
emerging challenge in systems where demand-side resources are expected to play a
significant role in mitigating the adverse impacts of renewable intermittency on key
system control functions like frequency regulation, schedule tracking, and local voltage
support [23]. Transactive control was conceived as an efficient approach to integrate
demand resources, as well as other distributed resources that could benefit system
operations, such as rooftop photovoltaics and electric vehicle battery chargers [24,
25]. The multi-scale and multi-temporal paradigm can efficiently integrate wholesale
energy, capacity, and regulation markets at the bulk system level with distribution
operations, where demand response resource are aggregated and dispatched [26].
92.1 Barriers To Integrated Demand Response
Demand response has long been considered a low-cost alternative to added generation
capacity [27]. Demand is now also being considered as an alternative to fast-response
generation reserves to reduce the dispatch of inefficient generation resources [28]. But
load control strategies for demand response applications can be challenging to plan
and operate, and little has been done to quantity their economic impact at the inter-
connection level. This is in part because the competing objectives of local and global
control [29, 30]. It is also in part because of the complexity of the models and the
simplifications required to make them analytically tractable [31], numerically feasi-
ble in simulations for large-scale resource planning [32], and realizable in renewable
integration studies [33].
Effective and widely used strategies for optimizing the scheduling and operation
of bulk-system resources have used markets to solve the cost-minimizing security-
constrained resource allocation problem since they were proposed in the early 1980s
[34]. Market-based control strategies were later adapted to building control systems
[35], generalized for power balancing [36], applied to feeder-scale operations [24], then
utility-scale operations [25], and most recently proposed for ancillary services [37, 38].
In addition, there is a rich literature describing models of varying complexity that
have been used to study the control of aggregate loads in these cases [39, 40, 41].
The design of utility-based generation-following load control systems, either by direct
command and control or by indirect price-based control, remains an active area of
research.
The trend toward a more integrated and interconnected complex energy system
is inexorable. Progress on the 21st century’s infrastructure of complex interlocking
energy resource, transformation, information, service, social, and economic networks
is challenging our current understanding of these systems and our ability to design and
control them. Transactive control was introduced to help address this transformation
by enabling a more integrated system where all the costs of delivering energy to
customers could be considered in real-time. An illustration of such a top-to-bottom
restructuring of electricity delivery based on transactive control signals is shown in
Figure 2.1. According to this vision of the future system, resource producers and
consumers have equal access to the infrastructure provided, while operators determine
the prices at which resources are efficiently allocated without violating physical limits,
and aggregators group smaller resources together to balance the market power and
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Figure 2.1: Top-to-bottom rethink of electricity infrastructure, including providers of
transmission and distribution infrastructure, system operators and resource aggrega-
tors.
physical influence of larger resources.
Fuller defines Transactive Control as [42]
Utilizing a central control and distributed agent methodology [...] to act
on behalf of consumers, sending information and automatically adjusting
settings in response to a centralized signal.
To remain simple and general, this definition deliberately omits considerations of the
temporal and physical hierarchies of power system operation. Neither does it specify
any particular requirement to satisfy existing or anticipated challenges to the system.
For example, while transactive control is widely believed to help address ramping
problems, very little work has been done to show how it does so at the system level.
Recently, it seems no new work on renewable integration and demand response
can fail to mention the California ISO forecast of the net load shape through the
year 2020. The shape of the curve shown in Figure 2.2 has led to its colloquial name
“the Duck Curve”. But this genial name does not properly convey the significance
of the finding: a load ramp in the late afternoon of 13,000 MW over three hours is
an operational challenge that should not be underestimated. In his report on the
subject, Lazar proposes ten strategies to address this challenge [43].
Strategy 1: Target energy efficiency to the hours when load ramps up sharply;
Strategy 2: Acquire and deploy peak-oriented renewable resources;
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Figure 2.2: The California “Duck Curve” [Source: CAISO]
Strategy 3: Manage water and wastewater pumping loads;
Strategy 4: Control electric water heaters to reduce peak demand and increase load
at strategic hours;
Strategy 5: Convert commercial air conditioning to ice storage or chilled-water stor-
age;
Strategy 6: Focus utility prices on the “ramping hours” to enable price-induced
changes in load;
Strategy 7: Deploy electrical energy storage in targeted locations;
Strategy 8: Implement aggressive demand-response programs;
Strategy 9: Use inter-regional power exchanges to take advantage of diversity in
loads and resources; and
Strategy 10: Retire inflexible generating plants with high off-peak must-run require-
ments.
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Among these, this thesis focuses primarily on the technical mechanisms that support
Strategies 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9, all of which call for a more integrated approach to system
planning and operation.
Significant challenges and research opportunities remain in load modeling and
simulation, understanding of the impact of consumer behavior on demand response,
the foundational theory for controlling widely dispersed demand response resources,
and the verification, validation, monitoring and metering of demand response systems
in utility operations.
Overall, it is clear that we are entering a period of increased electric utility recep-
tiveness and growing innovation in the methods and strategies for turning a largely
passive customer base into an active part of electric system operation. Although new
customer-owned distributed generation and storage resources are expected to become
increasingly significant, recruitment of existing controllable loads is still the most
widely available resource base available to engage the customer in system control.
The impact of controllable load on system operation can be deduced from studies
on the impact of variable generation. The studies to date suggest that the benefits
of variable generation outweigh the costs for reasonable mixes of variable generation
relative to conventional resources [16].
Many of the adverse impacts of variable generation are positive impacts for con-
trollable load in the sense that the magnitude of the cost or impact as a function of
generator variability is a cap on the magnitude of the benefit of load as a function of
load controllability.
Controllable load exhibits the further advantage of high downward substitutability
and thus can be significantly favored under liberalized ancillary service markets. This
feature of controllable load suggests that well-designed ancillary service markets along
with market-based load control strategies could be a very powerful combination.
Significant further research on how to structure such energy and ancillary service
markets, design load control strategies, and model the systems in which they operate
is required to further elucidate the benefits of this approach. Ultimately our ability
to plan and operate bulk power systems that utilize such resources will depend on
our ability to understand both the system as a whole as well as the details of the
economic, electromechanical, and human components which comprise it.
The transactive system architecture can potentially allow for the aggregation and
control of all the necessary resources, both supply and demand, at every level from
transmission to end-use devices, as well as all the necessary capability, energy, capac-
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ity, and ramping, at the necessary time-horizons from days-ahead to real-time. The
comprehensive nature of the structure should alleviate concerns of present day sys-
tem planners and operators regarding controllability of distributed smart grid assets,
allowing them to be fully incorporated into system operations to achieve multiple
objectives:
• Higher utilization of generation, transmission, and distribution assets, by chang-
ing on-peak load behavior;
• Lower wholesale market costs or power production costs, especially during high
price periods;
• Lower ancillary service costs by engaging distributed assets to supply them;
• Lower cost for integrating new solar and wind generation into system operations
by mitigating their variability and uncertainty;
• Higher environmental benefits from more efficient asset utilization and the po-
tential to easily internalize environmental costs; and
• Increased reliability at both the bulk grid and distribution levels, from coor-
dinating the engagement of distributed assets by multiple operating entities,
by (1) increasing available reserve margins, (2) incorporating them into bulk
grid wide-area control schemes, and (3) integrating them with distribution level
voltage control and reconfiguration schemes.
The transactive architecture should allow increased penetration of demand re-
sponse and other distributed assets, resulting from their significantly enhanced eco-
nomic viability, by allowing them to provide a complete set of services on par with
traditional large-scale transmission-level resources. This architecture also helps sus-
tain utility revenue requirements, stabilizes utility customer costs at low rates made
possible by lower cost distributed assets that displace the need for additional con-
ventional infrastructure. Thus the vision of enabling overall cost effectiveness and
environmentally sound grid infrastructure can be realized. While minimizing the in-
formation content of data transferred, it enhances overall cyber-security and customer
privacy.
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Figure 2.3: Inter-temporal data flow diagram.
2.2 Achieving Optimality in Transactive Systems
Several open questions remain when consider the optimal area control design problem
in the presence of significant demand response resources that autonomously respond
to frequency deviations caused by intermittent generation. Autonomous frequency
control using responsive loads was proposed by Schweppe et al. [44] and demonstrated
in the Olympic project, which showed its potential to mitigate generation loss. Au-
tonomous load control can provide much faster response to frequency deviation than
generation resources or dispatched load control can. However the aggregate control
gain and economic elasticity of responsive loads vary over time because these loads
are typically thermostatic (e.g., waterheaters, heat-pump compressors) that have both
time-of-day and weather sensitivities. Thus it seems necessary to investigate how the
standard ACE control or the previously considered optimal area control designs would
operate in the presence of autonomous demand response.
The question of what constitutes optimality under transactive control is compli-
cated by the lack of consensus in the definition of what is “transactive” control [45].
For this thesis we start from the definition proposed by Fuller because of its generality
and simplicity. This definition does not specify any particular physical or temporal
control architecture, leaving us free to choose what is most suitable for the problem
at hand. We use the temporo-physical hierarchy defined in [46] as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2.3, which fits well with Fuller’s definition and provides a relatively simple data
flow between physical and temporal scales. Using this approach the total generation
and load is scheduled hourly such that, for each control area, a uniform price is ob-
tained at which supply is equal to load plus net exports. This schedule is used to set
each area’s price schedule PS and net exports QS, which are in turn used by 5-minute
dispatch markets [47] to allocate remaining resources in response to deviations from
the hourly schedule. The allocation of QD additional exports at the price PD is then
used as a basis for the real-time price PR and quantity QR.
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Because we wish to consider the behavior of the system when demand response is
active, we are motivated to find control strategies that maintain the maximum total
economic surplus established by the schedule. Based on the transactive system design
demonstrated by Hammerstrom et al. [48], Kiani and Annaswamy [49] proposed a
hierarchical transactive control model for renewable integration that incorporates pri-
mary, secondary and tertiary frequency control that is consistent with the architecture
in Figure 2.3. This model was successful in describing not only the primary regula-
tion response of steam turbines to a loss of wind using a transactive model, but also
the disequilibrium process of the secondary and tertiary responses. Because trans-
active control incorporates economic signals, Kiani’s model can be used to evaluate
the impacts of transactive controls on total economic surplus both with and with-
out their proposed tertiary control. Evaluating the surplus impacts provides a useful
alternative to the typical optimization objective of minimizing frequency deviations,
generator response, or regulation cost, especially in the context of transactive controls
where the joint energy, power, and ramp responses have different time-varying cost
functions and are considered over different time-horizons.
The transactive control dispatch system is used to solve two concurrent problems.
(i) Schedule tracking: The hourly schedule is set by the unit commitment process
[50]. From this process we obtain two important parameters that are used to
dispatch retail resources at the 5 minute time-scale1: (1) the schedule price and
net exports, and (2) the participation factor for each generator and responsive
load to match real-time demand and supply within a control area.
The schedule price Ps is determined from the hour-ahead supply and demand
bids, and corresponds to the control area’s net export schedule Qs, which be-
comes the control reference for dispatching units over the coming hour.
(ii) Resource dispatch: Every five minutes generation and load resources are
re-dispatched and the regulation control is reset to establish the basis for the
control of system frequency and area exports over the next 5-minute interval.
Units with non-zero participation factors bid into the dispatch market to allow
the schedule to be adjusted so that recent resource state changes can be con-
sidered. Contribution and participation factors are computed and used (1) to
reset the power output for generation units, (2) to reset the state of demand
1The 5-minute dispatch interval is chosen because it was used in the Columbus and Olympic
systems and allows for easier comparison of simulations with data obtained from operations.
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response, and (3) set the frequency regulation gain for both generation and
demand response.
With both the scheduling and dispatch strategies available we have all the nec-
essary elements required to consider a regulation response strategy that minimizes
schedule deviation and tracks a surplus maximizing schedule with adjustments from
the last 5-minute redispatch operation. The implementation of solutions to the
scheduling surplus maximization problem in the interconnection scale is addressed in
[1]. According to this formulation the goal is to minimize the initial over-production
of power which reduces later under-production and allows the system to track its
schedule more cost-effectively.
We therefore need to address one specific aspect of the larger transactive control
design problem, namely the integration of the 5-minute dispatch control with the au-
tomatic control mechanism that regulates system frequency in the presence of demand
resources that are frequency sensitive [38]. To this end, this thesis proposes among
other things an approach to regulating frequency and area exports, and minimizes
the loss of economic surplus resulting from deviations from the hour-ahead schedule.
The approach proposed in this thesis addresses four important elements of this
solution: (1) modeling aggregated demand response behavior in transactive systems,
(2) controlling aggregated demand response, (3) optimal area control using demand
response as a regulation resource, and (4) optimal dispatch of demand resources at
the control area level.
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Chapter 3
Demand Response
Historically, demand response programs have taken the form of so-called “demand side
management” (DSM) activities. DSM seeks to alter electricity demand load shapes
to make them better match the available supply and reduce load peaks so as to defer
costly capacity expansion investments. Traditional DSM programs include increased
building and appliance efficiency standards, as well as equipment replacement/retrofit
programs.
In this chapter a derivation of a short-term demand response model suitable for
transactive control systems is presented, followed by its validation with field demon-
stration data. A discussion of what the newly gained understanding of short term
demand response might mean in terms of technology development, consumer accep-
tance, regulatory policy, and research opportunities is presented in Section 7.1 .
The first contribution in this chapter is the development of an analytic function for
short-term demand in residential thermostatic loads that are responsive to real-time
prices. The development of the demand function reflects first principles regarding
the nature of thermostatic load control. We show that this model reduces to the
Random Utility Model (RUM) employed in economics to study consumer choices and
the valuation of non-market goods [51].
The second contribution in this chapter is a validation of the model against data
obtained from the Olympic and Columbus field demonstrations. These demonstration
projects implemented residential level thermostatic inputs to a price-based market
clearing transactive control system on a five minute time-scale. The results of the
field demonstrations show that customers could exhibit positive short-term demand
response to short-term price variations. We show that the demand model can be
easily calibrated to give an accurate representation of the market data from these
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experiments.
Finally, the model is compared to four alternative models of demand response
(DR): no DR, half DR, full DR, and demand elasticity from Faruqui’s 2010 survey
of DR programs [52]. For all models, we compute the error in predicting the amount
of load shed at the 5-minute real-time price produced by the double-auctions of the
Olympic and Columbus experiments. The results show that the RUM outperforms the
alternative models for common “steady-state” demand conditions. In more extreme
situations where load state diversity is low or when large price deviations occur over
a very short time frame, the performance of the RUM is comparable to that of the
competing models.
3.1 Background
Load shifting has long been recognized as a second approach to modulate demand
response. Whereas traditional energy efficiency programs aim to reduce overall con-
sumption, load shifting focuses specifically on changing the time of day when energy
is used in order to favor times when costs are lower. Programs that focus on load
shifting typically require mechanisms such as time-of-use (TOU) pricing or real-time
pricing to induce transient changes in consumer behavior, such as those described by
Vardakas [53]. TOU and seasonal rates focus on the customer’s response to simple
static price signals [54]. The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) carried out
a major study of the top five experiments in the United States in the early 1980s
and concluded that consumers indeed responded to higher prices by shifting some of
their load to off-peak periods [55]. Later experiments produced similar results. The
City of Anaheim Public Utilities conducted a residential dynamic pricing experiment
and found that for a peak-time rebate of $0.35/kWh they could reduce electricity
use by 12% during critical-peak days [56]. California’s Advanced Demand Response
System pilot program used a critical peak pricing (CPP) tariff using the GoodWatts
system to obtain peak reductions as high as 51% on event days with a CPP rate
and 32% on non-event days with TOU rate. Enabling technology was identified as
an important driver for load reductions [52]. This observation was also made in the
Olympic Peninsula Project, where both TOU and real-time price (RTP) tariff were
tested [57]. Similar results over a large number of studies have been widely reported
and are summarized in a survey published by Faruqui et al. [52].
Since the introduction of homeostatic utility control by Schweppe et al. [44], it
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has been understood that key system state variables such as frequency and voltage
in large-scale interconnections could be regulated using price signals. Prices have
since been used primarily to schedule and dispatch generation resources using power
markets [50]. Both energy efficiency programs and time-of-use rates have consistently
been shown to effectively reduce loads on time-scales greater than one hour [58].
To avoid unfair pricing in the presence of demand response, David et al. [59] and
later Kirschen et al. [60] examined how the elasticity of demand could be considered
in wholesale scheduling systems. Initial work applying market-based mechanisms to
building control systems showed that the notion of market-based demand control
was feasible and effective for more granular systems [35]. The general concept of
transactive control was initially proposed [61, 62] as a method of coordinating very
large numbers of small resources using market-like signals at the electricity distribu-
tion level. The theory is essentially the same as for wholesale markets. However,
realizations can be quite different insofar as more frequently updated price signals
are typically used to manage distribution system constraints such as feeder capacity
limits. These prices can dispatch both distributed generation, energy storage and
demand response resources at much higher temporal and physical granularity than is
possible with wholesale markets.
A number of previous studies have considered the operational impact of using
retail price signals for controlling load in electric power systems. Glavitsch et al
[63] showed that nodal pricing could find a socially optimal operating point for power
markets . Following up on this work Alvarado [64] considered the question of whether
power systems could be controlled entirely using prices, and found that price signals
could indeed work. But the results came with some caveats, the most significant of
which is the question of stability of the feedback control over the entire system.
The feasibility of transactive control methods was demonstrated in the Olympic
and Columbus projects using distribution resource control systems that dispatched
distribution-level resources in quasi real-time using price signals. These experiments
yielded a trove of high-resolution data about the behavior of load resources in response
to short-term price variations.
Overall, two important lessons have been learned from decades of utility research,
development, and field experimentation with demand response [53]:
1. Consumer interest and sustained participation is essential to the success of
demand response programs. Too many programs showed too little consumer
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interest and participation. This drives up program costs and reduces effective-
ness. Tools to keep customers engaged and responsive to utility priorities are
needed. Substantive contract diversity and meaningful incentives need to be
available for customers to choose and actively engage in programs.
2. Programs should not provide rewards and incentives on the basis of complex
baseline or reference models. Mechanisms that provide or enable endogenous
sources of counterfactual prices and quantities should be preferred by utilities.
Although transactive systems are similar to wholesale markets, the price signals
are applied to different resources, affect consumer needs differently and are applied
at much higher temporal and physical granularity than is possible in wholesale mar-
kets. Short-term consumer response to price variations is also understood to be quite
distinct from long-term demand response. Long-term demand response is typically
associated with changes in consumer behavior and the conversion to more energy
efficient houses and appliances.
On the other hand, short-term demand response is primarily in the form of time-
shifting and often requires automation. Short term demand response can be very
different from long-term demand response because controllable load resources can be
quickly exhausted, leading to control saturation. As a result, short and long term
consumer responses are not generally comparable. In practice, long-term demand
response models tend to underestimate the magnitude of the controllable resources
and overestimate their endurance [24, 25] . This has two important consequences:(1)
Planning studies tend to undervalue the potential contribution of short-term demand
response system which is often overlooked in utility program development; and (2)
when it is not overlooked, the open-loop control gain is underestimated, resulting in
over-control, instability and excessive price volatility.
The lack of solid theoretical basis for short-term performance claims has emerged
as a significant challenge [65, 28]. Using static long-term own-price elasticities can
be expected to give rise to erroneous short-term demand response control because
short-term elasticities are more often substitution elasticities where the substitute is
obtained in time rather than by an alternative product, a distinction which was made
evident by Fan’s study of Australian price elasticities [66], among others. Own-price
elasticities represent averages over long periods of time. These averages may fail
to capture the magnitude and variability possible at any given time. For example,
Reiss and White [67] developed a household electricity demand model for assessing
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the effects of rate structure change in California and found that a small fraction
of households respond to the price changes with elasticities as large as −2, which
far exceeds the average long-term elasticity of −0.14 found in Faruqui’s survey of
DR programs [58]. Unfortunately, computing the elasticity of demand for short-term
demand response to real-time prices has proved challenging because the counterfactual
price and demand are difficult to determine in the absence of a short-term feedback
signal that elucidates the loads’ willingness to pay [68]. Thus, more accurate models
of short-term demand response are necessary for utility load control planning and
design if these systems are to be deployed effectively.
3.2 Random Utility Model
Short-term consumer response to price variations is generally regarded as quite dis-
tinct from long-term demand response. The primary difference stems from the fact
that long-term demand response is typically associated with enduring changes in con-
sumer habits, whereas short-term demand response usually requires automation to
support temporary changes in device behavior when prices are high. As a result,
the consumer’s considerations when, whether, and how to respond are not generally
comparable, nor are they necessarily mutually exclusive.
Unfortunately, most studies of demand response in the electricity sector have fo-
cused on the static long-term elasticity of consumer demand [58]. Lacking alternative
sources for short-term demand elasticity measures, utilities tend to use existing long-
term elasticities as the basis for load control program evaluation and control systems
design. Two important consequences arise from any discrepancy between the two
elasticities.
1. Over- or underestimation of the program value. If the short-term elasticity
is greater than the long-term elasticity, then an indirect load control program
would tend to be under-valued and would be less likely adopted.
2. Over- or underestimation of control gain. If the short-term elasticity is greater
than the long-term elasticity, then any attempt to mitigate instability from feed-
back signals would likely underestimate the open-loop control gain and would
result in incorrect design of the closed-loop control system. This can potentially
lead to less stable system operations and higher price volatility.
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These discrepancies, and the results of the Olympic and Columbus studies showing
that customers could exhibit positive short-term demand response, are the primary
motivations for developing a new model of short term electricity demand.1
3.2.1 First-principles Model
We model the general behavior of thermostats governed by consumer preference based
on an engineering model of houses’ responses in the short-term given a consumer’s
static setting for comfort. The average duty cycle is based on the fraction of time the
system is on relative to the total cycle time. For a thermostat operating within its
deadband, the fraction is very closely approximated by
ρ =
τon
τon + τoff
(3.1a)
where
τon =
1
r
ln
τset− 12 τhys−τon
τset+
1
2
τhys−τon (3.1b)
and
τoff =
1
r
ln
τset+
1
2
τhys−τoff
τset− 12 τhys−τoff
. (3.1c)
In these equations, r is the indoor air temperature decay rate time constant, τset is
the temperature set-point, τhys is the thermostat’s hysteresis, τon is the steady-state
temperature when the heating system is on (or cooling is off ), and τoff is the steady-
state temperature when the heating system is off (or cooling is on). This duty cycle
corresponds to the probability that we observe a device to be on at any given time.
The transactive control system assumes thermostats submit bids such that the
probability of clearing a lower retail electricity price is the duty cycle required to
maintain consumer comfort. Thus the system can be expected to run with the duty
cycle needed while preferentially running when retail electricity prices are lower. This
1It is worth noting that the effect of short-term demand response does not necessarily result in
lower energy demand. It often results in lower peak load at the expense of increased total energy
use. The reason is that consumers tend to respond to variations in price about a mean or expected
price, increasing demand when prices are low and decreasing it when prices are high. Comfort is
achieved by “storing” thermal resources (i.e., heat or cool) during low price periods and releasing it
during high price period. Because the store/release process is not expected to be 100% efficient [69]
any price-induced reduction in peak is typically associated with an increase in total energy use.
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comfort tracking cost minimizing strategy is embodied in the bid-response function
B = P¯ +K
P˜
τobs − τset (3.2)
where P¯ is the expectation value for the clearing price, P˜ is the standard deviation,
τobs is the actual indoor air temperature, and K is the customer’s comfort control
setting. The consumer-controlled variable K expresses how sensitive the household is
to the trade-off between money (the cost of energy) and comfort (distance from ideal
temperature). A high value of K signals a higher sensitivity to price fluctuations.
It gives the customer more opportunities to reduce costs at the expense of reduced
short-term comfort, embodied by the thermostat’s tracking error τobs − τset.
For a population of N thermostats with mean duty cycle ρ¯, the probability of
finding k devices in the on state is proportional to the binomial distribution of the
count
g(k) =
N !
k!(N − k)!ρ
k(1− ρ)N−k. (3.3)
The design of thermostatic loads requires significant oversizing of equipment, so we
assume that on peak the mean duty cycle ρ¯ = 0.5. Given the mean thermostatic
device load q¯ we can define the load deviation Q = (k− 1
2
N)q¯ from the most probable
load Q¯ and the total thermostatic load QR = Nq¯. The aggregate load entropy is then
given by
lim
ρ→0.5
σ(Q) = σ0 − 2Q
2
QR
(3.4)
where
σ0 =
QR
q¯
ln
QR
2q¯
− 1
2
ln 2pi
is the maximum entropy corresponding to the most probable load Q¯ = ρ¯QR. The
probability of observing any given load Q is the probability
2−Ng(k) =
1
1 + e−2σ(Q)
. (3.5)
Using the standard definition of demand elasticity for a load Q at price P we
obtain
η =
P
Q
∂Q
∂P
= P
∂ lnQ
∂P
= P
∂σ(Q)
∂P
. (3.6)
We observe that the maximum demand responsiveness ∂Q
∂P
occurs when the entropy
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is at its maximum. Therefore at the most probable price and load it must be that
∂2Q
∂P 2
∣∣∣∣ P = P¯
Q = Q¯
=
∂σ(Q)
∂Q
∣∣∣∣
Q=Q¯
= 0.
Integrating twice we find
σ(Q¯) = a+ bP¯ .
where a and b are unknown constants which must be determined from boundary
conditions or from a fit to data. We substitute this result into Eq. (3.5) and deduce
that the load as a function of price is
Q(P ) =
QR
1 + ea+bP
+QU (3.7)
where QU is the unresponsive load not subject to price-responsive behavior.
3.2.2 Model Assumptions
This model has the same form as McFadden’s random utility model [51]. The RUM
has been used extensively in economics to study consumer choice and in the valua-
tion of non-market goods [70]. That it can be derived independently from the first
principles of thermostatic controls establishes a strong tie between the engineering
approach and state of the art economic modeling of consumer preferences.2
The random utility model (and thus subsequent manipulations below) makes two
important assumptions.
1. A consumer’s choice is a discrete event in the sense that a device acting on
the consumer’s behalf must make an all-or-nothing decision. The consumer can
either run or not run an air-conditioner. The device cannot be run at part-load
for the next interval.
2. The consumer’s (or device’s) attraction to a particular choice is affected by a
random error with a type 1 extreme value (Gumbel) distribution. In this case
we use the term attraction in the retailing sense but we could just as well use
the term utility to be consistent with economic theory. The randomness of the
utility’s observation of the current comfort preference is assumed to arise from
2McFadden received the 2000 Nobel prize in economics for his pioneering work on economic
choices.
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the devices acting on behalf of consumers. The devices rationally choose the
outcomes with the highest utility based on the consumer’s indicated preference
for comfort.
Although the random utility model has been derived using various methods, Mc-
Fadden points out that according to Luce [71] it is axiomatic that the relative odds
in a binary choice will remain the same for independent alternatives when additional
alternatives become available. Therefore, the selection probability can always be
written in the form
Pi
eν(zi)∑N
n=1 e
ν(zn)
where ν(z) are scale functions of the stimulus z. When ν is linear in parameters, this
result is the multinomial logit formula found in the standard statistical literature.
In the absence of prior knowledge of the quantities demanded by consumers, the
derivation of the aggregate demand curve is based on this discrete choice statistic
for consumer demand [72]. Thermostats act as agents on behalf of consumers whose
utility is assumed to be composed of an observable component based on their comfort
setting, which follows an extreme value distribution and an unobservable component
that has zero mean from the perspective of the market. Thermostats are expected
to bid a price that will give the heating/cooling system a probability of running
satisfying the duty cycle required to maintain indoor air temperature. A thermostat’s
response to a market clearing price is an exclusive choice based solely on the bid it
submitted [73]. For a dichotomous choice, the reasoning is as follows: U is the
consumer benefit (utility in economic theory) that the thermostat obtains from taking
a particular action given the consumer’s preferences. This net benefit depends on an
unobservable characteristic α that has a zero mean distribution and an observable
characteristic β that is a known decreasing function of price. The net benefit is
defined as U = βx + α where x is the binary choice (x = 1 or 0) β represent the
marginal utility of the anticipated change in comfort and cost of electricity, and α
represents all other unobservable variables that can give rise to error in choices. The
action corresponding to x = 1 is taken if U > 0.
From a logistic regression we find that the probability of taking the action is then
ρ{x} = 1
1 + e−βx
. (3.8)
The optimal consumer bid from Eq. (3.2) is the utility maximizing price. The random
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Figure 3.1: Demand curves for steady state thermostatic loads in a transactive control
system.
utility model gives the same result as the load probability in Eq. (3.5).
3.2.3 Equilibrium Demand Response
The transactive control system used in the demonstration projects is quiescent when
load state diversity is maximized and the total load is steady. This steady-state
condition occurs when the distribution of bids is symmetric about the mean price
with the same relative variance. We assume that states are uniformly distributed over
the thermostat deadbands because without price disturbances, thermostatic devices
follow the standard duty cycle regime. Devices will be on for the time required to
rise from the on boundary of the thermostat deadband to the off boundary and off
for the time required to go the other way. Undiversified states will tend to randomize
under the influence of diverse physical parameters and state diversity grows until the
thermostats settle into the equilibrium demand regime. After re-diversification, prices
return to obeying the logistic distribution of Equation (3.8). We rescale the physical
quantities for an arbitrary system with QU unresponsive load and QR responsive load
at the prices p. Finally we rewrite Equation (3.8) to obtain Equation (3.7) again,
where a and b are the demand curve’s shape parameters.
The most probable demand elasticity at steady state occurs at maximum diversity
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when p = −a
b
and
ηˆD = ηD
(
−a
b
)
=
a
2
(3.9)
as shown in Figure 3.1. Using this we can estimate the demand function parameters
for any set of N bids by fitting a linear function to the bids within the central 60%
of the demand response range, i.e., from 0.2QR to 0.8QR. The most probable price
Pˆ is found at the mid-point Qˆ = QU +
1
2
QR. The demand elasticity ηD = 2Pˆ /QRd
where d is the demand response slope obtained from the linear fit. From this we find
the curve parameters
a = 2ηD and b = −a/Pˆ (3.10)
which can be obtained by applying the definition of elasticity to Eq. (3.7) such that
ηD =
p
Q(p)
dQ(p)
dp
|p=Pˆ and observing that the most probable price occurs when p = −a/b.
3.3 Model Validation
To test the validity of the Random Utility Model, we compare its performance to that
of models currently employed by utilities. The four comparator models are based
on three different levels of static participation from the installed demand response
capacity (i.e., 0%, 50% and 100% of QR−QU), as well as the -0.14 long-term demand
elasticity proposed by Faruqui [58]. The key difference between the different models
used by utilities is the assumption made about the short term elasticity of demand:
1. Zero elasticity (No DR) may be preferred when the demand response pro-
gram is not expected to be a significant fraction of the total load. However,
in such a case the open-loop control gain is essentially zero, and both program
valuation and feedback control design are not possible. Depending on the shape
of the demand curve, zero elasticity may arise at more than one quantity.
2. Maximum elasticity (Full DR) may be preferred when the purpose of the
study is to design the feedback control so as to avoid instability. The maximum
elasticity would correspond to the maximum open-loop gain and the choice of
closed-loop gain would therefore be such that instability could be avoided for
all physically realizable load conditions.
3. Most probable elasticity (Half DR) may be preferred when the purpose of
the study is to evaluate a load control program’s long-term value. Depending
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on the shape of the demand curve, the most probable elasticity may also be the
maximum elasticity.
We supplement these standard models by adding a fourth comparator:
4. Elasticity η = −0.14. This last model imposes the long term price elasticity
estimated by Faruqui [58].
It can be difficult to augment these static elasticity models with what is known
about consumer choices in energy purchasing. In a study by Goett and Hudson pub-
lished in 2000 [74], customers were found to consider a long-term marginal energy
price increase more onerous when the price is low than when it is high. However, en-
ergy consumers do not go so far as to consider price changes strictly in proportional
terms either. In addition, the authors noted that bonus or coupon inducements can
affect consumer choices. But these inducements are only relevant to long-term deci-
sions such as tariff or supplier choice. Other variables often considered by consumers
include contract duration (where long terms are viewed negatively), variable rates
(also viewed negatively) with shorter-term fluctuations being viewed more negatively.
The demand function model proposed in Section 3.2 was validated using data
obtained from the Olympic and Columbus projects. Bids received in both projects
were fit using the method described above. An example of this fitting process is
shown in Figure 3.2. The Olympic data set includes 103,842 market clearing events
from April 1, 2006 to March 31, 2007. A total of 1,174,923 bids were received from
38 customers. Real-time prices were computed from 5-minute double auctions on
a single feeder. The Columbus data set includes four separate feeders with over 5-
minute market clearing events from June 1, 2013 to September 30, 2013. The data
for both studies is summarized in Table 3.1.
The performance of the RUM and four alternative models are evaluated by com-
paring the quantity predicted by each model at the observed market price to the
actual quantity observed. The −0.14 long-term elasticity is unlikely to be a good
approximation for fast-acting demand response, but it provides a clear indication of
the errors potentially introduced when using long term elasticities in studies of short
term demand response.
The results of the Olympic experiment are presented in Table 3.2. We observe
that the random utility model outperforms the alternative models for all performance
metrics. The difference is particularly significant for the mean error and bias error,
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Figure 3.2: Example of demand function model validation with Columbus demon-
stration data. The bids shown are from 2013-06-22 22:45 EDT. The clearing price
PC and quantity QC are indicated by the circle. The expected price P¯ and quantity
Q¯ are indicated by the plus sign. The standard deviation of price P˜ and quantity Q˜
are indicated by the ellipse.
Table 3.1: Feeder characteristics
Demand Response
Feeder Id Customers Bids kW (% peak load)
Olympic (heating)
– 38 1,174,923 1,193 (52.4)
Columbus (cooling)
120 11 281,045 20 (0.7)
140 30 699,241 45 (1.0)
160 53 1,478,148 83 (1.2)
180 8 210,241 12 (0.2)
but less significant for the standard deviation. Results for the full Columbus data
sets are presented in Table 3.3. They are mixed. We note that the Full DR model
outperforms the RUM for mean error. On the other hand, the RUM outperforms the
Full DR model for bias error and the standard deviation on Feeder 160 (the largest
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Table 3.2: Olympic data analysis results
Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility −0.35% 1.74% 7.24%
Half DR −0.67% 5.63% 10.10%
Full DR −7.38% 6.83% 14.14%
No DR 6.04% 5.49% 8.89%
η = −0.14 6.62% 6.83% 14.14%
and most diverse in terms of number of consumers). The picture that emerges out of
Columbus is that the RUM model performs best in some instances but is comparable
to the static models overall.
There is, however, an important qualifier to the Columbus results. Saturation
of demand response (either all on or all off ) is associated with diminishing load
state diversity. This violates the assumption of the RUM. For this reason, we expect
feeders that frequently saturate the demand response resource control to not be well
represented by the RUM. These feeders would produce data more often consistent
with the No DR or Full DR models (depending on conditions). Unlike the Olympic
study, the experimental protocol for the Columbus study deliberately probed these
limits of control every other day. This resulted in frequent loss of load state diversity
in violation of the zero-mean assumption.
The experimental protocol in the Columbus demonstration is expected to have
introduced additional errors. This has been verified to first order by analyzing the
data excluding the experiment days. The results are shown in Table 3.4, where the
error on Feeder 160 is reduced from 1.00% to 0.67%. However, a second-order effect
is now observed insofar as the Full DR model seems to still perform better than
the random utility model with the error reduced from 0.81% to 0.34%. This can
be explained by the second-day recovery during which thermostats receive relatively
lower prices compared to the previous day and tend to respond more aggressively to
them. This hypothesis cannot be directly verified as the experimental protocol did
not normally include a third day during which neither an experiment nor a recovery
was taking place.
The model as presented is valid only for steady-state conditions. We therefore
ought to consider whether transient demand response behavior influences the accuracy
of the random utility model. Two factors are known to influence the magnitude of
the demand response transient: (1) the fraction of devices that respond to the price
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Table 3.3: Columbus analysis results for Feeders 120, 140, 160 and 180
Feeder 120 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 0.78% 0.24% 0.31%
Half DR 0.75% 0.25% 0.33%
Full DR 0.53% 0.24% 0.30%
No DR 0.98% 0.29% 0.37%
η = −0.14 14.53% 0.24% 0.30%
Feeder 140 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 0.97% 0.29% 0.36%
Half DR 0.99% 0.33% 0.41%
Full DR 0.71% 0.29% 0.37%
No DR 1.27% 0.38% 0.48%
η = −0.14 14.71% 0.29% 0.37%
Feeder 160 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 1.00% 0.28% 0.36%
Half DR 1.00% 0.33% 0.41%
Full DR 0.81% 0.31% 0.39%
No DR 1.19% 0.36% 0.45%
η = −0.14 14.81% 0.31% 0.39%
Feeder 180 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 0.61% 0.22% 0.26%
Half DR 0.44% 0.18% 0.24%
Full DR 0.34% 0.15% 0.20%
No DR 0.53% 0.22% 0.28%
η = −0.14 14.34% 0.15% 0.20%
signal, and (2) the diversity of device states when a price signal is received.
The results suggest that although the random utility model is valid for predicting
steady-state demand response behavior, its accuracy is limited in the case of large
magnitude price fluctuations that tend to drive a significant majority of responding
devices to a single common state. This kind of state degeneracy violates the parameter
distribution assumptions of the random utility model and reduces its accuracy for
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Table 3.4: Columbus analysis results for only non-experiment days
Feeder 120 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 0.78% 0.25% 0.31%
Half DR 0.74% 0.26% 0.33%
Full DR 0.52% 0.24% 0.30%
No DR 0.97% 0.29% 0.37%
η = −0.14 14.52% 0.24% 0.30%
Feeder 140 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 0.79% 0.21% 0.26%
Half DR 0.77% 0.21% 0.28%
Full DR 0.52% 0.20% 0.26%
No DR 1.02% 0.24% 0.31%
η = −0.14 14.52% 0.20% 0.26%
Feeder 160 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 0.67% 0.24% 0.30%
Half DR 0.59% 0.30% 0.38%
Full DR 0.34% 0.28% 0.37%
No DR 0.84% 0.33% 0.42%
η = −0.14 14.34% 0.28% 0.37%
Feeder 180 Error Standard
Model Mean Bias Deviation
Random Utility 0.69% 0.19% 0.22%
Half DR 0.58% 0.18% 0.24%
Full DR 0.45% 0.15% 0.21%
No DR 0.70% 0.21% 0.27%
η = −0.14 14.45% 0.15% 0.21%
predicting the load after an abrupt large-magnitude change in price is observed.
In general, we expect normal utility operations to be more like the Olympic con-
ditions than the Columbus conditions. We thus conclude that while the Columbus
results only weakly support the random utility model, they mainly point out the
importance of the steady-state assumptions in Section 3.2.
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3.4 Summary of Results
We have developed a logistic demand curve for short term electricity consumption
derived from the first principles of controllable thermostatic electric loads operating
under the transactive control paradigm. We have shown that this model corresponds
to the Random Utility Model commonly used in the economics of consumer choice.
The model’s performance is compared to results from two US Department of Energy
demonstration projects in which short-term demand response data was obtained. We
find that the random utility model predicts the total demand response to smaller
price fluctuations very well, but that model performance degrades as the magnitude
and frequency of price excursions increases and as the diversity of load states de-
creases. We conclude that the random utility model is suitable for demand response
studies that utilize steady state conditions for most situations with only infrequent
and modest price excursions.
In its present form the random utility model provides a robust framework that
is well-founded in the engineering principles of how thermostatic devices behave in
price-based control environments. By joining the engineering and economic behavior
of such devices, the random utility model is set to become an essential element in the
planning, design and eventual deployment of large-scale load control strategies.
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Chapter 4
Aggregation
This chapter proposes an aggregate load model of thermal loads controlled by ther-
mostats that have no deadband and synchronize their control update interval to
transactive market. This mechanism, which is denoted T∆0, is used to address stan-
dard control design questions regarding the aggregate control of Tδ0 thermostats
in utility-scale demand response systems. Section 4.2 presents a new state-based dy-
namic model of the aggregate load control problem for these new types of thermostats.
Section 4.3 examines the aggregate load controller design problem more generally and
considers the performance various conventional load control designs using Tδ0 ther-
mostats. Section 4.4 tests the aggregate load model and controller designs using a
large-scale agent-based simulation of Tδ0 demand response. Further discussion of the
general findings based on the simulation and suggestions for possible variations in the
aggregate load controller designs are deferred to Section 7.2.
4.1 Background
Significant changes in generation mix must occur to meet growing load and mitigate
the climate-change impacts of fossil-based electricity generation. Demand response
control has the potential to displace some and possible all generation resources used
for regulation and contingency reserves. However, the current standard practice for
both direct and indirect control of thermostatic load relies primarily on so-called “one-
shot” load shedding strategies for emergency peak load relief only. This approach uses
a controllable subset of all thermostatic loads in a particular class, e.g., water heaters
or air-conditioners, which are transitioned to a curtailed regime that reduces the
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population average power demand. After a time, these responsive loads are released
and return to their normal operating regimes.
This strategy is known to exhibit fluctuations in aggregate load during the initial
response as well as demand recovery rebounds after the loads are released. To mitigate
this behavior, “one-shot” direct load control strategies are sometimes enhanced by
either centralized load diversification mechanisms, such as using multiple subgroups
of the responsive loads dispatched in a sequence that smooths the overall response
of the load control system [75], or distributed mechanisms, such as using stochastic
control strategies [76]. Many of these mechanisms require some knowledge of the
aggregate thermal response of the buildings in which the loads are operating [77]. To
solve the more general tracking problem where load “follows” intermittent generation
[78] these mechanisms must address response saturation and loss of diversity [79],
high sensitivity to modeling errors and noise [80], and stability considerations due to
feedback delays [81, 82]. In particular proportional control [83] and integral control
[77] strategies have been proposed to overcome many of the problems identified.
Aggregating building thermal loads are known to provide a potentially significant
resource for balancing purposes [34] and have been used as the primary resource for
many demand response strategies, including those that seek to use real-time prices
to continuously regulate loads based on their bids, as in so-called transactive control
systems. When field demonstrations of transactive control using real-time prices
were conducted [24], the results sometimes revealed significant tracking errors in the
discrete-time response of the aggregate load control. The cause of the error was found
to be bidding strategies that didn’t or couldn’t account for the thermostat hysteresis.
Compensated bidding strategies developed to address these problems did not fully
mitigate these tracking problems [25], in part because of the complexities accounting
for hysteresis. The hysteresis of standard thermostats not only requires a switched-
mode representation of the individual building thermal response, but also requires
so-called “refractory states”, meaning that states are locked in for a certain time
after being entered [84]. These locked states are associated with transition delays
rather than thermal parameters. Tractable state space models of aggregate loads can
be obtained using model-order reduction strategies that linearize the system model
and limit the number of state variables required to represent responsive loads [39, 40],
as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The rate at which devices turn on and off is determined
by (1) the rate τ˙ = ron and τ˙ = roff at which they respectively cross the hysteresis
band limits ∆τ + δ and ∆τ − δ, as well as (2) the rate at which the lockout times tmin
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Figure 4.1: State-space model of aggregate conventional thermostatic loads in heating
regime with refractory states n∗on and n
∗
off . ∆τ is the difference between the indoor
and outdoor temperatures and δ is the hysteresis band limit.
expire. Such state-space models minimally represent any thermostat with non-zero
deadband. However they also require model parameter identification to be used in
formulating bidding strategies.
An alternative thermostatic controller design strategy was proposed to overcome
these modeling issues while not compromising the advantages of hysteresis control of
thermal loads [85]. This thermostat design uses a discrete-time zero-deadband (Tδ0)
concept that has no refractory states and synchronizes the state transition times
with external signals such as those coming from real-time retail double-auctions. The
new thermostat provides significant fast-acting DR resources and the same comfort
and cost savings as conventional thermostats when operated under real-time price
tariffs. By using suitably selected sampling rates to limit fast-cycling of equipment,
Tδ0 thermostats were hypothesized to give rise to readily linearized aggregate load
models. However, the aggregate control of these loads has yet to be analyzed and
simulated in detail to resolve steady state control error issues and achieve utility-scale
functionality.
4.2 Aggregate Load Curtailment Model
In this section we develop a model of aggregate load when using Tδ0 thermostats and
propose a general controller design approach that will allow various aggregate load
control strategies to be explored.
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Figure 4.2: General state-space model of discrete-time zero-deadband aggregate ther-
mostatic loads.
4.2.1 Aggregate Load Model
The current standard practice for direct load control can be readily applied to discrete-
time thermostats when operating with zero deadband. When the sampling time
ts exceeds the minimum heating/cooling system refractory state time tmin we can
reduce the state-space model to a second-order model as follows. Because there is
no deadband we can ignore the refractory states n∗off and n
∗
on shown in Figure 4.1.
We then derive the aggregate load response using a discrete-time state-transition
representation for Tδ0 thermostats
non(k + 1) = (1− ρon)non(k) + ρoffnoff (k)
noff (k + 1) = ρonnon(k) + (1− ρoff )noff (k)
(4.1)
where k is given in units of the sampling interval ts, and ρoff is the rate at which
systems move out of the off state and ρon is the rate at which they move out of the on
state, which we derive from the population average properties of individual homes’
thermal responses.
We can now consider a discrete-time model, as shown in Figure 4.2, where the
states x1 = non and x2 = noff represent the number of responsive devices in the on
and off states, respectively. The time tmin is generally regarded to be in the range
of 1 to 2 minutes, so we cannot consider designs where ts < 1 minute without having
to reintroduce the refractory states in the model. The rate parameters ρon and ρoff
represent the fraction of those devices whose indoor air temperature τ crossed the
indoor temperature setpoint τD is any given interval ts. The rate parameters of the
discrete-time model are determined from how the thermostat setpoint threshold τD
divides the population occupying each state. We represent the rates at which devices
are added into (or removed from) the controlled device population from (or to) the
general uncontrolled device population by hu(k) =
[
h1
h2
]
u(k).
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From Equation (4.1) we develop a single-input/single-output demand response
system state space representation for the net change in scalar load y(k) < 0 based on
the scalar load control signal u(k) > 0
x(k + 1) =
[
1− ρon ρoff
ρon 1− ρoff
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
x(k) + h u(k)
y(k) = c x(k)
(4.2)
where G represents the state transition matrix for the population of thermostats, h
represents the aggregate load control input vector and c represents the aggregate load
output vector. In general the input vector h will be determined by the utility’s choice
of which control signals are sent to thermostats and how thermostats curtail loads.
The particulars of the output matrix c are determined by the nature of the response
that is of interest, e.g., total load reduced or increased, or net change in load.
In the case of residential thermostats, we compute the rates ρoff and ρon from
the population statistics of the rates ron and roff at which indoor air temperature
deviation ∆τ = τ − τD changes in a single home. The rates of change of temperature
deviation are determined from the second-order thermal response [86]
q(t) =
(
CACM
UM
)
τ¨ +
[
CA + CM
(
1 +
UA
UM
)]
τ˙ + UAτ (4.3)
where UA the thermal conductance of the indoor air to the outdoor air, CA is the
heat capacity of the indoor air, UM is the thermal conductance of the indoor air to
the building’s solid mass, and CM is the heat capacity of the building’s solid mass.
The heat function q(t) includes both the internal, solar and ventilation heat gains
and losses qI(t), as well as the heat gain or loss qH(t) resulting from operation of the
heating/cooling system. From this we can derive the rates
roff (t) = τ˙off = −UACA τA(t)−
UM
CA
τM(t) +
1
CA
qI(t)
ron(t) = τ˙on = roff +
1
CA
qH(t)
when the heating/cooling system is off and on, respectively. We assume that the
heating/cooling systems are sized appropriately so that roff (t) < 0 < ron(t) when
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Figure 4.3: Discrete-time heating thermostat transition probabililities for on and off
states with PDF of 106 homes with a setpoint change of −0.1◦F.
heating and ron(t) < 0 < roff (t) when cooling for all t. In the remainder of this
chapter we will consider only the heating case, with the understanding that the cooling
case is similar in every respect, with sign changes where appropriate.
The computation of ρon and ρoff is illustrated in Figure 4.3. We now assume
that immediately following a control action all the devices in a particular state can
be inscribed in a rectangle, the horizontal dimension of which covers the range of
indoor air temperatures τ and the vertical dimension of which covers the range of its
derivative r = τ˙ . The mean rates of devices during the interval k to k+1 are denoted
r¯on(k) and r¯off (k). Device operating at the lowest rate are denoted r¯on(k)− 3σon(k)
and r¯off (k)− 3σoff (k) where σon(k) and σoff (k) are the standard deviations of rates
ron(k) and roff (k), respectively. These devices have a lower probability of crossing
the setpoint threshold τD than ones running at the highest rates r¯on(k) + 3σon(k) and
r¯off (k) + 3σoff . We assume that the distribution of devices within the rectangle has
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virtually zero skew and we further assume that very nearly all of the device rates
in the population fall within the ranges r¯ ± 3σ for both the on and off states. The
zero skew assumption may not be reasonable for large changes in setpoint, but such
consideration is beyond the scope of this chapter. In addition we assume that 3σ < r¯
for both the on and off states, a condition which is expected to be satisfied because
we assume that the devices are suitably oversized for their applications, as is the
common practice.
Two distinct cases must be considered depending on whether all the faster devices
cross the τD threshold. In the first case (shown for the on state in Figure 4.3) only
the devices in the blue region ρoff will transition to the off state. We also know
that the fastest devices in the complementary mode will overshoot no further than
τoff (k + 1) = τD + r¯on(k) + 3σon(k). From this we can define the probabilities of
devices transitioning out of the off and on states as
ρoff =
r¯off
r¯on + 3σon
∨ 1 and ρon = r¯on
r¯off + 3σoff
∨ 1
respectively, where ∨1 denotes the unity saturation limit for the fraction of devices
that can transition from a particular state during a single time interval ts.
In the second case (shown for the off state in Figure 4.3) the devices in the red
region ρon will transition to the on state. In this fast transition case we have
ρ′off = 1−
3 σoff
4 r¯off
and ρ′on = 1−
3 σon
4 r¯on
where the different form arises from the truncation of region B as compared to region
A. The choice of which value of ρ to use is based on which state has the faster devices,
which can vary dramatically with outdoor air temperature and heating/cooling system
performance. When r¯on > r¯off , then ρ
′
on and ρoff are used, and when r¯on < r¯off ,
then ρ′off and ρon are used.
Note that consequently the values of ρon and ρoff arise from the aggregate behavior
of the populations of devices whose temperatures move at the rates ron and roff with
variances σ2on and σ
2
off , respectively.
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Table 4.1: House thermal parameters.
Parameter Unit −3σ Mean +3σ
UA [BTU/
◦F.h] 200 350 500
CA [BTU/
◦F] 1551 2000 2449
UM [BTU/
◦F.h] 503 2000 3497
CM [BTU/
◦F] 7007 10000 12994
TS [
◦F] 69 72 75
QH [BTU/h] 2764 11552 20340
4.2.2 Load Control Model
The basic “one-shot” load curtailment control strategy that is typically implemented
by utilities can be described using Equation (4.2) with h =
[
0
1
]
and c =
[
0 1
]
. Such
strategies turn off u(0) devices that are on, after which we observe by how many
devices the load has reduced. Given knowledge of the average kW load Q¯ per device,
these quantities can be given in kW if desired. We obtain the pulse transfer function
for the “one-shot” load curtailment when discrete-time zero-deadband thermostats
are employed:
Y (z)
U(z)
=
(z − b)
(z − 1)(z − a) (4.4)
where a = 1− ρoff − ρon and b = 1− ρon. We make the following observations about
this system.
1. The system is marginally stable. The dominant non-integrating pole is stable
because 0 < {ρoff , ρon} < 1 =⇒ −1 < a < 1.
2. The system has a minimum-phase because 0 < ρon < 1 =⇒ 0 < b < 1.
3. The dominant pole is always to the left of the zero because 0 < {ρoff , ρon} <
1 =⇒ a < b.
The relationship of the pole to the zero for various outdoor temperature condi-
tions can be obtained using house thermal parameters such as the ones presented in
Table 4.1. For the values of Table 4.1 the results are illustrated in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Zero and pole locations of Equation (4.4) for a random population of
1 million homes with thermal parameters given in Table IV at various outdoor air
temperatures.
4.2.3 Open-Loop Response
The impulse response of the open loop system, Equation (4.4), for an impulse u(0) = 1
is :
y(k) =
1− b+ (a− b)ak−2
1− a for k = 1, 2, 3, · · · (4.5)
with y(0) = 0, which will always be the response of a “one-shot” load curtailment
signal when the loads are controlled by discrete-time thermostats with no deadband.
The steady state response is
y(∞) = ρon
ρoff + ρon
which we observe is the population average duty cycle R and is independent of u(k)
for k > 0 provided that
∑∞
j=0 u(j) > 0. We also note that any signal u(k) > 0 will
add more devices to the controlled population while u(k) < 0 will remove devices
from the controlled population. For any k > 0 we only require u(k) = −∑k−1j=0 u(j)
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Figure 4.5: Open loop impulse (left), decay (center), and step (right) response of
aggregate load model compared to agent-based simulation for 100,000 thermostats
per unit input u at -10◦C.
to return to the initial condition x(0) and when
∑∞
j=0 u(j) = 0, we will always have
y(∞) = cx(0). The model responses to various inputs are compared to simulations
with 100,000 thermostats using an agent-based simulation. The results illustrated in
Figure 4.5.
4.2.4 Model Identification
The performance of a utility-scale implementation of aggregate load controllers to be
designed in the next section depends on the estimation accuracy of model parameters
ρon and ρoff . Values for these parameters can be obtained by comparing the response
to an impulse input with Equation (4.5). We can show that the responses at k = 2
and 3 are sufficient to give an estimate for the observer parameters.
A single impulse response can be used to provide a relatively quick and simple
method of model parameter identification. After a single impulse u(0) and initial
conditions xˆ(0) =
[
0
0
]
, the system’s initial response is observed to be xˆ(1) =
[
0
y(1)
]
.
After a second time-step, the system is observed to be in the state xˆ(2) =
[
x1(2)
y(2)
]
.
Given Equation (4.1) we can estimate
ρˆoff = 1− y(2)
u(0)
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and similarly after a third observation y(3) is obtained we estimate
ρˆon =
y(3)− [y(2)]2
u(0)
u(0)− y(2) .
This method of estimating the model parameters makes two assumptions that must
be considered:
1. The initial conditions are xˆ(0) = 0. This condition is achieved by releasing
all the devices currently under control and waiting for the normal settling time
of controlled devices to elapse to ensure that the uncontrolled population is
roughly in both state and thermal equilibrium.
2. Only a single control impulse u(0) is sent at time k = 0 and then no control
signals u(k) for k = 1, 2, 3, · · · are sent so the impulse response can be clearly
discerned in the outputs y(2) and y(3).
These conditions are relatively easy to create and the impulse u(0) need not be
large to obtain useful measurements, particularly if the test is repeated multiple times
for each outdoor air temperature. Using this method a database of model parameters
can be obtained and used to estimate model statistics as well. Furthermore, the
magnitude y(1) will give an estimate of the product hc, while observation of y(4)
permits the estimation of h and c separately, if needed.
Finally, it is not necessary to probe the system response at all outdoor conditions
because the relationship of a and b is well known, particularly for infrequent peak
load conditions that can be more difficult to observe. The linear relationship of a
and b over the range of low outdoor air temperatures is seen in Figure 4.4 and allows
reliable extrapolation from more frequent conditions to more rarely observed and
more critical peak load conditions.
In the likely case that measurement noise is present, a mean square approximation
of these parameters may be considered by producing a series of impulses spaced apart
by a sufficient interval to guarantee that Assumption (1) above is satisfied. Under
high duty-cycle conditions, the linear relationship of the zero and pole assures that
varying conditions are not an obstacle to determining the slope of the line that relates
them using a least-squares fit.
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4.3 Aggregate Demand Response Controller De-
sign
In the previous section we proposed an aggregate load model and discussed its main
open-loop properties. It is important to this study that we examine the typical
range of control strategies suited to direct dispatch of demand response resources
and assess the degree to which these strategies work satisfactorily for aggregations
of Tδ0 thermostats. Therefore, in this section we examine various controller designs,
all of which are variations implemented on the general controller design shown in
Figure 4.6. The controller design parameters for this general controller are as follows:
• h is the system input vector for the response to the scalar signal u(k). This is
generally a curtailment signal and indicates how many devices are turned off.
• c is the system output vector for the scalar load y(k) arising from the internal
states x(k).
• h˜ is the observer input vector.
• c˜ is the observer output vector.
• h is the scalar reference input gain.
• Kc is the observer gain vector.
• Kq is the integral error feedback gain scalar.
The flexible design of controller allows for many of the basic control strategies
that are typically employed for discrete-time linear time-invariant system. This is
done with the understanding that some of the parameters may change over time
intervals much longer than the time horizon over which most demand response control
objectives are stipulated. In particular it is expected that the state transition rates
ρon and ρoff will change as a function of outdoor air temperature, but that the
relationship will be relatively easy to obtain for the aggregate population and that
it will be sufficiently consistent between seasons to allow simple system identification
approaches to provide accurate long term model parameters. A simple method of
identifying these parameters was discussed in the previous section.
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Figure 4.6: General structure of the controller (top): Block (A) is the aggregate load
model, (B) is the reduced-order observer, (C) is the load controller, and (D) is the
integral error feedback.
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Table 4.2: Controller design configurations.
Observer Controller Error feedback
Configuration h˜ c˜ Kc h Kq
Proportional
[
0
0
] [
0 1
]
[
0 ρon +
1
2
ρoff
]
0 ρon +
1
2
ρoff
Unity damping
[
1
0
] [
0 1
] [
ρˆon 1− ρˆon − ρˆoff
]
1− ρˆon − ρˆoff 0
Deadbeat
[
1
0
] [−1 1] See Eq. (4.7) See Eq. (4.8) 0
Pole placement
[
1
0
] [−1 1] See Eq. (4.9) See Eq. (4.10) 0
Integral error feedback
[
1
0
] [−1 1] See Eq. (4.11) See Eq. (4.12) See Eq. (4.11)
×1×a ◦b
ρoff ρon
Figure 4.7: Discrete-time root-locus of aggregate Tδ0 thermostatic loads.
4.3.1 Proportional Control
We can now consider the behavior of proportional control by examining the root
locus of the closed-loop system. With −1 < a < b < 1, the root-locus in Figure 4.7
indicates that the system has two real poles and a zero that is always between the
poles.
Since the open-loop system in Equation (4.4) has a discrete integrator, the steady
state error for a step input is zero. Unfortunately, numerical methods do not find
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Table 4.3: Maximum attenuating proportional control gains for various conditions.
Temperature Load Gain Zero Dominant pole Gain margin
[◦C] [% peak] K [/h] [/h] [dB]
-15 79 0.45 0.78 0.93 3.1
-10 70 0.40 0.66 0.91 3.9
-5 61 0.20 0.49 0.93 11.1
0 33 0.70 0.30 0.65 0.8
5 25 0.80 0.27 0.56 0.3
10 17 0.85 0.26 0.49 0.6
15 10 0.90 0.24 0.41 0.6
values of K with acceptable phase and gain margins. However, gains can be found for
the fastest possible attenuation for various outdoor conditions, as shown in Table 4.3.
The Jury-Marden test gives us the stability constraint on the closed-loop gain
ρon < K < ρoff + ρon
which can be a very narrow range and highly dependent on accurate knowledge of
the value of ρon, particularly when ρoff is small. Small values of K may lead to
slow response under certain conditions. PID control can yield a stable aggregate load
controller under conditions we expect to encounter in a realistic utility operational
setting. However, the response can also be somewhat oscillatory under higher load
conditions, when both fast and reliable aggregate load control is most needed, as
shown in Figure 4.8 (left). The narrow band of constraints on K limit at high loading
conditions limits the possibility of improving performance to such an extent that
proportional control seems largely impractical for direct load control. Indeed at peak
load only marginally stable control can be achieved when K = ρon.
4.3.2 Proportional-Derivative Control
Faster response than proportional control is often achieved by using a proportional
derivative controller such that
Gpd(z) =
(z − b)(k1z + k2)
(z − 1)(z − a)
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Figure 4.8: 100 MW proportional load control step response with maximum attenu-
ating proportional control gains based on the load parameters in Table 4.1 (left) and
proportional-derivative control step response (right).
Table 4.4: Proportional-derivative controller design parameters.
TO k1 kd z1 z2 p1 p2
-15 9.94 4.38 0.78 -0.44 0.80 -0.40
-10 9.95 4.38 0.66 -0.44 0.68 -0.41
-5 9.95 4.38 0.49 -0.44 0.54 -0.42
0 10.52 4.63 -0.44 0.30 -0.38 0.33
5 10.66 4.69 -0.44 0.27 -0.36 0.30
10 10.77 4.74 -0.44 0.26 -0.35 0.27
15 10.87 4.79 -0.44 0.24 -0.33 0.25
Solving for the fastest possible response with zero poles we obtain
k1 =
a
b2
− a
b
− 1
b
and k2 =
a
b
However, the stability margin of the system is not suitable for operation in noisy
conditions.
Using pole placement for damping ξ = 0.8 and settling time ts = 1 hour, as shown
in Table 4.4, does not offer improvements in the system’s stability characteristics
in spite of satisfactory time-domain response to step inputs, as shown in Figure 4.8
(right).
Lead and/or lag compensator design for the wide variety of conditions that the
controller is required to operate under would require an adaptive controller and was
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not considered here.
4.3.3 Unity Damped Control
We can design a direct aggregate load control strategy for Tδ0 thermostats that will
maintain a constant desired load curtailment r(k) > 0 for k > 0, assuming that
y(0) = r(0) = 0. We desire only that
y(k) = r(k) for k = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
which gives us
u(k) = (ch)−1[y(k)− r(k) + c(I−G)xˆ(k)] for k = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
where G is the state transition matrix for the population of thermostats and xˆ(k) is
an estimate of x(k).
For any curtailment control system the accumulated inputs from u(0) to u(k− 1)
represents the total number of devices N that have been curtailed up to the time k.
So xˆ2(k) = y(k) represents the load that is still off at the time k. Therefore we must
have
xˆ1(k) =
k−1∑
j=0
u(j)− y(k) for k = 1, 2, 3, · · · ,
which represents the load that has returned to the on state at the time k. This gives
us the estimated state
xˆ(k) =
[∑k−1
j=0 u(j)− y(k)
y(k)
]
for k = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
This state can be found from the input u(k) and output y(k) using a reduced order
observer described by:
xˆ(k) = b˜
k∑
j=0
bu(k) + c˜ y(k) for k = 1, 2, 3, · · ·
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Figure 4.9: Unity damped system diagram.
Figure 4.10: Unity damped (left) and deadbeat (right) responses of aggregate load
controllers.
where b˜ =
[
0
1
]
and c˜ =
[
1
−1
]
. From this we can determine the load control signal:
u(k) = r(k)− aˆy(k)− (1− bˆ)
k−1∑
j=0
u(j) for k = 1, 2, 3, · · · , (4.6)
where aˆ = (1− ρˆoff− ρˆon) and bˆ = 1− ρˆon with ρˆoff and ρˆon being the estimates of the
aggregate load response. This controller can be implemented as shown in Figure 4.9
with cˆ = 1
1+ρˆon
and dˆ = ρˆon
1+ρˆon
. We observe that 0 < dˆ < 0.5 < cˆ < 1. Thus the added
pole is stable and the added zero does not affect the minimum phase property of the
system. We note that this controller should reach steady state on the first iteration
and thus has a damping ratio of 1.0 and settling time of ts, as shown in Figure 4.10
(left).
The introduction into the system of model parameters cˆ and dˆ creates a source
of constant disturbances in the system that can result in a steady state error. This
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problem limits general applicability of this controller design unless integral error feed-
back control is used. An alternative approach to mitigate model error is to include
information obtained directly from controllable devices. This would be the case if
bidding mechanisms are used, such as when retail markets are implemented using
double auctions [36, 24, 25].
4.3.4 Deadbeat Control
An alternative type of controller is a deadbeat controller that uses only two load
control impulses to achieve steady state [87]. The controller has the advantage that
it does not continually draw on the uncontrolled population of devices to achieve
the control objective. It has the disadvantage that it may overshoot on the second
time-step, as shown in Figure 4.10 (right).
The state xˆ(k) and output y(k) are determined using the matrices
h˜ =
[
(1−bˆ)z
z−1
0
]
and c˜ =
[
0
aˆ
]
We solve for the feedback gain for zero poles using
K =
[
aˆ+ 1 −aˆ
]
A˜
−T
C−1 (4.7)
where A˜ =
[
1 0
ρˆon + ρˆoff − 2 1
]
is a Toeplitz matrix and C =
[
0 ρˆoff
1 1− ρˆoff
]
is the
controllability matrix. The tracking reference input gain is
h =
1
c(I−A + hK)−1h (4.8)
4.3.5 Pole Placement Control
In the general case of a pole-placement controller [87], we have the same controlla-
bility matrix and Toeplitz matrix as the deadbeat controller above. Given a desired
damping coefficient ξ and settling time t we compute the desired pole locations z1
and z2 and we obtain the tuned controller gains
Kc =
[
ρˆon[ρˆoff + ρˆon(1 + z1 + z2)] + z1z2 − z1 − z2 − 1
−ρˆoff − ρˆon − z1 − z2
]T
(4.9)
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and
h =
z1z2 − z1 − z2 − 1
ρˆon
(4.10)
As in the case of unity-damped and deadbeat controllers, any error in ρˆon and ρˆoff is
expected to result in a steady state error.
The performance of the five different controllers discussed in this section depends
on the accuracy of the estimated system parameters ρon and ρoff . If these are not suf-
ficiently accurate, this may lead to unacceptably large steady-state errors. Assuming
that the values of the system parameters change more slowly than the time constants
of the system, steady-state error can be mitigated using an integral error feedback
controller. The design of such a controller is discussed next.
4.3.6 Integral Error Feedback
To correct for the steady state error in the pole-placement controller we implement
integral error feedback using an augmented state
q(k + 1) = q(k) + ts[r(k)− y(k)].
We include the integral feedback error in the state-space representation using the
augmented controllability matrix
C =
0 ρoff 01 1− ρoff 0
0 −ts 1

and the characteristic polynomial is a(z) = (z − 1)2(z − a) or
a(z) = z3 − (a+ 2)z2 + (2a+ 1)z − a
The augmented Toeplitz matrix is therefore
A˜ =
 1 0 0ρoff + ρon − 3 1 0
2ρoff + 2ρˆon − 3 ρoff + ρon − 3 1
 .
The desired characteristic polynomial is simply α(z) = (z − z1)(z − z2)(z − zq)
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where z1, z2, and zq are the desired poles of the closed-loop system. Thus we have
α(z) = z3 − (z1 + z2 + zq)z2 + (z1z2 + z1zq + z2z1)z − (z1z2zq)
from which we obtain controller gains based on the estimated model
[
Kc Kq
]
=
 ρˆon + ρˆoff − 3− z1 − z2 − zqz1z2 + z1zq + z2zq − 3 + 2ρˆon + 2ρˆoff
1− ρˆon − ρˆoff − z1z2zq

T
A˜
−T
C−1 (4.11)
with the reference input gain
h =
1
z1z2 + z1zq + z2zq + 2ρˆon + ρˆoff − 3 (4.12)
This control design eliminates the steady-state error induced by model errors in ρˆon
and ρˆoff with a settling time determined by the pole zq.
4.4 Agent-based Simulation Results
The controller designs were tested on an agent-based simulation [88] of 100,000 resi-
dential thermostats using a second-order building thermal model, including internal
and solar gains, and ventilation losses. (The thermal properties of these loads are
given in Table C.1.) The second order models are linearized for the given outdoor
temperature resulting in first-order models for each house such that the individual
homes have distinct air temperature change rates as a function of the state of the
heating system. Note that the thermal model used in the agent-based simulation pre-
sented in this section is not an aggregate model as the one used for controller design
in the previous section. This allows the performance of the controllers designed in
the previous section to be evaluated using a plant model which better reflects reality.
Therefore, the effects of disturbances caused by errors arising from model order re-
duction of the design model as well as measurement noise are considered. The results
of the PDF model estimates are given in Table D.1.
To implement direct load control, thermostat setpoint changes are applied to a
subset of uncurtailed heating units. The magnitude of the setpoint change is generally
a function of the fastest rate of change, which at peak load is approximately roff .
The magnitude of this value was chosen to ensure that the impulse response resulted
55
Table 4.5: Controller design parameters for peak load (−15oC).
Control Poles Gains Errors
Kc Kq h Average Maximum
Impulse [0] [0.00 0.00] 0.09 0.00 69% 71%
Proportional [0] [0.00 0.31] 0.09 0.31 44% 87%
Damped [0.72] [0.09 0.46] 0.09 0.91 18% 61%
Deadbeat [0.72] [0.28 1.46] 0.09 2.93 35% 40%
Pole placement [0.43] [0.60 0.59] 0.09 3.67 84% 92%
Integral [0 0.72] [−0.30 1.61] 0.09 1.00 13% 41%
in a 100% response at the first time step. The number of homes curtailed is based on
the average heating system load when on such that u(k) = 1 is equivalent to 1 MW
of load, or approximately NC = 10
6/Q¯, where Q¯ is the mean value of the heating unit
load Q = qH/COP , where COP is the heating unit efficiency.
When a negative value of u(k) is obtained, units are released into the uncurtailed
population. The simulation first releases systems that have been curtailed the longest,
ensuring that the released population is the most diversified and exhibits the least
rebound oscillation after returning to the uncurtailed population.
The controller design parameters discussed in Section 4.3 are generated for peak
load conditions using the thermal parameters shown in Table 4.1. A summary of the
controller design parameters studied are shown in Table 4.5.
The impulse response for τO = −15◦C is shown in Figure 4.11 (left). The response
is different from the one expected from the aggregate model and illustrates the effect
of the errors and noise induced by state fluctuations in the system which are not
captured by the second-order aggregate load model. Further, the steady-state of the
response and the settling time for the devices to reach their normal diversity are also
indicated. The proportional control response does not have a steady state error, but
this is not clearly visible because of the very slow response, as shown in Figure 4.11
(right).
The response of the unity damping controller is shown in Figure 4.12 (left). The
effect of model error can be seen in the initial response, as a result of which it fails
to quickly achieve the desired level of curtailment. The response of deadbeat control
has the expected significant overshoot, but also exhibits large steady state error, as
shown in Figure 4.12 (right).
The response of the tuned controller using pole placement shows a compromise
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Figure 4.11: 100 MW impulse response (left) and proportional control (right) at
−15◦C.
Figure 4.12: 100 MW unity damping load control (left) and deadbeat load control
(right) at −15◦C.
between the unity damping and deadbeat controller designs, but still exhibits a large
steady state error, as shown in Figure 4.13 (left). The integral error feedback control
response shown in Figure 4.13 (right) addresses the problems identified in the previous
controller designs. The system exhibits an acceptable level of overshoot and maintains
the desired curtailment level for more than 90 minutes.
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Figure 4.13: 100 MW tuned load control (left) and integral feedback control (right)
at −15◦C.
4.5 Summary of Results
In this chapter we considered the utility-scale direct load control problem for the
situation when the controlled loads employ discrete-time zero-deadband (Tδ0) resi-
dential thermostats. We have shown how Tδ0 thermostats allow utility dispatchers
to use small adjustments to the consumer’s setpoint to modulate the total load with
greater precision and endurance than typically possible using current setback control
of thermostats with non-zero deadbands. These new digital thermostats can serve
as the basis for highly accurate direct load control systems, as well as price-based
indirect load control systems.
We have derived a new linear aggregate load model based on the dynamics of load
states and used its fundamental characteristics to considers a number of benchmark
aggregate load control designs from first-principles. We used this model to design
a simple closed-loop aggregate controller for a discrete-time utility-scale demand re-
sponse dispatch system that is compatible with the requirements for both direct and
indirect load control systems and tested the control design using a large-scale agent-
based model of demand response based on thermostatic loads. We showed that the
aggregate controlled load is stable, controllable and observable and exhibits both
the transient and steady-state response characteristics necessary to serve equally well
for utilities that seek to control load using either direct load control or price-based
indirect demand response strategies.
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Chapter 5
Regulation
Under the transactive control paradigm, retail markets for energy, capacity, and reg-
ulation services are deployed to provide an analogous realization of wholesale markets
at the distribution level. In spite of the conceptual similarity, the behavior of retail
markets differs significantly from that of wholesale markets and remains an active
area of research [89]. In particular, load behavior usually dominates the behavior of
retail systems, which contrasts with wholesale systems where generation is dominant.
In addition, there are a number of important processes in bulk power interconnec-
tion operations that have yet to be integrated fully into the transactive paradigm.
Two such processes are system frequency regulation and control area import/export
schedule tracking.
In Section 5.1 we introduce the interconnection operation control platform. We
then present the methodology for optimally controlling an area’s response to system
frequency deviations while tracking scheduled area exports. In Section 5.2 we propose
the structure of the model and the design solution for an optimal area control policy.
Finally in Section 5.3 we evaluate the performance of the optimal control policy
when compared to the conventional control policy under varying demand response
conditions.
5.1 Methodology
System operators that wish to use demand response resources to mitigate renewable
intermittency must have the means to control responsive loads in much the same
way they control responsive generating units. This can be done by updating the load
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control system gains every few minutes given the available demand response resources
committed to frequency regulation. Given these load control gain settings, the loads’
responses to frequency deviations can be autonomous without requiring the use of an
analog to AGC for loads.
It is quite feasible with today’s technology to dispatch load control gain settings
to load aggregators who then disseminate specific setpoints to the loads they control
without having to dispatch AGC signals to each load directly. However, doing so
requires adjustments to the existing frequency and inter-area power exchange control
system. This section details how this is accomplished within the structure of modern
power system control.
5.1.1 Frequency control mechanism
Primary control of bulk electric power systems is driven in part by deviations in fre-
quency at the system level and modeled by the system transfer function 1
Ms+D
, where
M represents the system’s inertial response and D represent the system’s damping
response. Each control area implements a combination of speed-droop control on
conventional generating units, under-frequency load shedding, and grid-friendly loads
to provide primary control. Renewable generating units provide no frequency regu-
lation capability because they cannot control their prime movers (wind and solar).
Secondary control of frequency and area exports is provided by units equipped with
master controllers and is based on the area control signal a using the conventional
ACE formula
A(t) = ∆Q(t) +B∆f(t), (5.1)
where A(t) is the raw ACE signal, ∆Q(t) = Q(t) − Qs is the deviation of the net
energy exported from the scheduled net exports over tie lines and ∆f(t) = f(t)− fs
is the interconnection’s frequency deviation from scheduled frequency. If an area’s
net exports deviates from its schedule (because of either an internal or external dis-
turbance), the area adjusts its generation (and potentially also its load) such that it
eventually will zero out A(t), while also providing adjustments necessary to support
system-wide corrections to frequency deviation.
In most realizations the ACE signal is updated by the SCADA system about every
4 seconds and further passed through a smoothing filter so that it changes with a time-
constant well in excess of the generating units’ fastest response, e.g., 30-90 seconds,
with the purpose of reducing wear and tear on generating unit governor motors and
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Figure 5.1: System frequency control diagram.
turbine valves [90]. In addition, this control action is subject to control performance
standards (i.e., CPS-1 and CPS-2 [91]), although these are not considered in this
study.
The fast response of frequency-sensitive loads (grid-friendly smart appliances)
to the frequency deviation enables the grid operator to redispatch generating units
in a more economically-efficient manner, although demand response may saturate
relatively quickly. Figure 5.1 illustrates the system’s frequency regulation diagram
with variable renewable generation and frequency sensitive demand response.
5.1.2 Transactive control platform
As noted in Chapter 2, Fuller’s definition of Transactive Control does not specify
any particular physical or temporal control architecture. We chose the hierarchy
illustrated in Figure 2.3 because it provides a relatively simple data flow between
physical and temporal scales. Using this approach, the total generation and load is
scheduled hourly such that for each control area a uniform price is obtained at which
supply is equal to load plus net exports. Figure 5.2 illustrates an interconnection
including N wholesale markets each belongs to a control area that exchange electricity
through system tielines to increase the economic surplus. This schedule is used to
set each area’s price Ps and net exports Qs which are in turn used by 5-minute
dispatch markets [24] to reallocate resources in response to deviations from the hourly
schedule. Depending on the events that have occurred during the preceding 5-minute
time period, the state of operation of generators and loads at the end of the period
is not necessarily the same as at the beginning of the period. For example, the water
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Figure 5.2: Inter-area transfer flows within an interconnected system consisting of N
control areas.
temperature of a hot water tank whose heater was switched off at the last time period
has lowered, and we expect this load might submit a higher bid to the market to avoid
staying in the off mode and satisfy a higher level of demand urgency. Accordingly,
generation and load resources may participate in the market with new bid prices, and
as a result the clearing price PD would change. However, the area export ea should
remain as close as possible to the hourly schedule.
5.1.3 Demand response integration in the 5-minute market
Figure 5.3 illustrates the impact of a supply disturbance on the 5-minute market
settlement process. The blue and the red dashed curves represent the demand and
the supply curves, respectively, in the next market cycle. In this example a portion of
renewable generation (in the flat segment of supply curve) is lost and the supply curve
is shifted to left by the magnitude of the disturbance ∆Qs
1. Load participation in
1Other kinds of disturbances include non-renewable generation loss or changes in load, and these
will have similar impact with only particular details differing. The choice of renewable generation
loss is preferred in this study because (1) it is a common concern for which demand response is
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Figure 5.3: Five-minute resource dispatch with supply (red) and demand (blue) re-
sponse to a loss of generation (∆Qs).
frequency response prior to the redispatch operation causes the shape of the demand
curve to change slightly and present only the remaining available demand response
to the next 5-minute redispatch market. Moving from the market k to the market
k+1, the clearing price increases from PD(k) to PD(k+1) so that the dispatched load
changes by Q˙d(k) = Qd(k+1)−Qd(k) = (1−α)∆Qs(k) and the dispatched generation
changes by Q˙s(k) = Qs(k + 1)−Qs(k) = −α∆Qs(k) where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 to satisfy the
physical constraint that Q˙s(k)− Q˙d(k) = −∆Qs(k) or Qd(k + 1) = Qd(k) = es.
To respond efficiently to a frequency deviation, generation units must change their
output by Q˙s(k) as their contribution to restoring the area’s export power to the
committed hourly-scheduled level, as shown in Figure 5.4. Concurrently load must
change demand by Q˙d(k) as its contribution to efficiently restoring system frequency.
The export power error at the time t is ∆Q(t) = Q(t) − Qd(ktd) = ∆Qs(ktd) +
Qs(t) − Qd(t). The economically optimal response is that for which the marginal
cost of the generation response is equal to the marginal cost of the demand response.
We compute the regulation response price, P (t) to quantify the marginal cost of
deviations from the hourly schedule in real time:
P (t) = PD(ktd) +
s(ktd) d(ktd)
d(ktd)− s(ktd)∆Q(t).
often cited as a potential solution, and (2) it provides a clearer illustration of the various effects on
transactive system behavior.
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Figure 5.4: Real-time response of generation and load to a disturbance.
where s(ktd) and d(ktd) are the slopes of the generation supply and load demand
curves at the time of dispatch ktd, respectively, for the redispatch exports Qd(ktd)
for the next 5 minutes, and Q(t) is the actual exports at the time t. In the 5-minute
dispatch market k, Qd(k), s(k) > 0 and d(k) < 0 are updated every 5-minutes.
At the system level a deviation in net power will be associated with a deviation
in frequency as well, regardless of whether the power deviation is endogenous to the
local control area. For this reason we incorporate two additional cost components,
one for the frequency deviation itself and the other for the control response arising
from the ACE signal. The net cost taken over the entire system is zero in the sense
that the payments made to areas mitigating a deviation are equal to payments by the
areas contributing to it.
The total balance of payments is∫ 300
0
PD[∆Q(t) +B∆f(t)]− P (t)[A(t)−∆Qs(t)]dt, (5.2)
where P (t) is the cost of the over/under-response to the ACE signal A(t) as a result
of the disturbance ∆Qs(t). The value of P (t) will depend on the mix of generation
(e.g., hydro, coal, nuclear, combine cycle gas turbine) that responds to the ACE
signal. Any non-zero payments by any party represents a deviation from the surplus-
maximizing condition represented by the schedule and therefore represents a loss of
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Figure 5.5: Standard system for H2-optimal control synthesis
surplus. Our objective then is to minimize these payments by expressing them as a
weighted squared sum of the three cost components, Bf , p, and P (t)(a−∆Qs)/PD.
This 2-norm minimization in the wake of a generation contingency of magnitude ∆Qs
is expressed by the objective
min
A(t)
∫ 300
0
ω1[∆f(t)]
2 + ω2∆
2
e(t) + ω3 (A(t)−∆Qs(t))2 dt. (5.3)
where ω1 = B, ω2 = 1 and ω3 =
P (t)
PD
.
When this objective is satisfied, we can be assured that we have also maximized the
total surplus given the prevailing conditions: by minimizing the individual payments
or receipts on both sides of the balance of payments we have minimized the deviation
from the surplus-maximizing schedule and therefore minimized the surplus loss due
to regulation.
5.1.4 H2-optimal control policy
We now have the conditions necessary to synthesize the H2-optimal control policy
for a control area that minimizes the costs associated with operating the system as
it returns to the scheduled set-point, including frequency regulation in the presence
of FADR resources. We require the individual component models within the control
area used to synthesize the optimal control policy.
We now introduce the state-space solution of the H2-optimal control problem [92].
We consider the standard control system in Figure 5.5 and we partition of the plant
G according to [
z
y
]
=
[
G11 G12
G21 G22
][
v
u
]
.
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The closed-loop system has the transfer function
z = F (G,K)v
where F (G,K) = G11 +G12(I −KG22)−1 +KG21. The H2-optimal control problem
consists of finding the causal controller K that stabilizes the plant G while minimizing
the cost function
J2(K) = ||F (G,K)||22
where ||F (G,K)||2 is the H2 norm of the transfer function from v to z.
To obtain this transfer function we begin with non-dispatchable generation, pri-
marily wind and solar resources. These resources do not contribute to either droop
or ACE-control responses and have null responses to both frequency and ACE sig-
nal. The fraction of non-dispatchable generation in the study area is denoted Fw and
for the design case we will use 75% renewable resource penetration to exemplify an
extreme situation.
The thermal generating unit response to the filtered area generation control signal
as is given by the simplified transfer function [90]
Gr(s) =
gˆr(s)
aˆs(s)
=
1
(1 + sTg)(1 + sTch)
, (5.4a)
where gˆr is the thermal unit’s output, Tg is the governor time constant and Tch is the
time constant of the steam chest. Typical values for steam turbine units are [90]
Tch = 0.3 sec and Tg = 0.2 sec,
which gives the ACE-controlled generation response transfer function
Gr(s) =
16.7
(s+ 5.00)(s+ 3.33)
. (5.4b)
The fraction of units that respond to the area generation control signal is denoted Fr
which is set to 25% for the design case. All dispatchable units that do not respond
to the area control error are provided with droop response such that [90]
Gd(s) =
gˆd(s)
fˆ(s)
=
1
R
Gr(s), (5.4c)
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where gˆd is the droop-controlled unit’s output and R = −0.05 is the conventional
frequency droop response of generating units. Given that we have selected a design
case with the extreme of 75% renewable generation, we expect the number of droop
units to be zero and this component is omitted from the design case model.
The filtered area generation control signal as is computed by sending the raw ACE
signal through a low pass filter F to avoid excessive actuation of the regulating units.
For the purposes of this study the values
B = 21 and F (s) =
1
1 + sTf
, (5.4d)
are used with Tf = 0.02 seconds.
Based on data obtained from field tests [48], the conventional grid-friendly con-
trol response exhibits two important behaviors. The first behavior is the primary
underfrequency event response, which acts like a strong derivative response reaching
maximum within a few seconds followed by a very slow recovery using integral error
feedback over a period of a minute or more. These are approximated satisfactorily
using the demand response transfer function
L(s) =
lˆ(s)
fˆ(s)
=
FdKds+Kp
Tls2 + s+Kl
, (5.4e)
where lˆ is the load response, Fd is the fraction of total load that is responsive, and
for the design condition Kd = 1/Fd is the fraction of responsive load that is armed
by the 5-minute redispatch2, and Kp is the quasi-steady state rebound response. The
derivative response time constant Tl = 0.17 seconds and the recovery time constant
Kl = 0.01 per second are based on the responses observed in the grid-friendly con-
trollers studied in the Olympic test [48]. This gives us
L(s) =
59s
(s+ 5.8)(s+ 0.1)
, (5.4f)
as the general fast-acting demand response transfer function. The response of the
loads is initially very fast and very strong, but it decays within a few minutes, and it
is therefore minimally described as a second-order response with derivative control.
The rebound response Kp is excluded in this model because it is expected to be
2Note KDFD is unity at 5% DR but when FD is changed KD is not changed.
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addressed by the redispatch operation after a maximum of 5 minutes. The load
response is therefore not net-energy neutral over the 5-minute period. This allows us
to suppress the non-minimum phase behavior that can emerge from thermostatic loads
when their curtailment signal is released and they settle into a higher load condition
for a prolonged demand response rebound period. For the controller design condition
we use 5% controllable load resources, but the total demand response availability is
varied from 0% to 50% for the control robustness analysis below.
The interconnected system’s overall response to net power deviations is given by
the damped inertial response transfer function
H(s) =
fˆ(s)
Qˆ(s)
=
1
Ms+D
, (5.4g)
where Qˆ is the response of all system generator output power, D = 1 is a typical
value for the load damping constant, and M = 6 is a typical value for the system
with somewhat low inertia [90].
Figure 5.6 illustrates the system. Each control area is modeled with: (1) loads L
controlled by frequency through the controller KL/R; (2) frequency droop generators
Gd controlled by the droop gain KG/R, and (3) ACE-controlled generators using the
controller K which we will design. The ACE input to the controller K considers the
frequency droop −1/R, system damping D, and the export error EA−ES, while the
frequency is obtained from the system inertial response 1/(Ms+D). The frequency
input to ACE is defined as the bias B = D − 1/R.
The interconnected system’s open-loop frequency, generation and load responses
to a nearly step disturbance are shown in Figure 5.7. For the design condition we
have set the demand response control gain to match the generation control gain as
expected from the 5-minute market dispatch of the regulation contribution factors.
5.2 Implementation
We can now consider theH2-optimal control design problem [93] for the system shown
in Figure 5.6 and arranged in the standard form shown in Figure 5.8. The controller
K provides coordinated dispatch of regulation response for generation resources Gr.
The controller measures the system frequency f and the control area’s net export
schedule power deviation p. The current ACE control policy from Eq. (5.1) is the
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Figure 5.6: System frequency and control area export regulation control diagram.
Figure 5.7: Model component frequency (f p.u. nominal frequency), load (l p.u. area
load) and generation (g p.u. system load) responses to a local disturbance (∆Qs p.u.
system load).
baseline control policy for this study. The frequency bias B is computed based on
the generation and load characteristics of the control area [90].
A 5% generation local loss input disturbance is modeled as very nearly a step-loss
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of generation in the local control area. The input filter for the power disturbance is
thus specified as
∆ˆQs(s) =
20∆Qs
s2 + 20s+ 0.01
, (5.5a)
where ∆Qs is the magnitude of the disturbance, which for this study is set at 5%
of the total system load. This magnitude disturbance corresponds to a deviation of
∆f = lim
x→∞
−d
D
(1 − e− DM t) × f = 3.0 Hz, which is very significant for a 60 Hz system.
This may seem like a large disturbance for a North American system. But it is not
atypical for systems in other parts of the world or for microgrids. Demonstrating
the effectiveness of transactive control in such systems in useful and therefore a large
disturbance is considered. The remaining disturbances are taken as frequency and
power measurement noise of magnitude of 1%.
The optimization seeks to minimize regulation deviations from the economically
optimal schedule given by the most recent 5-minute dispatch of frequency responsive
generation and load resources. Because the maximum surplus is achieved when the
dispatch schedule is followed, any deviation from the schedule will reduce the total
surplus. We therefore construct the H2 control output vector components
z(t) =
CA(t)CQ(t)
Cf (t)
 =

P (t)
PD
[A(t)−∆Qs(t)]
C Q(t)
B f(t)
 , (5.5b)
the 2-norm of which we will seek to minimize. The transfer function for the energy
cost impact is given as nearly an integrator in the sense that it costs slightly more
to provide an early generation response than a late one. The energy cost transfer
function is approximated as
cˆ =
1
s2 + 20s+ 0.01
. (5.5c)
The value P (t) is given in units of $/MWh and B is given in units of MW/Hz.
The measurement outputs for power and frequency y(t) =
[
p(t)
f(t)
]
are taken directly
from the system and the generation+load+disturbance outputs, respectively to which
the input disturbance noises are added.
The control input for the raw area control signal is u(t) =
[
A(t)
]
and will either
be the ACE control signal
aˆ = 1
s
Qˆ+Bfˆ (5.5d)
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Figure 5.8: Control area model in standard form.
for the baseline model, or the H2-optimal controller output as described below for
the study model.
5.2.1 State-space realization
Using the packed matrix notation G =
[
A B
C D
]
= D + C(sI−A)−1B we obtain the
state-space realization for the study model of the control area given by Eq. (5.6a).
G =

−0.1667 0 1.0417 −1.4706 0 0 −1 0 0 0 0.005 0 0
0 −8.3333 −4.1667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1333 0 0 0
0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0.6667 0 0 −5.8824 −0.2353 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −20 −0.08 0 0 0 4 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0.125 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 8.3333 −11.7647 0 0 −8 −20 −0.08 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.125 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 −0.0167 0 0 0.0625
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 2.0833 −2.9412 0 0 −2 0 0 0 0.01 0 0
0.3333 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0

,
(5.6a)
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which yields the synthesized H2-optimal regulation policy for the control area
K =

−0.1667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0
0 −8.3333 −4.1667 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.1333 0 0
0 4 0 −0 0 0 −0 0 0 0 −0 0
0.6667 0 −0 −5.8824 −0.2353 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 −547.427 772.839 0 −20 525.45 0 0 0 262.765 0
0 0 8.6287 −12.1817 0 0.125 −8.2836 0 0 0 −4.1418 0
0 0 5.4743 −7.7284 0 0 −5.2553 −20 −0.08 0 1.3723 0
0 0 −0.0863 0.1218 0 0 0.0828 0.125 0 0 0.0414 0
−0.024 −0.0082 −0.0166 0.0047 −0.0667 0.0091 1.4543 −0.0006 −0.1 −0.0496 0 0
−0.3843 −0.1308 −0.2652 0.0759 −1.0671 0.1453 23.2695 −0.01 −1.6002 −0.5265 0 0

,
(5.6b)
and the corresponding transfer function from power p to area control a
−58.472(s + 20)2(s + 5.6947)(s + 5)(s + 3.3333)(s + 0.3625)(s + 0.016667)(s + 0.0086675)(s + 0.0023866)
(s + 24.142)(s + 19.999)(s + 5.8723)(s + 5.2747)(s2 + 7.2484s + 13.55)(s + 0.16667)(s + 0.010017)(s + 0.0015464)
. (5.6c)
The smallest eigenvalue of the closed-loop system GK is −0.0005 and there are
conjugate poles at −3.6242±0.6443i. Unlike the ACE control policy, the H2-optimal
area control policy does not rely on a frequency input and only requires measurement
of net exports from the control area. By way of comparison, the conventional ACE
control state-space model is given by
KA =
[
0 1 0
1 0 B
]
, (5.7)
where B = D − 1/R = 21, which is used for the baseline model. The smallest
eigenvalue of the closed-loop system GKA is −0.0005 and it has a single pair of
complex conjugate poles at −0.0367± 0.0343j.
5.2.2 Model Validation
The model of ACE control is verified for varying amounts of demand response under
the design conditions, as illustrated in Figure 5.9. The ACE response is adequate
for the conditions given insofar as it restores both frequency and power within about
120 seconds of the initial event. The H2-optimal control response fully restores both
frequency and power deviations to zero but with significantly less overshoot. Although
it does not occur in this particular study, we anticipate that any residual transient
error that persists at the end of a 5-minute dispatch interval will be corrected after
the next dispatch or scheduling operation.
The area control signal (a) for H2-optimal control is initially faster in its response
to the initial event but of lesser magnitude. The power and frequency responses,
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Figure 5.9: ACE control (black) andH2-optimal (blue) control performance for design
conditions (5% FADR), showing the raw ACE signal (a p.u. area load), area genera-
tion output (p p.u. system load), and system frequency (f p.u. nominal frequency)
response to a loss of generation within the control area.
(p and f , respectively) are very similar for the first 10 seconds following the event.
However afterwards the power and frequency response to H2-optimal control signal
is reduced to minimize costly overshoot.
The steady-state power and frequency deviation for both control policies is zero
and both achieve steady-state in approximately the same time. As a result, the area
control signal reaches the same steady-state value for both control policies.
5.3 Control Performance
We recognize that demand response resource availability can vary widely from one
area to another, from hour to hour, and from season to season. Thus we evaluate
the performance of the H2-optimal control policy relative to the conventional ACE
control policy by comparing the response of each to widely varying demand response
resource availability. The area generation control signal, net power exports and system
frequency are compared for a 100 MW load base control area with a nominal energy
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Figure 5.10: ACE control (left) and H2-optimal control (right) model validation for
varying demand response level with generation response (g p.u. area load), demand
response (l p.u. area load), and generation regulation cost (cg in $/h p.u. area load).
price of $100/MWh. In addition, the cost of regulation and energy used for regulation
are compared.
The disturbance response of generation (p per unit area load) and load (l per
unit area load) are shown in Figure 5.10 for the conventional ACE signal (left) and
H2-optimal control (right). In addition, the generation control cost cg is shown in
units of $/h per unit area load. We observe decreasing stability of the ACE control
policy under higher penetration of fast-acting demand response. This phenomenon
is consistent with previously observed results for load controller delays that exceed
1/4 second [94]. In contrast, the H2-optimal control policy exhibits less oscillation
and shorter settling-time performance indicating that it is much less susceptible to
overall performance degradation under high demand response scenarios. In every
other important respect, and particularly with respect to the steady-state, the H2-
optimal control policy is comparable to the ACE control policy.
The comparative costs contribution to the objective function are presented in
Figure 5.11. The ACE control policy exhibits significantly more deviations from
the schedule, particularly under high demand response conditions and is unable to
establish a steady regulation regime under high demand response. In all conditions
ranging from no demand response to 50% demand response, the H2-optimal control
policy establishing a steady regulation regime that zeros out the deviation of operation
from the surplus maximized schedule within about 150-200 seconds.
The cost savings and energy impacts from utilizing H2-optimal control are shown
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Figure 5.11: ACE control (left) and H2-optimal control (right) cost and dispatch for
varying demand response levels, where Ca is the total control cost (in $), CQ is the
power control response cost (in $), and Cf is the frequency control response cost (in
$).
Table 5.1: Cost, generation, and net export impacts of ACE control versusH2-optimal
control
Cost Generation Exports
FADR ACE H2 Saving ACE H2 Reduction ACE H2 Change
(%) ($) ($) (%) (MWh) (MWh) (%) (MWh) (MWh) (%)
0 13750 13443 2.2 13.75 13.44 2.2 13.75 13.75 0.0
1 13734 13389 2.5 13.73 13.39 2.5 13.75 13.79 -0.3
2 13736 13382 2.6 13.74 13.38 2.6 13.75 13.79 -0.3
5 13754 13427 2.4 13.75 13.43 2.4 13.75 13.77 -0.1
10 13761 13469 2.1 13.76 13.47 2.1 13.75 13.74 0.1
20 13822 13451 2.7 13.82 13.45 2.7 13.76 13.82 -0.4
50 14264 13369 6.3 14.26 13.37 6.3 13.81 14.33 -3.7
in Table 5.1. It is noteworthy that in all cases generation and energy costs are reduced,
while exports are largely unchanged. We note that at very high FADR levels cost
and generation are reduced more significantly while exports are impacted more clearly.
This suggests that further study of the system behavior at very high levels of demand
response may be desired in the future
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5.4 Summary of Results
In this chapter we presented a H2-optimal approach to synthesizing the control pol-
icy for control areas in bulk electricity interconnections. The approach is suited to
controlling both generation and demand response in areas that have a high pene-
tration of both intermittent renewable resources and fast-acting demand response.
The implementation of the H2-optimal control policy is compatible with, and indeed
depends on the transactive control 5-minute dispatch strategy such as demonstrated
by the Olympic and Columbus studies.
The transactive H2-optimal area control policy is shown to be superior to the con-
ventional ACE control policy in that it is (1) significantly more robust to uncertainty
in the amount of fast-acting demand response that is available, (2) always less costly
and less energy intensive, and (3) minimizes deviation from any surplus maximizing
schedule.
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Chapter 6
Dispatch
This chapter proposes a system-wide optimal resource dispatch strategy that enables
a shift from primarily energy cost-based approach to primarily ramping cost-based
one. This optimal dispatch answers the question of what power schedule to follow
during each hour as a function of the marginal prices of energy, power and ramping
over the hour1. The main contributions of this chapter are (1) the derivation of the
formal method to compute the optimal sub-hourly power trajectory for a system when
the cost of energy and ramping are both of the same order, (2) the development of
an optimal resource allocation strategy based on this optimal trajectory, and (3) a
simulation method to evaluate the cost savings of choosing the optimal trajectory
over the conventional sub-hourly dispatch used in today’s system operation.
In Section 6.2 we develop the optimal control function in both time and frequency
domains. In the case of the frequency domain optimal control function the solution
is presented as a continuous function. A discrete-time solution suitable for periodic
feedback control systems is presented in Section 6.3. In Section 6.4 we examine the
performance of this optimal dispatch solution in terms of varying prices for a given
“typical” hour, and in Section 6.5 we analyze the cost savings in an interconnection
that models the Western Electric Coordinating Council (WECC) system for the year
2024 under both low (13%) and high (50%) renewable generation scenarios. A de-
tailed discussion and synthesis of the consequences that appear to arise from this new
paradigm and our perspective on possible future research on this topic are deferred
Chapter 7.
1The marginal price of a product or service is the change in its price when the quantity produced
or delivered is increased by one unit.
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6.1 Background
The conventional utility approach to addressing renewable generation variability is
to allocate additional firm generation resources to replace all potentially non-firm
renewables resources. This approach can have significant financial impacts in reduc-
ing the revenue from energy supply while increasing the costs of providing ramping
response to variable generation. This chapter examines an approach to mitigating
these financial impacts.
Firm resources are typically fast-responding thermal fossil resources or hydro re-
sources when and where available. For new renewable resources the impact of this
approach is quantified as an intermittency factor, which discounts the contribution
of wind in addition to its capacity factor and limits the degree to which they can
contribute to meeting peak demand [13]. However, the intermittency factor does
not account for the ramping requirements created by potentially fast-changing re-
newable resources [14]. The need for fast-ramping resources discourages the dispatch
of high-efficiency fossil and nuclear generation assets and can encourage reliance on
low-efficiency fossil-fuel resources for regulation services and reserves [15].
One solution to overcoming the renewable generation variability at the bulk elec-
tric level is to tie together a number of electric control areas into a super-grid so that
they can share generation and reserve units through optimal scheduling of system in-
terties [1]. In an interconnected system, the combined power fluctuations are smaller
than the sum of the variations in individual control areas. Furthermore, fast-acting
energy storage systems and demand response programs can provide required ancillary
services such as real-time power balancing [95] and frequency regulation [96] if they
are equipped with suitable control mechanisms. A competitive market framework
in which energy resources participate to sell and buy ancillary service products can
accelerate the transition to a high-renewable scenario by supporting the long-term
economic sustainability of flexible resources.
Concerns about the financial sustainability of utilities under high level of renew-
ables are also beginning to arise. The question is particularly challenging when one
seeks solutions that explicitly maximize social welfare rather than simply minimizing
production cost [97]. The growth of low-marginal cost renewable resources can lead
one to expect utility revenues to decline to the point where they can no longer recover
their long term costs. But this conclusion may be erroneous if one fails to consider
both the impact of demand own-price elasticity, as well as the impact of load control
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automation on substitution elasticity. The latter type of demand response can sig-
nificantly increase the total ramping resource on peak and decrease ramping resource
scarcity. One option for replacing energy resource scarcity rent is increasing fixed
payments. But this may lead to economic inefficiencies as well as an unraveling of the
market-based mechanisms built so far. Another option is to enable payments based
on ramping resource scarcity rent through existing markets for ancillary services. At
the present time, the majority of resources continue to be dispatched based on the en-
ergy marginal cost merit order. But it is not unreasonable to consider how one might
operate a system in which the marginal cost of energy is near zero and resources are
dispatched instead according the ramping cost merit order.
In the presence of high levels of variable generation, the scheduling problem is
a co-optimization for allocating energy and ramping resources [98]. Under existing
energy deregulation policies, there is usually a market in which energy producers
compete to sell energy, and a separate market in which they compete to sell power
ramping resources for flexibility. Producers get paid for their energy deliveries in the
energy market and for power ramping flexibility in the flexibility market. But today’s
dual-pricing mechanism is dominated by the energy markets, which drives generation
resources to secure revenue primarily in the energy market, and only deliver residual
ramping resources in the flexibility market. Meanwhile poor access to energy markets
leads loads and storage to seek participation primarily in the flexibility market while
only revealing their elasticities to the energy market. This relegates loads and storage
to only a marginal role in the overall operation of the system, which is the motivation
for seeking policy solutions to improving their access to wholesale energy markets,
such as FERC Orders 745 and 755.
6.2 Methodology
Consider a utility’s cost minimization problem over a time interval T . The utility’s
customers purchase their net energy use E(T ) at a pre-determined retail price. So
in today’s systems, profit maximization and cost minimization are essentially the
same problem. For each hour the utility pays for energy delivered at a real-time
location-dependent wholesale price that is also dependent on demand under typical
deregulated nodal pricing markets. The utility’s scheduled energy use is forecast for
each hour based on its customers’ expected net energy use, which is then used to
compute the utility’s net load over that hour. We assume that over any interval T
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Figure 6.1: Power (left) and ramp (center and right) price functions.
the utility may incur additional costs for any deviation in actual net load from the
scheduled load.
The price function at the operating point is split up into the marginal price of
energy a = ∂P
∂Q
(measured in $/MW2·h), the marginal price of power b = ∂R
∂Q
(measured
in $/MW2), and the marginal price of ramping c = ∂R
∂Q˙
(measured in $·h/MW2). In
order to reflect resource scarcity all cost functions are assumed to be quadratic so
that the price function for each is linear as shown in Figure 6.1. The marginal prices
a and b determine prices as a function of the power demand Q, and the marginal
price c determines prices based on the ramp rates Q˙. The cost parameters arise from
the schedule and may vary from hour to hour, but do not change within any given
hour. Any of the marginal prices may be zero or positive depending on the market
design and prevailing conditions in the system. For the purposes of this chapter, we
will assume that they cannot be negative.
Over the time interval T the total cost of both the power trajectory Q(t) and
the ramping trajectory Q˙(t) given the power price P (t) = aQ(t) and ramp price
R(t) = bQ(t) + cQ˙(t), respectively, is given by
C(T ) =
∫ T
0
P [Q(t)]Q(t) +R[Q(t), Q˙(t)]Q˙(t)dt. (6.1)
Given the dispatch fromQ(0) toQ(T ) and the scheduled energy use E(T ) =
∫ T
0
Q(t)dt
we augment the cost function with the Lagrange multiplier λ so that we have∫ T
0
a(Q−Qz)Q+ b(Q−Qz)|Q˙|+ cQ˙2 + λQ dt
=
∫ T
0
G(t, Q, Q˙)dt,
where the |Q˙| represents the magnitude of the ramp rate Q˙, and QZ is the amount
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of must-take generation having zero or effectively zero marginal energy cost. Then
the optimal dispatch trajectory Q(t) is the critical function obtained by solving the
Euler-Lagrange equation
∂G
∂Q
− d
dt
∂G
∂Q˙
= 0.
From this we form a second-order ordinary differential equation describing the critical
load trajectory
Q¨− a
c
Q =
µ
2c
.
where µ = λ−aQZ . Using the Laplace transform we find the critical system response
in s-domain is
Qˆ(s) =
Q0s
2 + Q˙0s+
µ
2c
s(s2 − ω2) , (6.2)
where ω2 = a
c
. The general time-domain solution for the critical function over the
interval 0 ≤ t < T is
Q(t) =
(
Q0 +
µ
2a
)
coshωt+
Q˙0
ω
sinhωt− µ
2a
, (6.3)
where Q0 and Q˙0 are initial power and ramp values.
We can determine whether this solution is an extremum by computing the second
variation
∂2C
∂Q2
(T ) =
∫ T
0
[α(v)2 + 2β(vv′) + γ(v′)2]dt
=
∫ T
0
H(t)dt,
with H(t) > 0 for all v 6= 0 subject to v(0) = 0 = v(T ). We then have
α =
∂2G
∂Q2
= 2a, β =
∂2G
∂Q∂Q˙
= b, γ =
∂2G
∂Q˙2
= 2c.
Thus for all a, b, c > 0, H(t) > 0 and Q(t) is a minimizer. Since the only physical
meaningful non-zero values of a and c are positive, this is satisfactory. We will examine
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cases when a and c are zero separately. Note that when Q˙ < 0, we have b < 0, so
that the sign of b does not affect the general solution.
Given the constraints
∫ T
0
Q(t)dt = ET and Q(T ) = QT , which come from the
hour-ahead schedule, we obtain the solution for µ and Q˙0 for the case where a, c > 0:[
µ
Q˙0
]
=
[
A B
C D
]−1 [
E∆
Q∆
]
, (6.4)
where
A =
sinhωT − ωT
2aω
B =
coshωT − 1
ω2
C =
coshωT − 1
2a
D =
sinhωT
ω
E∆ = ET − sinhωT
ω
Q0 Q∆ = QT −Q0 coshωT .
When a = 0, the cost of energy is zero and only the ramping cost is considered.
Then the time-domain solution is
Q(t) =
µ
4c
t2 + Q˙0t+Q0, (6.5)
with
A =
T 3
12c
B =
T 2
2
C =
T 2
4c
D = T
E∆ = ET −Q0T Q∆ = QT −Q0,
which gives the critical response in s-domain
Qˆ(s) =
µ
4cs3
+
Q˙0
s2
+
Q0
s
.
When c = 0, there is no scarcity for ramping so that the ramping price is based
only on the marginal energy cost of additional units that are dispatched. Then we
have the time-domain solution
Q(t) = − µ
2a
, (6.6)
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Figure 6.2: Optimal dispatch controller diagram with discrete update time ts.
with
µ = −2aET
T
.
This gives the critical response is s-domain
Qˆ(s) = − µ
2as
,
and the initial and final ramps from Q(0) to − µ
2a
and from − µ
2a
to Q(T ) are limited
by the ramping limits of the responding units.
6.3 Optimal Dispatch Controller
The partial fraction expansion of Eq. 6.2 is
K1
s+ ω
+
K2
s
+
K3
s− ω , (6.7)
where K1 =
Q0
2
− Q˙0
2ω
+ µ
4a
, K2 = − µ2a , and K3 = Q02 + Q˙02ω + µ4a , with the values of the
parameters are computed from Eq. 6.4.
The initial response of the optimal controller is dominated by the forward-time
solution
K1 e
−ωt = L−1
[
Q0
2
− Q˙0
2ω
+ µ
4a
s+ ω
]
(s),
which handles the transition from the initial system load Q0 to the scheduled load
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QE = − µ2as . The central response is dominated by the scheduled load solution
K2 = L−1
[
− µ
2as
]
(s).
Finally, the terminal response is dominated by the reverse-time solution
K3 e
ωt = L−1
[
Q0
2
+ Q˙0
2ω
+ µ
4a
s− ω
]
(s),
which handles the transition from the scheduled load to the terminal load QT . A
discrete-time controller that implements the solution of Eq. 6.7 is shown in Figure 6.2.
The controller implements the three main components to the optimal solution with
step inputs µ, Q0, and Q˙0. Note that the marginal prices a, b and c for the entire hour
are constants in the controller blocks, which makes the controller design linear time-
invariant within each hour, but time-variant over multiple hours. The discrete-time
solution is then
Q∗(k) =

K1τ
k +K2 +K3τ
−k : a > 0, c > 0
µ
4c
t2sk
2 + Q˙0tsk +Q0 : a = 0, c > 0
− µ
2a
: a > 0, c = 0
where τ = eωts .
The discrete-time dispatch control is illustrated in Figure 6.3 for various values
of ω =
√
a/c. When the value of ω is large, the optimal dispatch is dominated by
the energy cost and the cost of high ramp rates is negligible compared to the energy
cost. The result is a dispatch that moves as quickly as possible to scheduled load QE.
In the limit of zero ramping cost, the optimal response is a step function2. As the
cost of ramping increases relative to the energy cost, the optimal dispatch begins to
reduce the ramp rate while still following a trajectory that satisfies the hourly energy
delivery requirement. In the limit of zero energy cost, the optimal dispatch trajectory
is parabolic.
2Step responses are only possible by generation or load tripping, which is not considered as part
of the conventional control strategy.
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Figure 6.3: Optimal discrete time control for various values of ω at ts = 5 minutes.
6.4 Performance Evaluation
In this section we develop the cost performance metric of the optimal dispatch control
design. The optimal dispatch cost function is found by evaluating Equation 6.1 using
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Equations 6.3, 6.5 and 6.6. Thus when a, b, c > 0 we have3
C(T ) =
sinh 2ωT
2ω
[
a(A2 +B2) + bABω
]
+
sinh2 ωT
2ω
[
b(A2 +B2)ω + 4aAB
]
+
coshωT − 1
ω
[(bAω + 2aB)C − (aB + bAω)Qz]
+
sinhωT
ω
[(bBω + 2aA)C − (aA+ bBω)Qz]
+
[
aC2 − aCQz
]
T.
where A = Q0 + µ/2a, B = Q˙0/ω and C = −µ/2a. For the case when a = 0 we have
C(T ) = bµ
2
32c2
T 4 + 3bµQ˙0+µ
2
12c
T 3 +
(
bQ˙20
2
+ bµ(Q0−Qz)
4c
+ µQ˙0
8c2
)
T 2 +
(
bQ˙0(Q0 −Qz) + cQ˙20
)
T.
When c = 0 we have
C(T ) = aET
(
ET
T
−Qz
)
.
We use as the base case a conventional unit dispatch strategy that requires gen-
erators ramp to their new operating point during the 20 minutes spanning the top
of the hour. Accordingly the generators begin ramping 10 minutes before the hour
and end ramping 10 minutes after the hour. In the aggregate for a given hour this
strategy is illustrated in Figure 6.4 where
QE =
6
5
(
ET − Q0 +QT
12
)
,
with the initial and terminal ramp rates
Q˙0 = 6(QE −Q0) and Q˙T = 6(QT −QE).
Three cases are shown: overproduction to compensate for a lack of generation in pre-
vious hours (top), scheduled production (center), and underproduction to compensate
for extra generation in previous hours (bottom).
3Note that if the ramp rate Q˙ changes sign at the time tc =
1
ω tanh
−1(−BA ) and 0 < tc < T , then
we must divide the cost integral into two parts to account for the absolute value of Q˙ on b terms.
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Figure 6.4: Conventional power dispatch for base case: (top) significant negative
schedule error requiring over-production, (center) small negative, zero and positive
schedule error requiring over (red), normal (black) and under (blue) production, and
(bottom) significant positive schedule error requiring under-production.
The cost of the base case is then
Cbase(T ) =
aT
18
(Q2T +QTQE + 14Q
2
E +QEQ0 +Q
2
0)
− aT
12
(QT + 10QE +Q0)Qz
+ | b
2
(QE −Q0)|(QE +Q0 − 2Qz)
+ | b
2
(QT −QE)|(QT +QE − 2Qz)
+ 6c
T
(Q2T − 2QTQE + 2Q2E − 2Q0QE +Q20).
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The zero-order hold ramp discrete form of Equation 6.1 gives us the cost of oper-
ating with a discrete control time-step ts, i.e.,
C∗(T ) =
T/ts∑
k=0
(
P ∗[Q∗(k)]Q∗(k) +R∗[Q∗(k), Q˙∗(k)]Q˙∗(k)
)
ts
=
T/ts∑
k=0
ats
4
[
Q∗(k)2 + 2Q∗(k)Q˙∗(k)
+ Q˙∗(k)2 − 2Qz[Q∗(k) + Q˙∗(k)]
]
+ 1
2
[∣∣∣b(Q˙∗(k)−Q∗(k))∣∣∣ (Q˙∗(k) +Q∗(k)− 2Qz]
+ c
ts
[
Q∗(k)2 − 2Q∗(k)Q˙∗(k) + Q˙∗(k)2
]
where Q∗(k) = Q(kts) and Q˙∗(k) = Q∗(k + 1). We evaluate the performance of the
control strategy for different control update rates ts using two future scenarios, one
for low renewables where ω > 1, and one for high renewables where ω < 1 for both
unconstrained and constrained transmission operating conditions.
6.5 Case Study: WECC 2024
In this section we examine the cost savings associated with using the optimal con-
trol solution on the WECC 2024 base case model introduced in [1]. The WECC
2024 model is a 20-area base case used by WECC for planning studies. The 20-area
model combines a number of smaller control areas based on the anticipated intertie
transfer limits reported in the WECC 2024 common case [99]. In this model con-
straints within control areas are ignored, while internal losses are approximated. The
peak load, annual energy production and demand consumption are forecast, includ-
ing intermittent wind, solar, and run-of-river hydro for the entire year. The demand
characteristics, generation capacity, production costs and tieline limits are given in
Tables C.2 through C.6.
The model also includes a hypothetical market for each consolidated control area,
with a flat zero-cost supply curve for all renewable and must-take generation re-
sources and a constant positive supply curve slope for all dispatchable units. The
hourly generation of intermittent resources is provided by the base case model and
incorporated into the supply curve so that there is effectively no marginal cost of
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production for renewable energy and must take generation. All generating units are
paid the hourly clearing price, and when the marginal energy price in a control area
is zero then renewable generation may be curtailed. As a result, under the high re-
newable scenario, zero energy prices are commonplace and renewable generation is
curtailed more frequently. Demand response is similarly considered for each control
area and the output of this scheduling model provides the hourly nodal prices required
to satisfy the transmission constraints, if any.
The low renewables case is the WECC forecast for the year 2024, which corre-
spond to 29.5 GW (16.1%) of renewable capacity and 140.8 TWh (13.4%) of annual
renewable generation. The high renewables case is given as 400% of capacity of the
WECC forecast for the year 2024, which corresponds to 117.8 GW (63.5%) and 523.9
TWh (49.6%) respectively. The blended energy price of operations is $130.6/MWh
and $50.2/MWh for the low and high renewables cases, respectively.
The ramping price was not considered in the WECC 2024 base case model. For
this study we have assumed that the ramping energy cost is based on the marginal
energy cost for the dispatchable generation and the demand response, as well as the
cost of changing the dispatchable generation output, as shown in Table 6.1. In both
cases, the marginal price of power b is the average marginal price of energy a over the
hour. In the low renewables case the marginal price of ramping c is the marginal price
of power b multiplied by 12 seconds. In the high renewables case, c is the marginal
price of power b multiplied by 49 hours. The value of ω is approximately 121 times
greater in the low renewable case than it is in the high renewable case. Note that
a is zero when renewables are curtailed while b is assumed to also be zero because
curtailed renewables and demand response are presumed to be dispatchable.
The values of the ramping response constant c were also selected such that the
overall cost of operating the system remains more or less constant when going from
the low to high renewables scenarios under the base case. This allows us to evaluate
the impact of the optimal control strategy without involving the question of revenue
adequacy under the high renewables scenario. Given that there are few markets from
which to determine these values, we must be satisfied with this assumption for now.
The statistical nature of the intermittency and load forecast errors and their con-
nection to load following and regulation was studied at length in [100]. The authors
showed that consolidated control of WECC could yield both cost savings and per-
formance improvements. In particular, the study showed that with high accuracy
control 1% standard deviation in load forecast was expected, with 0% real-time mean
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Figure 6.5: Single hour optimal dispatch for low (top) and high (bottom) renewables
with a ramp from 100 GW to 110 GW using a 10-minute discrete-time dispatch control
rate, with hourly energy schedule correction errors varying from −5% to +5%.
error at 0.15% standard deviation at peak load. However, for the purposes of a
preliminary study like the one presented in this chapter, we will consider the schedul-
ing error to be Gaussian with a mean error of 0 MW and a standard deviation of
100 MW. We believe that energy and flexibility markets should be efficient enough
to remove all systematic error from the price signals leaving only the random noise
that is satisfactorily modeled by Gaussian noise.
The comparison of the conventional and optimal dispatch for a typical case is
shown in Figure 6.5. The conventional control strategy is shown in dotted lines,
with the 10 minute optimal-dispatch trajectory shown as solid lines. Note that the
ramp rate is constant between discrete control updates. The evaluation is completed
with the marginal prices and marginal costs at 100 GW, as shown in Table 6.1. The
energy schedule changes according to a varying energy error remaining at the end of
the previous dispatch interval. A −5% error represents an energy deficit of 5 GWh
for a 105 GWh schedule, while a +5% error represents an energy surplus of 5 GWh.
The marginal prices in Table 6.1 are chosen to satisfy the following conditions:
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Table 6.1: Marginal prices and marginal costs for 105 GWh schedule at 100 GW
initial power and 10 GW/h ramp for cases in Figure 6.5
Variable Base case Study case Units
Marginal prices :
a 1.27× 10−3 6.34× 10−4 $/MW2·h
b 1.27× 10−3 6.34× 10−4 $/MW2
c 4.23× 10−6 3.09× 10−2 $·h/MW2
Marginal costs :
P 133.09 66.55 $/MW·h
R 133.13 375.19 $/MW
ω 17.3 0.1433 h−1
Table 6.2: Single hour cost savings under low and high renewable for a ramp from
100 GW to 110 GW at 5 minute discrete dispatch control update rate, with varying
energy error redispatch
Dispatch Reference Cost Optimal Cost Cost Dispatch
Energy Energy Ramp Total Price Energy Ramp Total Price Savings Error
(GWh) ($M) ($M) ($M) ($/MWh) ($M) ($M) ($M) ($/MWh) ($M/h) (%) (%)
Low renewable scenario
110.3 10.8 1.2 12.0 108.62 10.8 1.1 11.9 107.93 0.1 0.6 -0.8
107.1 10.1 0.9 11.0 102.50 10.1 0.9 11.0 102.50 0.0 0.0 -0.4
105.0 9.6 0.9 10.5 100.00 9.6 0.9 10.5 99.98 0.0 0.0 0.0
102.9 9.1 0.9 10.0 97.53 9.1 0.9 10.0 97.51 0.0 0.0 0.4
99.8 8.4 1.1 9.6 96.06 8.4 1.1 9.5 95.42 0.1 0.7 0.9
High renewable scenario
110.3 1.6 24.1 25.7 232.77 1.6 13.5 15.1 136.75 10.6 41.3 -2.0
107.1 1.3 11.7 13.0 121.55 1.3 4.8 6.1 57.27 6.9 52.9 -0.8
105.0 1.1 9.4 10.5 100.00 1.1 3.2 4.3 41.25 6.2 58.8 -0.0
102.9 1.0 11.7 12.7 123.35 1.0 4.8 5.8 56.43 6.9 54.2 -0.7
99.8 0.7 24.1 24.8 248.95 0.8 13.4 14.2 142.37 10.6 42.8 -1.9
1. The system operating cost is roughly $100/MWh at a system load of 100 GW.
2. For the low renewables case, the energy cost is roughly 10 times the ramping
cost, while for the high renewables case the ramping cost is roughly 10 times
the energy cost for the nominal schedule. This was necessary to ensure that
costs were the same for both cases.
3. The marginal power price b for both cases is equal to the marginal energy price
a of the respective case.
We considered the performance degradation resulting from longer dispatch in-
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Table 6.3: WECC 2024 cost savings from optimal dispatch under different transmis-
sion constraint and renewable scenarios
Cost
Scenario Base case Optimal Savings
Model ($B/y) ($B/y) ($B/y)
Unconstrained:
Low 126.0 125.9 0.16 (0.1%)
High 108.6 77.8 30.85 (28.4%)
Constrained:
Low 184.4 184.1 0.26 (0.1%)
High 388.3 231.2 157.12 (40.5%)
Table 6.4: Summary of energy and price impacts of optimal dispatch control for the
WECC 2024 base case
Total Price
Scenario Energy Base case Optimal
Model (TWh) ($/MWh) ($/MWh)
Unconstrained:
Low 1054.6 119.5 119.35 (-0.1%)
High 1067.2 101.8 67.29 (-51.2%)
Constrained:
Low 1054.5 174.8 174.55 (-0.2%)
High 1055.7 367.8 87.96 (-318.2%)
tervals by evaluating the performance using 5-minute updates, 1 minute updates,
and 4-second discrete control time steps but found no appreciable difference in the
economic performance. The results shown in Table 6.2 are shown for the 5-minute
dispatch interval. The output of the presented discrete control method is a load pro-
file that does not necessarily lead to the scheduled hourly energy, because the load
trajectory over each time interval (which is linear) is slightly different from the op-
timal load trajectory (that often has a curvature). One approach to deal with this
energy deficiency is to use a higher time resolution, so that the trajectories lie on
each other more precisely. Another approach is to adjust the targeted load such that
it delivers the scheduled energy over each time interval. In this case, the discrete
control load is not necessarily equal to the optimal load.
Generally, at low levels of renewables, savings are not possible using the optimal
control strategy. The cost savings observed in the extreme low renewables dispatch
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Figure 6.6: WECC 2024 load duration (top) and optimal dispatch savings duration
(bottom) using discrete optimal control at 5-minute dispatch rate for the uncon-
strained (left) and constrained (right) high renewables scenario. The scatter plots
are the corresponding cost (top) and load (bottom) values for the durations curves
shown.
cases in Table 6.2 are due to the fact that discrete dispatch control follows the optimal
trajectory sampling every ts seconds. This dispatch error can result in small over or
underproduction depending on the degree of asymmetry in the optimal trajectory.
At higher levels of renewables the savings are potentially more significant. In
addition, the savings are maximum when dispatch tracks the original schedule, which
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suggests that there may be a strong economic incentive to avoid carrying over energy
tracking error from one schedule interval to the next.
The interconnetion-wide scheduling solution in [1] includes a 20-area constrained
solution. The hourly energy prices for each area are computed considering both
supply and demand energy price elasticities. The energy prices are computed for the
interconnection-wide surplus-maximizing schedule over the entire year. The marginal
power price is the price of energy for the schedule hour. The marginal price of ramping
is 1/300 marginal price of power in the low renewable case, and 49 times the marginal
price of power in the high renewable case. The costs, savings and price impact of using
this scheduling solution compared to the base case are presented in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
The unconstrained solution is evidently less costly because the combined system-wide
fluctuations are smaller than the sum of the individual variations in each balancing
authority.
The WECC 2024 system-wide load and savings duration curves4 are shown in
Figure 6.6. The potential savings are very significant for all scenarios, with the
highest savings being found when high levels of renewable resources are available. The
savings when more transmission constraints are active are augmented considerably
with respect to unconstrained system conditions.
6.6 Summary of Results
The principal result of this chapter is that the use of an optimal dispatch strategy
that considers both the cost of energy and the cost of ramping simultaneously leads
to significant cost savings in systems with high levels of renewable generation. For
the WECC 2024 common case the savings can exceed 25% of total operating costs in
the high renewables scenario.
As the bulk power interconnection resource mix shifts from primarily dispatchable
non-zero marginal fuel cost resources (e.g., natural gas) to primarily non-dispatchable
renewable resources (e.g., hydro, wind, solar) we expect a steady shift in bulk sys-
tem revenue from energy scarcity rent to ramping scarcity rent. While the total
revenue must remain largely the same for financial sustainability, the scarcity pricing
mechanism must change.
4A duration curve shows the number of hours per year that a time-series quantity is above a
particular value. It is obtained by sorting the time-series data in descending order of magnitude and
plotting the resulting monotonically descending curve.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
In this chapter we synthesize and discuss more generally the significant results, ob-
servations, and outstanding issues arising from the development of a hierarchical
inter-temporal solution to transactive control at the interconnection scale.
Transactive control, and more broadly transactive energy require coordination of
economic, technical and consumer processes at every scale, both physical and tem-
poral as shown in Figure 7.1. In a conventional power system, scheduling, dispatch,
and regulation are established using dissimilar mechanisms according to the prevail-
ing physical or temporal scale. In contrast to this, transactive control systems seek
to employ a common scale-free price-based coordination mechanism. This requires a
certain degree of uniformity in the coordination approaches at each scale, which in
turn requires us to demonstrate that we can model and control control systems that
can work with prices over a wide range physical and temperal system scales. This
thesis has demonstrated both observation (bidding) and control (response) strategies
that support a transactive approaches for several important processes at different
scales of grid operation, i.e., aggregate observation and control of periodic demand,
control area of system frequency and inter-area power exchange, and optimal control
area dispatch.
In this thesis we have examined four important areas of transactive control system
design. These are aggregate demand response observation and control, frequency
regulation and optimal dispatch. Each section in this chapter discusses these in more
detail with Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6 discussed in Sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4 respectively.
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Figure 7.1: Physical (top) and temporal (bottom) system diagram of transactive
control systems.
7.1 Demand Response
The availability of a more accurate model of aggregated demand response can be
expected to support a wide range of new work on controllable load using real-time
pricing. Long-term demand response behavior models do not support the design and
analysis of fast-acting demand response as well as the proposed short-term model. In
this section we discuss the advantages of using short-term demand response models.
As an equilibrium model, the random utility model is expected to be valid for both
small signal control stability analysis as well as certain tariff design problems.
7.1.1 Model Limitations
The random utility model is not necessarily valid in its current form for large price
disturbance. Roozbehani et al. [82] examined the feedback stability question in the
context of wholesale markets and found that real-time wholesale prices could create
an unstable closed-loop feedback system for both ex-ante and ex-post settlement
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Figure 7.2: Demand (left) and elasticity (right) curves for a nominal case with ηD =
−2.5 and P¯ = 0.5.
systems. It was established that the absence of an inelastic component in demand
contributed to instability, supporting the intuition that increasing feedback gain from
price-responsive demand is a concern. Static demand elasticity was also found to
lead to loss of efficiency. In follow-up work on price volatility, the authors found
that although demand bidding mechanisms eliminate the exogenous feedback delays
inherent in settlement-based systems, there remain endogenous load dynamics that
can cause bidding mechanisms to exhibit instability [101] and consequently more
sophisticated models of demand and consumer response to real-time price dynamics
may be required.
The random utility model does not account for the aggregate equilibrium duty
cycle of thermostatic loads. In its simplest form, the model assumes a 50% effective
duty cycle. The duty cycle tends to skew the demand curve away from the more
probable load Qˆ = QU +
1
2
QR. Incorporating this effect would most likely improve
the model, particularly with respect to bias error and standard deviation.
When a significant price deviation occurs relative to the natural diversity state,
the loads enter a transient response regime. If we compare maximum entropy from Eq.
(3.5) to the minimum elasticity from Eq. (3.6) we find that they occur at different
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prices. Specifically, load state diversity is maximized when P = P¯ , but demand
elasticity
η(P ) =
−bPea+bP
1 + ea+bP
.
is minimized when
P = P¯
W (e2ηD−1) + 1
2ηD
where W is the Lambert W-function
W (z) =
∞∑
n=1
(−n)n−1
n!
zn.
For values of z approaching zero this function is well approximated by z, giving:
P ≈ P¯ e
2ηD−1 + 1
2ηD
The price at which elasticity is minimized is always greater than P¯ for all 0 < Q < QR
when QU > 0. (Note that QU is typically positive, except when a high surplus of
uncontrollable distributed generation is present, such as might occur with significant
deployment of rooftop solar photovoltaics.) This implies that in equilibrium demand
elasticity will tend to increase with prices, as illustrated in Figure 7.2. Under such
conditions thermostatic devices no longer follow the equilibrium duty cycle regime
and their states diverge from the equilibrium distribution. Consequently their bids
depart from the logistic probabilities and no longer follow the bid price distribution
of Equation (3.8).
In addition, if the price deviates too quickly, then a diabatic1 response governs
the change in state diversity. As diversity decreases the equilibrium price moves fur-
ther from the most probable price and the elasticity of demand changes significantly.
Decreasing elasticity is observed when loss of diversity favors loads that are on and
the bid distribution skews left. The distribution skews to the right with increased
elasticity when diversity favors loads that are off. Note that the periodic behavior of
thermostatic loads means that diversity is expected to fluctuate in such a way that
elasticity oscillates with damping of about a/2 arising from the diversity in the ther-
1The term ‘diabatic’ here is used in analogy to non-adiabatic processes, i.e., a diabatic process is
one in which a significant fraction of the macroscopic state arises from changes in the distribution
or arrangement of microscopic states rather than only from the sum of individual states. In other
words the total response include a significant contribution from changes system entropy.
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mal properties of the home and frequency related to the population average cycling
time of the heating/cooling systems.
Device state diversity appears to be a key characteristic that governs demand
response. True state diversity can be measured by taking the weighted generalized
mean Mq−1 of the proportional occupancy of states in the population of responsive
devices, and then taking the reciprocal of this quantity to obtain the density of devices
in states. The diversity of order-q is then defined as
Dq ≡ 1
Mq−1
=
(
N∑
n=1
pqnn
)1−q−1
. (7.1a)
In the limit of q = 1, the first-order mean occupancy is well-defined and its natural
logarithm converges to
H = −
N∑
n=1
pn ln pn (7.1b)
This is simply the Shannon entropy calculated using natural logarithms instead of
base-2 logarithms [102].
Given the linear relationship of bid price to the device state, we use the bid price
entropy norm as a measure of state diversity, as shown in Table 7.1. A higher bid
price entropy is associated with a higher state diversity. This further explains why
the Olympic results fit the equilibrium state assumptions of the random utility model
so much better than the Columbus results.
If the demand response resource is very limited it can be expected to saturate more
often and lead to reduced diversity and reduced entropy. This effect is illustrated by
the reduced diversity duration curves of the Columbus experiments shown in Fig-
ure 7.3. In such cases, we expect the full DR and no DR models to be as accurate as
the random utility model when DR is called and released, respectively and the half
DR model to be more accurate when DR is not called. This condition is more clearly
evident in the Columbus data where the total resource was relatively small compared
to the total feeder capacity. The observed fluctuations in unresponsive load result in
large changes in demand response and lead to DR control saturation, thus making
the alternative models satisfactory when compared to the random utility model.
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Figure 7.3: Demand response state diversity duration curves for the Olympic feeder
and Columbus feeder numbers 120, 140, 160, and 180.
Table 7.1: Bid price entropy statistics
Load State Entropy
System Mean Standard Deviation
Olympic 0.68 0.19
Columbus 120 0.54 0.20
Columbus 140 0.60 0.18
Columbus 160 0.47 0.17
Columbus 180 0.51 0.17
7.1.2 Technical and Regulatory Impacts
Interest in transactive control has also resulted in renewed discussion of tariff de-
sign and rate-making processes for utilities that wish to adopt the real-time pricing
strategy. The Columbus demonstration included a rate case for the real-time price
double auction called “RTPda” that was approved by the Public Utility Commission
of Ohio [103, 104]. However, real-time price tariffs and rate designs can be difficult
to study when loads respond to hourly or sub-hourly prices. These tariffs present
new challenges for utilities and regulators alike. Concerns have also been expressed
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regarding customer acceptance of real-time prices [58] but utilities could offer a port-
folio of tariffs, including a real-time price, from which customers may choose. The
rate at which tariffs are adopted then becomes a conventional portfolio optimization
problem where opt-in/opt-out incentives and penalties are offered to achieve tariff
adoption mixtures that meet utility and regulator objectives [105].
The implications of adopting the random utility demand response model for both
utilities and regulations have yet to be explored fully. However, some initial thoughts
may foster discussion and suggest further research on methods to effectively incen-
tivize enduring and sustainable demand response from residential customers.
First, the existence of upper and lower price asymptotes is often overlooked in
demand response analysis for electricity loads. We recognize that linearization of the
demand function is often necessary. But the asymptotes require us to acknowledge the
existence of hard upper and lower constraints on short-term responsive load. When
prices deviate from the most probable price, the elasticity of demand approaches zero.
Thus an important change occurs in fast-acting demand response when prices induce
load to move into either curtailment or pre-heat/pre-cool/recovery regimes: load di-
versity is decreased and important endogenous load oscillations can be induced, which
are independent of the oscillations induced by control feedback. Unless technical steps
are taken to dampen endogenous load oscillations before they occur, price oscillations
can emerge that can only be mitigated by reducing the feedback from load and wait-
ing for load state diversity to be restored. It is therefore incumbent on utilities to
identify all the conditions under which instability can emerge and implement either
market and/or load control mechanisms to mitigate them.
Second, existing residential electricity tariffs do not adequately support the de-
velopment of fast-acting demand response or the mechanisms needed to mitigate the
potential instabilities associated with demand response. This is particularly a concern
in the presence of supply resources at the distribution level, such as rooftop photo-
voltaic panels and significant amounts of battery storage, such as so-called vehicle-to-
grid discharging. Clearly the availability of such resources can be easily incorporated
into the market mechanism demonstrated in both the Olympic and Columbus trials.
However, the marginal cost of most renewable retail resources is effectively zero, which
not only can give rise to revenue adequacy problems for utilities, but can also effec-
tively shut off the very price signaling mechanism needed to control load. Strategic
bidding may be necessary for these resources to elicit non-zero price signals, as was
demonstrated in the Olympic study to manage minimum and maximum generation
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run time limits. However, strategic bidding at the retail level entails an entirely new
class of regulatory problems that may require mitigation strategies that are not part
of current tariff design and approval procedures.
Demand response in residential settings presents an additional challenge to util-
ities. Historically, the cost-per-point and cost-per-megawatt for the supporting in-
frastructure and management of these systems has been significantly higher than
for commercial and industrial customers. Recent industry estimates suggest that
customer-premises portals and in-home energy management systems will cost be-
tween $US150 and $US300 by 2030 [106]. But life-cycle cost analysis for transactive
technology is not generally available yet, in part due to the lack of simulation tools
that can properly evaluate the benefits of the technology [107]. Fast-acting demand
response requires higher communication rates than hourly or day-ahead critical peak
pricing mechanisms used for commercial and industrial demand management. Auto-
mated metering infrastructure has offered the promise of fast and accurate commu-
nications with residential loads. But much of that promise has yet to be analyzed in
detail or realized in practice, either with incentive-based or even direct load control
mechanisms.
The cost per unit of power reduced of behind-the-meter infrastructure for residen-
tial loads has been typically difficult to compare to the cost per energy saved using
long-term demand response programs. The additional costs per customer tends to
delay adoption of residential demand response programs until after the more cost-
effective available commercial and industrial demand resources have been exhausted.
The advent of smart thermostats like the NESTTM and potentially implicitly smart
loads like electric-vehicle chargers can be expected to increase the available low-cost
responsive load in the residential settings [108].
7.2 Aggregation
We have shown that closed loop control of aggregate T∆0 thermostatic loads can
be accomplished provided a suitable control system which curtails u(k) device for
k = 0, 1, 2 · · · . Each control impulse transfers devices between the unresponsive
population and the responsive population, altering the responsive population’s state
x(k+ 1) by simply adding the new population’s xk(k+ 1) response to the input u(k).
By combining load curtailment and load release impulses the aggregate response can
be shaped to track an arbitrary reference signal r(k), provided sufficient devices are
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available in both the responsive and background unresponsive population to supply
the net change required by each impulse u(k).
Overall the results indicate that an aggregate load model of discrete time ther-
mostats can be used to design such an aggregate load control strategy. But not all
controllers designed using conventional methods perform equally well. Proportional
controllers and unity-damped controllers, while simplest to implement, tend to be
slow to respond and can have stability problems at high load. Pole placement designs
tend to result in controllers with steady state errors and/or excessive overshoot. Inte-
gral error feedback exhibits the smallest average error as well as the smallest overshoot
and are therefore deemed the best controllers studied. The main disadvantage of the
integral-error-feedback controller design remains the need to implement a parameter
estimation method to reduce the effect of model error on tracking performance.
A potentially useful extension to this approach is “symmetric control”, which uses
all devices in the unresponsive population instead of only devices that are on. This
control approach allows the utility to increase loads by turning devices on as easily
as it can decrease load by turning devices off. In some cases, this approach may
be more practical for utilities to deploy, and offers the added benefit of addressing
possible privacy concerns resulting from any strategy that requires the utility to know
whether one particular device is actually on before choosing which devices to signal.
In addition, it offers the utility an opportunity to aggregate load control for ancillary
services, which may require both load up and load down regulation.
In the cases when we seek full control over the load we must make two important
assumptions regarding load curtailment strategies.
1. Devices are selected regardless of their current state.
2. The load is observed based on the number of devices that remain on rather than
the number of devices that are turned off.
The demand response strategy is then described by using h = [R¯, 1 − R¯]T and
c = [q¯, 0], where R¯ =
r¯off
r¯on+r¯off
is the population average duty cycle, and q¯ is the
population average load of a single device. The system is controllable when
|C| =
∣∣∣∣∣ R¯ R¯(1− ρon) + (1− R¯)ρoff1− R¯ R¯ρon + (1− R¯)(1− ρoff )
∣∣∣∣∣
= R¯ρon − (1− R¯)ρoff 6= 0
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or when
R¯ 6= ρoff
ρoff + ρon
,
a condition that is satisfied when σon, σoff > 0; i.e., the thermal properties of the
population are diversified. The system is observable when
|O| =
∣∣∣∣∣ q¯ 0q¯(1− ρon) q¯ρoff
∣∣∣∣∣ = q¯2ρoff 6= 0
which is always true when thermostatically controlled load is active.
In future work we anticipate examining parameter identification strategies to fa-
cilitate the implementation of practical load control at the utility scale. In addition,
adaptive control, model-predictive control and optimal control strategies should be
considered. The latter seems particularly interesting in the context of optimal area
control and balance frequency regulation objectives with periodic redispatch of load
control resources to keep the maximum number of loads available for regulation ser-
vices over time.
7.3 Regulation
Using the closed-loop system model GK we can compare the proposed control pol-
icy’s contribution to improving intra-area control robustness to uncertainty in the
availability of fast-acting demand response at the time of a generation contingency.
Uncertainty in controllable load can be very large and results from significant diurnal
and seasonal variations in the load composition [109]. Fast-acting demand response is
typically associated with heating, cooling, and more recently, vehicle charging loads
because they are flexible in the short term and are usually a significant fraction of
the total load at peak times when generation contingencies pose a greater threat to
overall system reliability.
7.3.1 Robustness to FADR Uncertainty
The robustness of the H2-optimal control policy relative to the conventional ACE
control in the presence of highly varying levels of FADR is apparent from Figure 5.11.
This result is highly significant, particularly when used in the context of FADR to mit-
igate high penetration of renewables. Increasing renewable resources are associated
104
with declining system inertial response [110] and can lead to more rapid degradation
in system stability. As previously discussed, increased FADR can also contribute to
deteriorating system stability margins [94]. So while FADR can mitigate renewable
intermittency in terms of temporarily relieving thermal generating units from having
to quickly ramp, it cannot be concluded that FADR necessarily improves short term
system stability without additional measures being applied to the area control policy.
The initial results for high-levels of FADR suggest that this is indeed the case and
that at the very least the conventional ACE control policy must be reexamined as in-
creasing levels of uncontrollable renewable generation are used and FADR is employed
to mitigate the impact.
A further consideration is the selection of the FADR design condition. In this
study a 5% FADR level was used. The performance of the new control policy using
this design condition is quite robust for a wide range of FADR levels. However, it
should be recognized that the new control policy is optimal only when the FADR
level is close to 5%. At other levels of FADR availability the performance would
be suboptimal, although it still remains much better than the conventional ACE
control policy, as the cost and energy savings in Table 5.1 demonstrate. This suggests
that careful consideration should be given to the choice of FADR design conditions,
especially with respect to (1) the probability distribution of FADR levels over the
course of time, (2) the probability of a generation contingency occurring over the
course of time, and (3) the relative cost impacts of those contingencies.
It is significant that the new control policy relies only on measurement of im-
port/export power from the control area. For the control policy to be effective, these
measurements must be made at very high rate compared to the SCADA measurement
rate of 0.25 Hz for ACE. Based on the very fast response rate of the loads, a mea-
surement rate similar to that of phasor measurement units (PMUs) may be necessary
for the proposed area control policy. Most PMUs can sample phase angles at 60 Hz,
and are capable of point-on-wave measurements in excess of 1000 Hz. However, the
control design would have to consider the communications latency from the remote
PMUs to the control area’s data concentrator [111]. PMU technology and availabil-
ity is evolving rapidly and the North America Synchrophasor Initiative (NASPI) has
considered the possibility of such a requirement in the design and implementation of
the current synchrophasor network [112].
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7.4 Dispatch
The significance of the results shown in Figure 6.3 cannot be understated. First we
observe that when the marginal price of energy a is much larger than the marginal
price of ramping c, the optimal response is very similar to the conventional dispatch
strategy, giving us some assurance that today’s operations are very nearly optimal.
However, when a << c, today’s hourly dispatch strategy is not optimal. As the frac-
tion of cost attributed to energy decreases relative to the cost attributed to ramping,
we see that ratio ω =
√
a
c
decreases and the value of changing the dispatch strategy
increases dramatically. In the limit of a very high renewable scenario the savings
achievable using the optimal dispatch strategy can be extremely significant. Failure
to adopt an optimal dispatch such as the one proposed could result in major and
likely unnecessary costs. Utilities will inevitably find it necessary to mitigate these
costs, either by reducing the amount of renewables, by increasing the revenues from
their customers, or by developing some kind of optimal resource allocation strategy
such as the one proposed.
A sensitivity analysis of the savings as a function of the marginal price of ramping
c shows that the savings are not overly sensitive to changes in our assumption of the
cost of ramping scarcity. Figure 7.4 shows that for a 50% decrease in c, we observe
a 10.3% decrease in savings, while a 50% increase in c results in a 3.9% increase in
savings. This suggests that the savings from employing the optimal dispatch strategy
is quite robust to our uncertainty about the marginal price of ramping resources.
In any financially sustainable future scenario, we must consider how the long-
term average costs and fixed costs are recovered under the pricing mechanism. We
have implicitly assumed in this study that renewable generation and utilities cannot
sustainably continue employing complex power purchasing agreements and subsidies
to hedge against energy price volatility. Instead all parties should come to rely on
separate real-time pricing mechanisms for energy, power and ramping response of the
resources they control.
Shifting revenue from resource allocation mechanisms based primarily on energy
resource scarcity to ones based primarily on flexibility resource scarcity can be ex-
pected to have a significant impact on the cost of subhourly resource dispatch. The
optimal strategy for low renewable conditions very closely matches the strategy em-
ployed today when moving hour-to-hour from one scheduled operating point to an-
other. Indeed, the optimal dispatch strategy does not offer any significant cost savings
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Figure 7.4: Sensitivity of savings to marginal price of ramping resources.
when overall pricing is dominated by energy resource scarcity.
However, as increasing amounts of renewables are introduced, the scarcity rents
may shift from energy to flexibility resources. The optimal subhourly dispatch strat-
egy may be expected to change with increasing emphasis on avoiding high ramp rates
over sustained periods at the expense of maintaining a constant power level over the
hour.
The relationship between existing price signals for various grid services and the
three principal price components needed to implement this optimal strategy requires
further investigation. It is evident that the marginal price a represents a linearization
of the energy price itself at the current operating point. But it is not clear yet whether
and to what degree the marginal prices b and c can be connected to any existing price
signals, such as the capacity price or the price of ancillary services such as frequency
regulation resources, generation reserves, and demand response. The links do suggest
themselves based on both the resource behaviors and physical dimensions of the
parameters. However, it is not yet certain whether this will be simply a matter of
obtaining a linearization of the services’ cost functions at the appropriate operating
point.
Additionally, it is instructive to note that the marginal price of redispatched power
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b is not important to the optimal dispatch strategy, insofar as the parameter does not
appear in Eq. 6.2. This leads one to conclude that to the extent capacity limits do not
affect either energy or ramping scarcity rents (or are already captured in them), the
marginal cost of additional resource capacity is never considered for optimal subhourly
dispatch control. This is consistent with the expectation that sunk costs should not
be a factor in the selection of which units to dispatch at what level, at least to the
extent that these costs are not entering into the energy or ramping costs.
In the presence of significant renewables, the energy marginal cost does not en-
tirely reflect the grid condition without considering the cost of ramping up and down
services. Therefore, the energy price cannot be solely used as a control signal to the
generation and load units to achieve the optimal utilization of resources. In order to
quantify the value of ramping product we suggest using a market framework in which
flexible generation and load resources compete to sell their ancillary service products
at the bulk electric system level. As renewable level rises the marginal price of energy
decreases (smaller a value) because renewables are zero-generation cost resources, but
the marginal price of ramping increases (larger c value) because the system requires
more flexibility to handle the generation variation. In long run, inflexible units get
retired and more flexible units are built to support the renewable integration since
flexibility will be a revenue source rather than energy.
The availability of high renewables can lead to situations where low cost energy
is being supplied to areas with high cost flexibility resources through constrained
interties. The optimal strategy avoids dispatching these high cost flexilibity resources
to the extent possible by reducing the ramping schedule. The more transmission
capacity available, the lower the overall cost, but we note that even when the system is
constrained, the cost of optimally dispatching flexibility resources can be significantly
lower under the high renewables case than under a low renewables scenario.
7.5 Ramping Market Price
Wholesale electric energy markets have been used widely since they were first in-
troduced in the 1980s. The market design is conceptually relatively simple and is
illustrated in Figure 7.5, where renewables have lower marginal cost than fossil units.
The supply and demand curves are constructed by summing the marginal cost func-
tions of all supply and demand units when ordered by price. As a result, when the
clearing price is obtained, only the supply units with marginal costs below that price
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Figure 7.5: Energy market with supply curve (red) and demand curve (blue), with
the price PC at which the export ∆Q is realized.
and demand units with reservation prices above that price are operated.
The key feature of this mechanism for the purposes of transactive control between
control areas that if a specific difference ∆Q between supply and demand is desired
(e.g., a specific import or export quantity is to be achieved) then we can directly
compute the price PC at which that import or export is realized.
Throughout this thesis ramping supply markets are used assuming (1) that they
exist and (2) that they operate in a similar manner. In this section we explore whether
these two assumptions are true and to the extent that they are not, what must be
done to see them realized.
We illustrate a wholesale ramping market in Figure 7.6. In this market, demand
response from loads are the least costly to deploy per unit of ramp rate, followed by
storage units, and fossil units are the most costly to deploy. The required rate Q˙C is
obtained from the real-time system operation, and units that have contributed to the
ramp response are compensated at the price RC . All the units with ramping prices
below RC are required to provide the ramp response Q˙C .
At this point it remains unclear how to design a market clearing mechanism that
generates the separate marginal price signals identified in the optimal dispatch strat-
egy in Chapter 6. This remains an important area of ongoing research.
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Figure 7.6: Ramping market with supply curve (red) and demand curve (blue), with
the price PC at which the export ∆Q is realized.
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Figure 7.7: Price-based control over-actuation of aggregate load
7.5.1 Unified Market Design
Throughout this thesis we have considered problems where energy, power and ramping
are controlled jointly. We have made the assumption that this is necessary based on
the observation that E(t) =
∫ t
0
L(x)dx and R(t) = L˙(t), where E is the total energy
consumed by the load L at the time t, and R is the rate of change of the load L
at the time t. We then recognized that there can be only one controllable resources
in the aggregate at any given timescale, as shown in Figure 7.7, using price control
gains KE, KQ and KR. Using independent prices for energy, power, and ramp as
control inputs at any given timescale to control the system leads to over-actuation
of the system–there are three control inputs (PE, PQ, and PR), but there is only one
degree of freedom (Q). Consequently we must consider a unified price-based control
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Figure 7.8: Market-based unified price-based control of aggregate load
where there is a single price, which effectively controls the joint energy, power and
ramp behavior of the load, as shown in Figure 7.8.
The unified price is given as
P (s) = B(s)
[
1
s
ME(s) +MQ(s) + sMR(s)
]
,
where ME, and MQ and ME are the energy, power, and ramp price-discovery mech-
anisms. The assumption in the literature is that these mechanisms are independent,
but the results of this thesis suggest that it cannot be so.
The energy and ramp market mechanisms are well separated in frequency domain,
and the results of the optimal dispatch function support this conclusion. However, the
bids into the energy market and the bids into the ramp market are not independent, as
is often recognized when one attempts co-optimization of the two. In the aggregate,
the ramp resources are determined by the cleared energy resources. Thus there is
only one set of coordinated bids, B, which come from the aggregated loads and must
be cleared through all the markets simultaneously, with each market influencing the
response in a separate response band in frequency domain.
What remains to be determined is the exact design of these bid clearing mech-
anisms so that they jointly determine a unified price. Specifically, we do not have
transfer functions that adequately describe the general transfer functions of these
markets such that we can bring control theory to bear on the system design problem.
In Appendix B we examine the stabilization of a “tatonnement” transfer function for
bilateral negotiated price discovery. The study of transfer functions for multilateral
and auction-based price discovery processes is a significant open area of research for
transactive control systems.
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7.6 Recommendations
In summary, we have identified the following ten recommendations for future work in
transactive control research.
Recommendation 1: Utilities need to identify the conditions under which price in-
stability can emerge under high renewables and implement either market and/or
distributed resource control mechanisms to mitigate them.
Recommendation 2: Strategic bidding may be necessary for resources to elicit
nonzero price signals. However, strategic bidding at the retail level entails
an entirely new class of regulatory oversight that is not currently envisioned in
most jurisdictions.
Recommendation 3: The benefits of automated metering infrastructure for resi-
dential customers have yet to be studied in detail or realized in practice, either
with indirect price-based or direct load control mechanisms.
Recommendation 4: Symmetric control, which uses all devices in the uncontrolled
population instead of only devices that are on, needs to be considered as a pos-
sible control approach that allows the utility mitigate renewable intermittency.
Recommendation 5: Adaptive control, model-predictive control and optimal con-
trol strategies should be considered for utility-scale resource dispatch, partic-
ularly in the context of optimal area control and balance frequency regulation
with periodic redispatch of distributed resources to maintain provision of suffi-
cient distributed resources for regulation services.
Recommendation 6: Further examination of the choices of fast-acting demand re-
sponse (FADR) designs is needed, especially with respect to (1) the availability
of FADR over time, (2) the probability of a generation contingency occurring
over time, and (3) the relative cost impacts of those contingencies.
Recommendation 7: Distributed resource control designs that depend on phasor
measurement units (PMUs) need to carefully consider the communications la-
tency from the remote PMUs to the control area’s data concentrator before
being considered as an element of or alternative to transactive control systems.
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Recommendation 8: The relationship between existing price signals for various
grid services and the energy, power, and ramp price components needed to
implement optimal dispatch strategies need to be investigated. Quadratic cost
functions allow a linearization of these prices at the current operating point.
But the marginal price of ramping in particular has yet to be connected to any
ancillary services market designs or existing cost functions.
Recommendation 9: The problem of how to design a general transactive market
clearing mechanism that discovers distinct marginal prices for energy and ramp-
ing remains an important unresolved question.
Recommendation 10: The exact design of market mechanisms that produces a
unified price signal is unresolved. Specifically, we do not have transfer functions
that adequately describes the power response as function of price in the short
term such that we can analyze system performance in general. The study of
transfer functions for multilateral and auction-based price discovery mechanisms
is an important open area of research for transactive control systems.
113
Chapter 8
Conclusions
The results of this thesis generally show that it is possible to establish both a common
transactive basis for control at over a wide range of scales, as well as achieve locally
advantageous implementations of transactive control that in many cases outperform
the conventional controls used today. This is achieved for example, by leveraging the
flexibility of millions of small load devices to relieve the burden on flexible generators
to respond to ramping demands stemming from the inflexibility of other generators.
Similarly, the results show how dispatch flexibility can be used to both guide more
robust and cost-effective frequency regulation response, as well as maintain optimal
scheduling from one hour to the next.
In this thesis we have examined four important areas of transactive control system
design that will be necessary to the eventual implementation of a more comprehensive
transaction energy system. These are (1) aggregate demand response observation and
(2) aggregate discrete-time cyclic load control, (3) optimal frequency regulation with
area import/export tracking, and (4) optimal area dispatch.
An ab initio aggregate load model of fast-acting controllable thermostatic elec-
tric loads operating under the transactive control paradigm that corresponds
to the Random Utility Model commonly used in the economics of consumer
choice. The proposed model is verified with empirical data collected from field
demonstration projects and shown to perform better than alternate models
commonly used to forecast demand in normal operating conditions. The results
suggest more broadly that (1) existing utility tariffs appear may be unable to
incentivize sufficient fast-acting demand response to mitigate the impact of high
renewables, and (2) existing load control systems may be easily saturated and
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become unstable if utilities simply close the control loop using only real-time
energy prices.
An aggregate load controller for discrete-time zero-deadband thermostats, a gen-
eral controller design that allows various aggregate load control strategies to be
explored, and specific controller that allow large-scale control of thermostatic
loads that have high endurance. The aggregate load controller is studied for a
variety of conventional control designs and is used to design a stable discrete-
time closed-loop aggregate load controller for a utility-scale demand response
dispatch system. The new controller is shown to be stable, controllable, and
observable. It is tested using a large-scale agent-based model of residential
heating loads, and works equally well with both direct and indirect load control
systems.
A frequency regulation strategy using an H2-optimal controller for control ar-
eas in bulk electricity interconnections that is suited to jointly controlling gen-
eration and demand response in areas that have a high penetration of both
intermittent renewable resources and fast-acting demand response. The mecha-
nism offers significant cost savings in systems with very high levels of renewable
resources. The results show that the optimal controller outperforms the conven-
tional ACE control policy by 1) providing faster return to the schedule under
varying demand response levels, 2) reducing the cost of calling up reserve units
for regulation services, and 3) minimizing deviations from the global surplus-
maximizing schedule.
An optimal dispatch that considers both the cost of energy and the cost of ramp-
ing simultaneously and exploits significant cost savings opportunities in systems
with high levels of renewable generation. The optimal price-based control solu-
tion responds to both a short-term price of energy for demand dispatch, as well
as a short-term price of power for ramp response. The result is (1) a formal
method to compute the optimal sub-hourly power trajectory for a system when
the cost of energy and ramping are both of the same order, (2) an optimal re-
source allocation strategy based on this optimal trajectory, and (3) a simulation
method to evaluate the cost savings potential of using the optimal trajectory
when compared to the conventional sub-hourly dispatch used in today’s system
operation.
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8.1 Principal Contributions and Findings
(1) Demand Response can be modeled as a logistic demand curve for short term
electricity consumption derived from the first principles of controllable thermo-
static electric loads operating under the transactive control paradigm. We have
shown that this model corresponds to the Random Utility Model commonly used
in the economics of consumer choice. The model’s performance is compared to
results from two US Department of Energy demonstration projects in which
short-term demand response data were obtained. We found that the random
utility model predicts the total demand response to smaller price fluctuations
very well, but that model performance degrades as the magnitude and frequency
of price excursions increases and as the diversity of load states decreases. We
conclude that the random utility model is suitable for demand response studies
that utilize steady state conditions for most situations with only infrequent and
modest price excursions.
In its present form the random utility model provides a robust framework that
is well-founded in the engineering principles of how thermostatic devices behave
in price-based control environments. By joining the engineering and economic
behavior of such devices, the random utility model is set to become an essential
element in the planning, design and eventual deployment of large-scale load
control strategies.
(2) Load Aggregation at the utility scale was developed in the direct load con-
trol problem for the situation in which the controlled loads employ discrete-
time zero-deadband (T∆0) residential thermostats. We showed how T∆0 ther-
mostats allow utility dispatchers to use small adjustments to the consumer’s
setpoint to modulate the total load with greater precision than is possible using
current setback control of thermostats with non-zero deadbands. These new
digital thermostats can serve as the basis for highly accurate direct load control
systems, as well as price-based indirect load control systems.
A new linear aggregate load model was found based on the dynamics of load
states and its fundamental characteristics were used to consider a number of
benchmark aggregate load control designs from first principles. We used this
model to design a simple closed-loop aggregate controller for a discrete-time
utility-scale demand response dispatch system that is compatible with the re-
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quirements for both direct and indirect load control systems and tested the
control design using a large-scale agent-based model of demand response based
on thermostatic loads. We showed that the aggregate controlled load is stable,
controllable, and observable, and exhibits both the transient and steady-state
response characteristics necessary to serve equally well for utilities that seek
to control load using either direct load control or price-based indirect demand
response strategies.
(3) Optimal regulation using an H2-optimal approach was synthesized to obtain
the control policy for control areas in bulk electricity interconnections. The
approach is suited to controlling both generation and demand response in areas
that have a high penetration of both intermittent renewable resources and fast-
acting demand response. The implementation of the H2-optimal control policy
is compatible with, and indeed depends on the existing methods of transactive
control 5-minute dispatch strategy. The transactive H2-optimal area control
policy was shown to be superior to the conventional ACE control policy in
that it is (1) significantly more robust to uncertainty in the amount of fast-
acting demand response that is available, (2) always less costly and less energy
intensive, and (3) minimizes deviation from any surplus maximizing schedule.
(4) Optimal dispatch was solved using a strategy that considers both the cost of
energy and the cost of ramping simultaneously, which leads to significant cost
savings in systems with high levels of renewable generation. For the WECC 2024
common case the savings can exceed 40% of total operating costs in the high
renewables scenario. As the bulk power interconnection marginal resources shift
from primarily dispatchable non-zero marginal fuel cost resources (e.g., natu-
ral gas) to primarily non-dispatchable renewable resources (e.g., wind, solar)
we expect a steady shift in bulk system revenue from energy scarcity rent to
ramping scarcity rent. While the total revenue must remain largely the same
for financial sustainability, the scarcity pricing mechanism must change.
8.2 Future Research
As discussed in Chapter 7 the results achieved do not provide all the elements nec-
essary to realize the vision of a fully transactive system. Significant work remains
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at all physical and temporal scales. Notably absent is the computational infras-
tructure required for transactive implementations. Also significant is that very few
pilot projects are planned, particularly addressing coordination by higher level system
functions such as control area dispatch or inter-area scheduling. With regard to the
specific systems discussed in this these, the following future research opportunities
have been identified.
8.2.1 Demand Response
Future work on short-term aggregate demand response must investigate models that
account for varying effective duty cycles for large populations of responsive loads and
account for the effect of large fast changes in prices. Methods based on the entropy
of the population states seem to offer significant promise.
The random utility model supports previous claims that additional research will
be required to mitigate the potential instabilities that may emerge when employing
real-time pricing signals for closed-loop feedback control of fast-acting residential
demand response. This work will necessarily require a contribution from the field of
control theory, while maintaining strong support from economists with an interest in
mechanism design.
The model also highlights emerging challenges for tariff design and rate approval
processes, particularly in cases where significant distributed generation and storage
resources participate in price-discovery alongside fast-acting demand response. The
question of incentive-compatible retail market design can be expected to become more
important as new tariffs and rate structures are developed by utilities and regulators.
8.2.2 Aggregate Thermostatic Load Control
Future work on thermostatic control needs to develop parameter system identification
strategies that facilitate the implementation of practical load control at the utility
scale. In addition, adaptive control, model-predictive control and optimal control
strategies should be considered. The last seems particularly interesting in the context
of optimal area control and balance frequency regulation objectives with periodic
redispatch of load control resources to keep the maximum number of loads available
for regulation services over time.
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8.2.3 Regulation
The H2-optimal control design has considered only local disturbances, viz., loss of
generation originating within the same generation control area. It will be necessary
to consider a wide range of additional disturbances including
1. An internal loss of load (note that this is not equivalent to a negative loss of
generation because the responsive resource mix changes),
2. An external loss of generation or load,
3. A loss of a tieline between generation control areas, and
4. Rapid ramp up and down, both internally and externally, due to unexpected
changes in renewable resources.
In addition, the new control policy must address the impact of eliminating direct
observation of system frequency from the measurement. The role of the secondary
generation is to cancel the steady-state frequency deviation and bring each area’s
net exports back to the scheduled value, either with ACE or H2-optimal control.
A component of the H2-optimal area generation control minimizes the frequency
deviations so it will cope with some, but not necessarily all of the steady-state fre-
quency deviation. It seems unlikely that such a change to the area control policy
could go unnoticed, particularly in the event that system inertia and damping change
significantly in a short time. Although generation droop remains in effect for all con-
trolled generating units that do not have a master controller, the slow diminution of
droop-only units could lead to situations where there is slow or inadequate control of
system frequency even though there is very authoritative control of inter-area power
exchanges.
This study examined an extreme case in which 75% of the generation was un-
controlled renewable and only 25% of the generation was regulated using the area
control policy. For one thing, such a great percentage of renewables means the sys-
tem does not have enough inertia to deal with both renewable and load uncertainty,
so the existing AGC system is unable to adequately control the system. Although we
considered a relatively low inertia systems, we expect that much lower total system
inertia should be considered (perhaps as low as M = 2 seconds). With such low
system inertia it seems even more likely that control areas will require an augmented
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or entirely new control policy, and that the advantage of H2-optimal ACE control
may be more evident.
In North America, balancing authorities are scored based on how well they con-
tribute to interconnection frequency regulation needs while tracking their export
schedule. The optimal response as presented here does not consider how often “zero-
crossings” of nominal frequency occur or how noisy frequency control is. Future
studies of optimal-ACE policies considering fast-acting demand response control de-
sign will need to also consider the control performance standards CPS-1 and CPS-2
[91].
8.2.4 Dispatch
The principal consequence of using the proposed dispatch strategy for control areas
considering both energy and ramping costs is an annual cost savings in WECC pro-
jected to exceed US$150B by the year 2024. Extrapolated roughly to all of North
America, this may result in savings approach US$500B annually. It is also clear
that the use of energy-only market designs runs counter to the results of this study.
Flexilibity resource markets may become increasingly important as ramping resources
become more scare. This may be true even in regions that are not dominated by local
renewable generation but adequate transmission capacity is available for renewables
in remote regions to displace local dispatchable generation. This may give rise to a
new set of challenges for utility and system operators as they seek a revenue model
that not only provides for operating costs, but also maintains the coupling between
retail demand response and wholesale supply and retail delivery constraints. If the
cost of the wholesale system becomes increasingly dominated by ramping resource
constraints, while retail continues to use energy prices to encourage consumer effi-
ciency, then retail behavior will be not affected as much by short-term wholesale
price fluctuations. This trend runs against the desire for more engaged consumers
who can respond to system conditions in real time. Clearly a new utility revenue
model is needed if the transformation to a high renewable modus operandi is to occur
successfully in the coming decades.
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8.3 Summary
Taken as a whole the results of this thesis show that one can incorporate transactive
energy technology into today’s system operations without simultaneously transform-
ing all aspects of system operation in all parts of the system. Each solution can
be independently deployed profitably and successfully in a heterogenous operating
environment while maintaining system reliability, security, and economic stability.
But the advantages of integrating these solutions together grow with the increased
use of transactive technologies, with greater availability of renewable energy resources,
and with greater participation by consumer-based assets in system operation. In the
final analysis, transactive control offers the greatest potential for consumer benefits,
the most flexibility approach to evolving the utility business model, and most impor-
tantly the most effective means of addressing the global impact of meeting the energy
demands of the 21st century economy.
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Appendix A
Demand Elasticity
Over the years, research has consistently shown that demand response (DR) can
participate in all electricity markets, including energy, capacity, and regulation [28].
Transactive control and Powermatcher were proposed and demonstrated in the field
as approaches that could unify the scheduling, dispatch and control of all distributed
energy resources, including DR, on the retail side [38]. Since then there is growing
interest in the broader concept of transactive energy in both Europe and North Amer-
ica [113]. In addition a number of important technical contributions have been made
to support transactive energy systems, including the design of device controllers [73],
real-time pricing [114], and retail market designs, in various jurisdictions in North
America and elsewhere.
However, the fundamental behaviors and properties of transactive systems remain
a largely open research area. From the viewpoint of power system and control engi-
neering, this is a critical gap and to this day it stands as a significant barrier to the
widespread adoption of transactive control systems—utilities are hesitant to adopt a
new control strategy in the absence of a clear and validated mathematical framework
to study and prove the stability, robustness, and reliability against all hazards.
One important aspect of this gap is the nature and role of DR elasticity of energy,
power, and ramp resources in electricity markets. This appendix briefly presents a
result that may be of significance to researchers in transactive energy and transactive
control insofar as it establishes a strong and potentially useful connection between the
elasticity of energy, power and ramp response resources in electricity markets, both
wholesale and retail. This relationship is examined and its implications are discussed
briefly with respect to the design of DR controllers, utility and demand aggregator
business models, and regulatory oversight of electricity markets, especially in the
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context of retail competition.
A.1 Analysis
Consider the energy consumption q(p, t) at the energy price p and time t, the price
varying also in time. The power demand is
s(p, t) =
∂q(p, t)
∂t
and the ramp rate is
r(p, t) =
∂s(p, t)
∂t
=
∂2q(p, t)
∂t2
.
We know the energy demand elasticity is
ηq(p, t) =
p
q(p, t)
∂q(p, t)
∂p
and if we assume that short term energy elasticity (viz., 1 hour or less) is the constant
ηq, then we must have
q(p, t) =
p
ηq
∂q(p, t)
∂p
∂q(p, t)
∂t
=
∂
∂t
(
p
ηq
∂q(p, t)
∂p
)
ηqs(p, t) =
∂p
∂t
∂q(p, t)
∂p
+ p
∂2q(p, t)
∂p∂t
=
∂q(p, t)
∂t
+ p
∂
∂p
∂q(p, t)
∂t
= s(p, t) + p
∂s(p, t)
∂p
(ηq − 1)s(p, t) = p∂s(p, t)
∂p
and thus the power demand elasticity
ηs =
p
s(p, t)
∂s(p, t)
∂p
= ηq − 1
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By similar reasoning we find that the ramp demand elasticity is
ηr =
p
r(p, t)
∂r(p, t)
∂p
= ηs − 1
and we identify a previously unrecognized but potentially important relation between
the energy, power and ramp response elasticities with respect to energy price:
ηq = ηs + 1 = ηr + 2 (A.1)
We make the following observations based on Equation (A.1).
1. When any one of the ramp, power, or energy demand elasticities is
constant in time then they all are constant in time. Thus it is only
necessary to observe one constant elasticity to know them all.
2. In the limit of absolutely inelastic energy demand, power demand
elasticity is unitary. This result implies that even though energy demand
may be nearly inelastic, power and ramp demand can remain highly elastic.
3. Ramp demand elasticity is always highly elastic. This suggests that for
ramping DR resources, the supplier of ramp resources never has market power.
A.2 Discussion
The absence of concurrent energy, power, and ramp pricing and DR data to val-
idate Equation (A.1) is noted. We believe those with access to field data on DR
elasticity should examine their data to confirm whether and under what conditions
Equation (A.1) holds. In addition, we suggest the following research questions be
considered in light of Equation (A.1) and the observations made above.
A.2.1 Device Control
If a device that demands energy is designed to elicit information from the consumer
for the purposes of developing a demand curve, then Equation (A.1) implies that it is
sufficient to obtain this information for only one of energy, power, or ramp responses
and the other demand curves may be computed directly. It is not necessary to design
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a separate transactive control strategy for the energy, power, and ramp behavior of
the device.
In addition, this result suggests that policies to prevent resources from bidding
concurrently in energy, capacity and regulation markets may not conform to the
underlying dynamics of transactive systems. Devices cannot decouple these behaviors
from each other even if they wanted to. This fits well with markets that concurrently
clear energy, capacity, and regulation prices and ensures that no device is provided
conflicting or inconsistent price signals from the markets.
A.2.2 Business Models
Utilities and load aggregators must consider the market power implications of Equa-
tion (A.1), insofar as they will often have monopoly market power as suppliers of
energy DR resource while having monopsony market power as consumers of ramp re-
sponse resources. We note in particular that because load is likely to supply ramping
resources its market power is expected to be as low as it is for energy demand, while
power response resources will likely be close to unitary elasticity. This is particularly
important as utilities begin to shift revenue away from energy-based tariffs toward
tariffs based on products and services that have greater downward substitutability.
However, if customers are purchasing ramping DR to mitigate the intermittency
of their own on-site renewables such as solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, then their
market power increases. The presence of large numbers of such PV- and DR-enabled
consumers can be expected to create a rich and flexible retail market in which re-
sources can be coordinated using only price signals. If the utility uses a business
model based on revenue from trading activity rather than revenue from sales of net
energy, capacity scarcity or ramping services, then it is likely to see greater stability
in net revenue by becoming a market maker rather than a provider of last resort for
these resources.
A.2.3 Regulatory Oversight
From the regulatory perspective, the utility as a market maker presents a new chal-
lenge. Historically, regulatory bodies have focused on authorizing retail tariffs because
the utility is a natural monopoly. If the utility is a market maker reimbursed only
for the cost of operating the system that enables trading and delivery among market
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participants, then the regulator now ensures that the utility’s market and operation
costs are fair and equitable.
However, the regulator is now also concerned with whether the market is being
manipulated by any of the participants. As a result, regulators must work with
utilities to determine whether any customer or load aggregator is exerting excessive
market power. The methods for this kind of monitoring are well-known from other
markets. But we expect that certain particulars will be unique for retail electricity
markets, particularly in light of the conditions that give rise to Equation (A.1). This
problem is complicated by the tight coupling of energy, power, and ramping, as a
result of which mitigating the utilities’ energy monopoly power may not be sufficient
to mitigate their monopsony market power for ramping services, or vice-versa.
A.3 Conclusion
Transactive energy facilitates integrated economic and technical scheduling, dispatch
and control of demand response resources as intermittent renewable energy grows
and challenges the economic viability, security and reliability of bulk electricity sys-
tems. We have shown that there exists an important and simple relationship between
the energy price elasticities of energy demand, power capacity demand and ramping
resources. Data collection from existing demand response systems is needed to val-
idate this result. But the strong coupling of energy, power, and ramping response
elasticities may have important consequences on how we design, deploy, and operate
demand response controls, on which utility business models are preferred, and on how
we adapt our regulatory oversight mechanisms to better monitor transactive energy
systems.
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Appendix B
Price Negotiation Convergence
Indirect dispatch systems use incentive signals such as real-time prices to “call” de-
mand response. Most of these systems use day-ahead price signals [115]. Faster-
acting 5-minute real-time pricing was also demonstrated successfully in the Olympic
and Columbus studies. However, in all such systems computing the incentive signal
to be dispatched can be a challenge. In particular, price-feedback systems have been
shown to be potentially unstable when they are based on previous responses [82]. In
the case of the 5-minute real-time pricing system, a retail double auction was used in
which consumer bid prices above which they would forgo consumption for the next
five minutes. The advantage of using auctions is that by eliminating the time delay
in the feedback, a significant source of the system instability is mitigated.
Unfortunately, auction-based price discovery mechanisms are not always feasible
or desirable. In the Pacific study an iterative price-discovery approach was proposed
as an alternative to auction-based mechanisms [116]. In this paper we discuss the tech-
nical considerations regarding negotiated price-discovery mechanisms when applied
to demand response dispatch problems. We address one of the principal problems in
fast-acting indirect demand dispatch; i.e., computing the incentive signal necessary
to achieve a particular level of demand response. We specifically examine the theo-
retical basis for a real-time negotiation-based price-discovery mechanisms such as the
one tested in the Pacific demonstration and propose an approach for ensuring that
such mechanisms robustly and reliably find the retail price at which supply will equal
demand.
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B.1 Transactive Price-Discovery
We first examine the technical considerations for utilities that wish to dispatch de-
mand response for loads that present responses that are functionally unknown. When
this situation arises, utilities must employ one of several possible mechanisms to dis-
cover the dispatch signal that will satisfy the physical constraints on the system. In
this section we will consider one such mechanism with the understanding that the
principles and methods apply more broadly to any iterative price-discovery mech-
anism a utility may wish to employ. The main contribution of this section is the
derivation of a technique to evaluate limitations on iterative mechanisms used to de-
termine the price at which supply equals demand. We examine this limitation to
illustrate how one can use it to design stable real-time price discovery mechanisms
for retail electricity markets.
Using arbitrary functional models of supply and demand we can analytically ex-
amine the behavior of iterative price discovery mechanisms used in systems that do
not employ auction clearing for price-discovery. The simplest iterative price-discovery
method is a negotiated price, in which the utility offers an initial hypothetical price
p(0) to which potential consumers respond either individually or in the aggregate
with a hypothetical quantity q(0). The utility follows up with a second proposed
price p(1) to which the consumers respond with a proposed quantity q(1), followed
by p(2), q(2) and p(3), q(3) and so on until the utility determines that the process
has converged on a price that cannot be changed significantly without increasing the
mismatch between supply and demand, or that the process must be stopped due to
excessive iteration.
In such a process it is presumed that the functions used by suppliers and consumers
to convert quantities to prices and prices to quantities, are respectively the supply
and demand curves. These curves are not shared in their entirety with the other
party, either because they are considered too business-sensitive to reveal (as is often
the case with suppliers) or because they are not explicitly known to the party (as is
often the case for consumers). The exchange is also presumed to be so limited that
neither party can deduce the other’s complete curve, while still sufficient to reliably
deduce the dispatch price and quantity at which the two curves intersect.
The simplest possible iterative price-discovery process can be described using the
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Figure B.1: Logistic map iteration sequence of price discovery mechanisms in a trans-
active system for a < −b (left) and a > −b (right).
iterative state equations for quantity and price
q(k) =
1
b
[p(k)− P ] +Q and p(k + 1) = a[q(k)−Q] + P,
where a and b are the slopes of the supply and demand curves, and P and Q are
the clearing price and quantity, to which the negotiation process should converge.
When the supply and demand curves are linear functions, we can define the iterative
price-discovery process using a linear discrete-time state-space representation[
p(k + 1)
q(k + 1)
]
=
[
0 a
a
b2
0
][
p(k)
q(k)
]
for k = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
The stability of this iterative price-discovery mechanism is determined by the mag-
nitude of the roots of the system’s characteristic equation z2 − a2
b2
= 0. Noting that
b < 0 < a, we conclude that the negotiation can converge on the clearing price and
quantity only when a < −b.
The impact of this stability condition is illustrated in Figure B.1 for two different
combinations of a and b, one stable (top) and one unstable (bottom). When the slopes
of the supply curve (a) and demand curves (b) in the neighborhood of the clearing
price are such that their ratio (a/b) is less than −1, the iterative price discovery
mechanism fails to converge on the clearing price and quantity1.
1The scenario presented assumes that the negotiation always begins with an opening bid from
the supplier. If the opening bid is from the consumer, the iteration direction shown in Figure B.1
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This stability condition cannot be generally satisfied for all linear supply and
demand curves, specifically when supply is very inelastic and/or demand is very
elastic. Neither do we expect it to be satisfied for any general non-linear curves. We
can evaluate whether a non-linear system will be stable by considering the following
approximations for the supply and demand responses
p˜(k + 1) = αq(k)2 + βq(k) + Pmin
and
q˜(k) = QU +QR
p(k)
Pmax
respectively, in the neighborhood of the clearing price and quantity. This approxima-
tion is the canonical quadratic map problem based on the recurrence equation
xn =
1
2
(
1− f(n) [rnf(x)−1(1− 2x0)])
where f(n) is the time-domain solution function and f(x)−1 is its inverse [117]. This
system is known to be meta-stable (i.e. it has no single fixed solution point xn) for
values of r > 3.5, and chaotic for values of r > 4, with closed-form solutions to f
known only for r ∈ {−2, 2, 4}.
To determine the stability of a linear negotiated market clearing mechanism when
the supply and demand curves are not linear functions, we must evaluate the joint
spectral radius for the linearized state space representation[
p(k + 1)
q(k + 1)
]
=
[
0 A(q(k))
A(q(k))
B2(p(k))
0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
[
p(k)
q(k)
]
for k = 0, 1, 2, · · ·
where (A,B) ∈ G are the first order terms of the Taylor expansions
P (x− q) = P (q) + P ′(q)︸ ︷︷ ︸
A(q)
(x− q) + 1
2
P ′′(q)(x− q)2 + · · ·
Q(y − p) = Q(p) +Q′(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B(p)
(y − p) + 1
2
Q′′(p)(y − p)2 + · · ·
is reversed and thus the stability condition is reversed as well. This suggests that one approach to
addressing stability is to simply reverse the negotiation process when convergence is not achieved.
However, this approach does not improve the convergence rate.
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of the demand and supply curves about the price and quantity at the iteration k,
respectively. Such a system is only stable when the mean spectral radius ρ(G) < 1.
Thus we can only say that for systems with small amounts of demand response and
typical supply curves, convergence can be expected when the supply and demand
elasticities at the clearing price and quantity are such that −B(Pc) < A(Qc). If
this is not true, the negotiation will converge only to a boundary region outside of
which this condition is satisfied because within that region the process diverges. If
the clearing price and quantity are inside the divergence region, then they cannot be
discovered by the simple linear negotiation strategy described above.
In the case of logistic demand curves observed in transactive system field demon-
strations to date, convergence is possible only when
ηD > − 1
ηS
(
Pc
Qc
)2
(B.1)
where ηS and ηD are the supply and demand elasticities at the clearing price, respec-
tively. This limits the conditions for which convergence is possible when using linear
negotiation stratgies to only relatively inelastic demand curves in the neighborhood
of the clearing price and quantity. The more elastic supply is, the less elastic demand
must be for the negotiation to successfully converge on a price at which supply will
equal demand. As has been observed in the field demonstration data, high demand
elasticities do occur during period of constrained supply conditions. This is why
we conclude that simple linear iterative negotiated price-discovery mechanisms are
generally unsuitable for price-based demand response dispatch systems such as those
used for transactive control.
B.2 Stable Mechanism Design
We can use the insights gained from the analysis above to devise a price discovery
mechanism using an enhanced negotiating strategy for the utility that will satisfy
its objective of quickly finding a price at which supply equals demand. The util-
ity’s second proposed price in response to the consumer’s initial proposed quantity is
augmented with a term that includes the last proposed price, such that
p(k + 1) = [c− kp]p(k) + [a− kq]q(k)
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Figure B.2: Advanced negotation strategy diagram with quantity constraint tracking
where c is a proportional coefficient for the previous price, and K = [kp, kq] are
feedback coefficients that we will use to tune the relative input of the previous price
and quantity. The design of this system is illustrated in Figure B.2 and the state-
space representation of this advanced negotiation strategy for any reference quantity
input r(k) is [
p(k + 1)
q(k + 1)
]
=
[
c a
a
b2
+ c 0
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
G
[
p(k)
q(k)
]
−
[
1
1
b
]
︸︷︷︸
H
[
kp kq
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
K
[
p(k)
q(k)
]
(B.2)
with the output quantity
y(k) =
[
0 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
c
[
p(k)
q(k)
]
.
The negotiation strategy design problem for the utility is then reduced to deter-
mining the value K such that negotiation converges as quickly as possible on the price
at which supply equals demand. This “deadbeat” system response requires that the
characteristic equation be reduced to z2 = 0, a condition which can be obtained when
K =
[
c− a
2
b2c(b− 1) −
a
b
, a+
a2
bc(b− 1)
]
. (B.3)
An example for three different levels of demand response is shown in Figure B.3,
where the demand curve has been linearized in the neighborhood of the clearing
price and quantity, as described above. In all three cases, the deadbeat negotiating
strategy converges in two iterations to the clearing price and quantity, outperforming
the simple linear negotiation strategy for even the stable case. More significantly, the
deadbeat strategy converges when the simple strategy fails to converge.
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Figure B.3: Simulation of stable (left), marginal (center) and unstable (right) negotia-
tions without (dotted) and with (solid) corresponding deadbeat negotiation strategies.
B.2.1 Demand Response Uncertainty
We note that in Equation (B.3) the slope of the demand curve b is included in the
computation of the negotiation strategy parameters of K. Uncertainty in b can result
in an error in the clearing price and quantity. The demand curve may not be known
exactly or it may change from time to time. The utility may wish to employ an
enhanced negotiation strategy to reduce the clearing price error that may result from
inaccurate estimation of this demand curve parameter b.
A reliable design method based on control theory is to compensate for the un-
known demand function by implementing integral error feedback [87] in the negoti-
ation process. This approach adds a third state to the state-space representation in
Equation (B.2). This new state represents the accumulated error between the most
recent quantity from the consumer(s) and the clearing quantity. This error is then
multiplied by a gain ke and the result is added to the price response p(k + 1). This
approach raises the overall order of the system by one and can be expected to de-
crease the convergence rate compared to the deadbeat negotiation. But integral error
feedback has the significant advantage that it compensates for all constant errors in
the system, not just demand elasticity estimation errors. The same method used to
find K above can be used in this case to find the joint feedback gains [K, ke] required
to obtain the fastest possible convergence using a linear negotiation. The behavior of
this price-discovery mechanism is illustrated in Figure B.4.
The solution for [K, ke] using this approach can be found given any reasonable
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Figure B.4: Discrete-time system diagram of advanced negotation strategy diagram
with demand curve uncertainty
assumption for the value of b. Choosing a value of bˆ = −1 gives the solution for the
feedback gains
kp = 1, kq = a+
1
a
, and ke = 1− 1a , . (B.4)
The general solution for the augmented state approach is
kp = 1, kq = a+
bˆ2
a
, and ke = 1− bˆ2a
where bˆ is the utility’s estimate for the slope b of the demand response curve, as
illustrated in Figure B.5. The general solution can be expressed in terms of a utility’s
price negotiation strategy as
p(k + 1) = p(k) + (2a+ 1) q(k) +
(
1− bˆ
2
a
)
k−1∑
j=1
q(j)
which will converge in a finite time when b < 0 < a but with no particular restriction
on the relative magnitudes of a and b.
The closed-loop stability of this solution depends on the magnitude of the error
in the estimate of bˆ. Specifically, the characteristic equation of this price-discovery
solution is
z(z2 − 1 + bˆ
2
b2
)
which suggests that convergence is guaranteed when
√
2b < bˆ < 0. (B.5)
The constraint that the magnitude bˆ cannot be more than about 40% greater than b
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Figure B.5: Integral error feedback negotiation strategy for the same cases as Fig-
ure B.3 with a +10% error in the demand response curve estimate bˆ.
is a generally reasonable one for the slope of the demand curve in the neighborhood
of the solution price and quantity.
B.3 Conclusions
The dependence of deadbeat negotiation strategy on the utility’s knowledge of the
demand curve slope b suggests that it is possible to compute the clearing price using a
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parametric fit of the demand curve from a very large set of bids instead of negotiating
with all the loads individually. Instead of performing an auction clearing as in the
Olympic and Columbus demonstration projects the utility can indirectly determined
the price at which supply equals demand by computing what the negotiation would
produce given the demand curve imputed by the bids without actually performing the
negotiation.
This method does assume that the demand curve fits a mathematical function of
some type that can be expected to represent the loads’ collective behavior most of
the time. For example, the demand curve may generally take the form of a logistic
function as observed during quiescent periods in both the Olympic and Columbus
demonstrations. This function was derived in Chapter 3 and has the form
Q = (1 + eα+βP )−1QR +QU
where α is the unobservable component of the demand response behavior and β is the
observable component. The parameters can be estimated using the logistic regression
α = P¯ − βξ¯
and
β =
Pξ − P¯ ξ¯
P 2 − P¯ 2 .
where ξ = ln(QU +QR−Q)− ln(Q−QU). Given such a fit we can estimate the slope
of the demand curve at the clearing price
bˆ = − βQRe
α+βP
(eα+βP + 1)2
,
a value that can be readily used to compute the clearing price without performing
the full market clearing procedure.
In control theory a non-zero reference quantity r(k) is included in Equation (B.2).
This term merits further consideration because it can be used by the utility to change
the quantity that the negotiation will converge to. However, this quantity does not
necessarily converge to a price at which supply will equal demand. Non-equilibrium
values of r(k) may be theoretically interesting, but they likely do not have physical
meaning that is useful unless the utility intentionally wishes to increase or decrease the
load for some operational reason, such as maintaining a net level of imports or exports.
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Generally such deliberate manipulation of the negotiation strategy should be regarded
with skepticism, particularly if the result would be an economically inefficient price
or a power imbalance that results in operational reliability concerns.
Control theory also suggests that when using the integral error feedback negoti-
ation strategy, a better estimate bˆ of the demand response slope b results in a faster
convergence for the negotiation. But the process will always converge regardless of the
error. Here again, collecting real-time demand data from customers can contribute
to significantly improving the performance of the price-discovery mechanism by pro-
viding information needed to obtain a sufficiently accurate estimate of the demand
curve slope.
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Appendix C
Model Specifications
Table C.1: Aggregate Load Model Parameters
Parameter Variable Distribution µ σ Remarks
Wall conductivity UA Normal 350 50 Truncated at ±3σ
Air heat capacity CA Normal 2000 150 Truncated at ±3σ
Mass conductivity UM Normal 2000 500 Truncated at ±3σ
Mass heat capacity CM Normal 10000 1000 Truncated at ±3σ
Setpoint temperature TS Normal 72 1 Truncated at ±3σ
Design temperature TH None 10 –
Equipment oversizing − QH(TH−TS)UA Normal 1.55 0.15 Truncated at ±3σ
Equipment efficiency COP Normal 3.0 0.5 Truncated at ±3σ
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Table C.2: WECC 2024 demand forecast and internal area losses [1]
Area Peak Energy Loss
number Consolidated area [MW] [GWh/year] factor
1 AESO 16095 115061 1.019
2 BCH 12542 69326 1.020
3 PNW = AVA + BPA + CHPD 33384 184103 1.025
+ DOPD + GCPD + PACW
+ PGE + PSEI + SCL + TPWR
4 NWMT 1898 12163 1.023
5 PAWY 1681 11028 1.013
6 NCA = BANC + CIPB 30626 144848 1.043
+ CIPV + TIDC
7 SPPC 2447 15784 1.026
8 ID = IPFE + IPMV + IPTV 4157 19290 1.036
9 UT = PAID + PAUT 8443 39362 1.028
10 CO = WACM + WAUW 5867 34863 1.023
11 LDWP 7789 34129 1.027
12 NEVP 7034 30083 1.045
13 PSCO 8130 41027 1.028
14 SCA = CISC + VEA 26847 119573 1.040
15 AZ = AZPS + SRP 23596 109534 1.026
+ TEPC + WALC
16 CISD 5573 26702 1.037
17 IID 1342 4836 1.043
18 PNM 3136 16449 1.026
19 CEF 3255 15452 1.033
20 EPE 2391 11106 1.032
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Table C.3: WECC 2024 aggregated installed supply capacity [1]
Non-dispatchable (must-take) generation Dispatchable
Area Intermittent [MW] Base (invariable) [MW] generation [MW]
AESO 2275.2 3710 17733
BCH 815.3 3531 17000
PNW 14432.0 5845 36675
NWMT 664.2 1227 1993
PAWY 1315.3 1648 2105
NCA 5092.7 5351 38684
SPPC 800.0 1118 3287
ID 660.3 374 2845
UT 256.5 2183 8136
CO 656.4 1807 4310
LDWP 687.0 89 8727
NEVP 75.7 426 13085
PSCO 2441.1 1616 11645
SCA 6028.1 977 28645
AZ 3220.6 8601 39353
CISD 432.8 34 8558
IID 34.4 1170 1514
PNM 840.3 910 4504
CFE 384.2 697 6600
EPE 1.3 0 3512
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Table C.4: WECC 2024 producer cost and surplus difference for 100% inelastic load
(in M$/year) [1]
Producer cost reduction Producer surplus reduction
Unconstrained Constrained Unconstrained Constrained
AESO 6642 1797 11421 2820
BCH 55 149 79 284
PNW 35 479 -552 588
NWMT -260 -236 -1622 -1516
PAWY -297 -246 -2513 -2132
NCA -393 121 -817 145
SPPC -297 -254 -1058 -933
ID 1873 1907 2630 2696
UT 453 557 763 997
CO 1244 1296 2978 3147
LDWP 2304 2422 2498 2632
NEVP -183 -4 -214 -8
PSCO -454 -306 -1044 -753
SCA 5697 6083 7215 7771
AZ -4624 -4082 -12111 -10968
CISD 992 1108 1061 1187
IID -213 -192 -1467 -1375
PNM -324 -262 -873 -735
CFE -521 -287 -873 -506
EPE 573 622 573 622
Total 12301 10671 6075 3965
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Table C.5: WECC 2025 production cost per unit in $/MWh [1]
Standalone Constrained
100% inelastic 95% inelastic 100% inelastic 95% inelastic
AESO 78.48 78.47 67.51 67.50
BCH 32.72 32.71 31.31 31.30
PNW 26.33 26.31 24.64 24.63
NWMT 1.45 1.44 14.78 14.77
PAWY 0.00 0.00 11.11 11.10
NCA 32.14 32.13 31.68 31.67
SPPC 9.76 9.75 21.29 21.28
ID 109.06 109.07 32.83 32.79
UT 35.66 35.62 26.92 26.91
CO 50.93 50.92 19.19 19.18
LDWP 97.06 97.04 51.01 51.01
NEVP 49.45 49.44 49.91 49.90
PSCO 26.24 26.23 31.62 31.61
SCA 76.38 76.37 41.27 41.26
AZ 6.11 6.11 28.10 28.09
CISD 79.17 79.17 52.90 52.90
IID 0.01 0.01 13.82 13.81
PNM 16.58 16.57 27.71 27.71
CFE 21.43 21.43 33.10 33.11
EPE 90.20 90.19 57.33 57.33
Average 41.96 41.95 33.40 33.39
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Table C.6: WECC 2024 model inter-area transfer limits [1]
Path From To Minimum Maximum
number area area [MW] [MW]
P01 AESO BCH -1200 1000
P03 PNW BCH -3150 3000
P08 NWMT PNW -2150 3000
P09 NWMT CO -2573 2573
P14 ID PNW -2250 3400
P16 ID SPPC -360 500
P18 NWMT ID -256 337
P20 ID UT -2250 2250
P22 PNM AZ -2325 2325
P24 NCA SPPC -150 160
P26 NCA SCA -3000 4000
P27 UT LDWP -1400 2400
P30 UT PSCO -650 650
P31 PSCO PNM -690 690
P32 SPPC UT -235 440
P35 UT NEVP -580 600
P36 CO PSCO -1680 1680
P42 IID SCA -1500 1500
P43 LDWP SCA -4000 4000
P44 CISD SCA -2500 2500
P45 CISD CFE -800 400
P46N NEVP LDWP -6000 6000
P46S NEVP SCA -5000 5000
P47 EPE AZ -1048 1048
P48 EPE PNM -1970 1970
P49 AZ NEVP -10200 10200
P59 AZ SCA -218 218
P65 PNW LDWP -3100 3220
P66 PNW NCA -3675 4800
P76 PNW SPPC -300 300
P78 UT PNM -600 600
P79 AZ UT -300 265
P80 NWMT PAWY -600 600
PP1 PAWY UT -1700 1700
PP2 IID CISD -150 150
PP3 AZ CISD -1160 1650
PP4 AZ IID -160 260
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Appendix D
Simulation Results
Table D.1: Estimated, simulated, and errors of aggregate thermostat load state tran-
sition probability ρ using joint PDF (N=normal, Ln=log normal, Log=logistic) using
106 homes and td = 1 minute.
TO N(X) N(Y) N(X) Ln(Y) Log(X) N(Y) Log(X) Ln(Y)
(◦F) ρoff ρon ρoff ρon ρoff ρon ρoff ρon
Est 1.00 0.44 1.00 0.44 1.00 0.43 1.00 0.43
5 Sim 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.42 1.00 0.42
Err 0.1% -3.5% 0.1% -3.5% 0.1% -2.4% 0.1% -2.3%
Est 0.99 0.55 1.00 0.55 0.99 0.54 1.00 0.54
10 Sim 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.54 1.00 0.54
Err 0.5% -2.3% 0.4% -2.4% 0.5% -1.3% 0.5% -1.4%
Est 0.98 0.67 0.98 0.67 0.98 0.67 0.98 0.67
15 Sim 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.67
Err 1.8% -0.5% 1.5% -0.8% 1.9% 0.3% 1.6% 0.1%
Est 0.94 0.80 0.95 0.80 0.94 0.79 0.95 0.79
20 Sim 0.98 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.98 0.81 0.98 0.81
Err 4.2% 2.1% 3.4% 1.8% 4.3% 2.8% 3.5% 2.4%
Est 0.86 0.90 0.87 0.90 0.86 0.89 0.87 0.90
25 Sim 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.93 0.91 0.93
Err 5.5% 3.7% 4.4% 3.4% 5.7% 4.2% 4.7% 3.8%
Est 0.75 0.96 0.75 0.96 0.74 0.96 0.75 0.96
30 Sim 0.78 0.99 0.78 0.99 0.78 0.99 0.78 0.99
Err 4.4% 2.7% 3.6% 2.5% 4.6% 3.0% 3.9% 2.8%
Est 0.62 0.99 0.62 0.99 0.62 0.99 0.62 0.99
35 Sim 0.64 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.64 1.00 0.64 1.00
Err 2.6% 1.1% 2.4% 1.0% 2.9% 1.2% 2.7% 1.1%
Est 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.50 1.00
40 Sim 0.51 1.00 0.51 1.00 0.51 1.00 0.51 1.00
Err 1.7% 0.3% 1.7% 0.3% 1.9% 0.3% 1.9% 0.3%
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1 System overview
This section presents an overview of power system
operations, the role of demand response and a his-
tory of transactive control in electric power systems.
When loads act as a resource situated in electric
power systems, we are motivated to ask how demand
resources can be used to provide needed services in
electric system planning and operations, how the
individual responses of consumer devices are aggre-
gated to enable practical application of load as a
resource, and what may be the environmental and
emissions impacts of employing demand response
control. These questions are very complex and diffi-
cult to answer in the context of today’s fast-evolving
electricity infrastructure. The changing nature of
the system, the economic and regulatory context,
and the loads themselves are all conditions that
must be considered if we are to employ demand re-
sponse to affect such as mitigating renewable inter-
mittency, empowering consumers, and reducing the
cost of system operation.
Responsibility for the reliability of electricity in-
terconnections is shared by all the operating entities
within each interconnection. In a traditional power
system, these entities are vertically integrated. A
committee process involving all the entities within
each power pool establishes the reliability criteria
utilities use for planning and operations. Typically,
the operating entities belong to larger regional coor-
dinating councils so that they can coordinate their
criteria with neighboring power pools. Since 1965
these regional councils have been organized under
what is now called the North America Electric Reli-
ability Corporation (NERC), which establishes the
standards for system reliability [2].
With the evolution toward market-based oper-
ations in recent decades, vertically integrated op-
erating entities have been broken up into gener-
ation companies (GENCOs), transmission owners
(TRANSCOs), load serving entities (LSEs), and en-
ergy traders that do not own assets, all of whom are
collectively the market participants [3]. The respon-
sibility for ensuring the reliability of a control area
is delegated to independent system operators (ISO)
or regional transmission operators (RTO). In gen-
eral, market participants have the duty to provide
accurate data about their assets and prices, as well
as follow the dispatch orders of the ISO/RTO. The
ISO/RTO has the duty to ensure that each mar-
ket participant meets the reliability rules, and de-
termines the dispatch orders necessary for the elec-
tricity supply and demand to match according to
NERC’s reliability standards. This system is pred-
icated on a successful competitive market in which
private decentralized trading and investment design
work to allow substantial commercial freedom for
buyers, sellers and various other types of traders
[4].
The method used to implement such a system
planning and operating model uses a two-stage
process referred to as the “unbundled” or “two-
settlement” approach:
1. Unit-commitment (UC) is a days-ahead process
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that determines the hourly operating set points
of the generation assets based on their bid en-
ergy prices and the forecast system load.
2. Economic-dispatch (ED) is an hours-ahead pro-
cess that determines the real-time generation
schedules and procures additional supply to en-
sure system reliability.
This two-step approach can be used for both reg-
ulated and unregulated markets and the analysis
method is similar for both short-term operations
and long-term planning with the only caveat that
ISOs must perform the system studies for deregu-
lated markets to determine whether additional gen-
eration and transmission may be required.
Overall the time frames for planning and oper-
ations can be separated into the following security
functions [5]:
1. Long term planning (2-5 years) determines
needed investments in generation and transmis-
sion.
2. Resource adequacy (3-6 months) secures gener-
ation to serve expected load and sets long-term
maintenance schedules.
3. Operations planning (1-2 weeks) coordinates
short-term maintenance schedules and long-
lead generation.
4. Day-ahead scheduling (12-24 hours) performs a
security-constrained UC using energy bids.
5. Real-time commitment and dispatch (5-180
minutes) performs real-time security-based eco-
nomic balancing of generation and load.
For time intervals shorter than about five min-
utes, the reliability of the system is delegated en-
tirely to the generation and loads according to reli-
ability standards promulgated by NERC and coor-
dinated separately by each interconnection.
1.1 NERC Reliability Standards
The North American power system is divided into
two major interconnections, Eastern, Western and
three minor interconnections: Quebec, Texas and
Alaska (in approximate order of total generation ca-
pacity). One or more reliability councils govern each
interconnection. Six reliability councils govern the
Eastern Interconnection: Florida (FRCC), Midwest
(MRO), Northeast (NPCC), ReliabilityFirst (RFC),
Southeast (SERC) and Southwest (SPP). The West-
ern interconnection is governed by WECC, Texas is
governed by ERCOT, Quebec is governed by NPCC,
and Alaska by ASCC (which is a affiliate member
of NERC) [6].
Each interconnection is operated as a single large
machine. Each generator contributes in synchrony
with every other generator to supply electric energy
to the interconnections’ customers. The angular ve-
locity ω of the generators at steady state determines
the system frequency f = ω/2pi. However, if the
power generated differs from the power consumed,
the frequency will change according to the swing
equation df/dt = M∆P +D∆f , where M is the in-
ertial constant of the interconnection, ∆P is power
deviation, D is a system-specific frequency correc-
tion term, and ∆f is the frequency deviation from
nominal [7]. At steady state the frequency is the
same throughout the entire interconnection.
Balancing Authorities (BA’s), of which there are
at present 131 in the United States, manage the bal-
ance of generation and load. Each BA dispatches
generators to meet their individual needs, although
some BA’s also control loads. The BA’s are con-
nected via high-voltage transmission lines (called
tie-lines) to neighboring BA’s. If one BA has too
little generating capacity to support its native load,
it can schedule a transfer of power from other BA’s
with available generating capacity within the same
interconnection. The ability to transfer power be-
tween BA’s is the foundation of an interconnection’s
reliability.
Because the frequency is the same across all the
BA’s in an interconnection, each BA must consider
two inputs to the control of generation (and load, if
applicable):
Interchange error: net flow balance of power rel-
ative to the scheduled transfer.
Frequency bias: the obligation to provide energy
to support frequency stability.
Each BA uses a common set of meters on the tie-
lines connecting it to its neighbors to monitor and
account for interchanges. Consequently all gener-
ators and loads fall strictly within the boundary
of a metered region of balance control. However,
only some of the generators within a particular BA
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are directly controlled by the BA to correct for in-
terconnection frequency and scheduled tie-line flow
deviations.
1.2 Balancing and Frequency Control
Customer demand and uncontrolled generator out-
put vary continuously within each BA resulting
in unintentional deviations from scheduled tie-line
flows and interconnection frequency. Consequently,
BA’s must continually adjust controlled generator
output by quantifying the mismatch in their inter-
change obligations as well as their frequency sup-
port obligations. This mismatch is estimated using
the Area Control Error (ACE) in MW. Operators in
each BA monitor ACE and dispatch generation re-
sources (and sometimes load) to keep it within lim-
its that are generally proportional to the size of the
BA. The dispatch control is accomplished through
a combination of automation, human and market
(either bilateral or open) actions, and if necessary
emergency actions such as automatic or manual gen-
eration or load shedding.
ACE is to a BA what frequency is to an inter-
connection: when ACE is high it indicates over-
generation in the BA and reflects upward pres-
sure on the system frequency; when ACE is low
it indicates under-generation in the BA and re-
flects downward pressure on the interconnection fre-
quency. However, when ACE is the same sign as
the frequency error, it tends to increase ACE and
when frequency error is the opposite sign it tends
to decrease ACE. This relationship is captured in
the CPS-1 performance standard. Failure to main-
tain balance, as well as other grid problems such as
congestion, equipment faults, and other rapid uni-
lateral adjustments in generation or load will cause
frequency variations that are reflected in violations
of the CPS-1 standard.
BA control is maintained over a continuum of
time ranging from seconds to hours and is divided
accordingly into four levels of control:
Primary control: The primary frequency re-
sponse that occurs within seconds of a distur-
bance in the frequency. It is provided by gover-
nor action on generators, which sense changes
in the generators’ speeds and adjusts the input
to the generators’ prime movers. It is also af-
fected by certain loads such as motors whose
speeds drop with frequency, by frequency pro-
tections that interrupt load at pre-defined fre-
quency levels, and by firm load curtailment pro-
grams that ensure stability under severe distur-
bance scenarios.
Because generator loss is the most common
system disturbance, the amount of Spinning
Reserve in the interconnection determines the
available frequency response. It is understood
that a) primary control does not restore fre-
quency, it only arrests the frequency excur-
sion, and b) operators must continually mon-
itor their frequency response resources to en-
sure that Blackstart Units are able to control
frequency and arrest excursions.
Secondary control: Balancing services are con-
trolled in the “minutes” timeframe (although
some resources can respond faster; e.g., load
and hydroelectric units) using the BA’s’ AGC
system and supplemented with manual actions
by the dispatchers. AGC computes the ACE
and determines the most economical way for
the available resources to restore balance, and
sends set points to the affected generators (and
loads, if any).
Initial reserve deployments after a disturbance
can also be initiated under secondary con-
trol. These resources maintain the minute-to-
minute balance needed to restore frequency to
its scheduled value following a disturbance and
are usually drawn from both Spinning and Non-
Spinning Reserves.
Tertiary control: These are the actions taken to
set reserve resources in states that allow oper-
ators to handle current and future contingen-
cies. This is particularly important after a dis-
turbance, when new reserves must deployed or
restored.
Time control: Although frequency and balance
control is very accurate, it is not perfect and
errors due to transducer inaccuracies, prob-
lems with the SCADA hardware or software,
or communications errors can lead to integral
errors in frequency that must be corrected over
the long term. The Time Monitor compares a
clock driven by the interconnection frequency
to an official reference time at NIST. In most
188
interconnections the Scheduled Frequency is
changed when the Time Error exceeds a cer-
tain threshold. In WECC a Time Error Cor-
rection (TEC) is applied automatically through
the Automatic Time Error Correction software.
Table 1 enumerates the services provided, the
time horizons over which they are relevant and the
NERC standard that governs the adequacy of the
service.
1.3 ACE Calculation
The area control error signal is called ACE and is
calculated by each BA using the following equation
ACE = (Pa − Ps)− 10B(fa − fs)− Em
where Pa is the actual net interchange (in MW), Ps
is the scheduled net interchange (in MW), B is the
BA’s bias (in MW/dHz), fa is the actual frequency
(in Hz), fs is the scheduled frequency (which may be
offset ±0.02 Hz when TEC is active), and Em is an
measurement error correction factor to address in-
accuracies that arise when using instantaneous flow
measurements as hourly meters on tie-lines [2].
The actual power and frequency measure-
ments are provided by each BA’s SCADA sys-
tem approximately every 4 seconds although time-
synchronization of the measurements is not guaran-
teed [7].
1.4 Ancillary Service Markets
Market designers identify system operators as the
party responsible for reliability in a way that is com-
patible with competitive energy markets. One of the
key lessons learned from California’s market failure
is that the definition of what constitutes an ancil-
lary service is critical to ensuring sufficient liquid-
ity, which influences reliability. A key aspect of the
ancillary service market designs coming out of the
1990s is the recognition of cascading downward sub-
stitutability of reserve resources because faster re-
sponding resources are considered higher quality [8].
Consequently price inversions (viz., slower reserves
getting higher prices) are an undesirable property
of ancillary service markets and can lead to per-
verse incentives and inappropriate bidding. Unfor-
tunately early solutions to market design problems
varied and appeared to address ISO-specific con-
cerns rather than the broader issue of what con-
stitutes a “good” reserves market design.
Reserve markets can be viewed as a multi-part
auction where resources compete to provide reserve
services by submitting two bids, one for capacity
and one for energy. The resource ranking is de-
termined by the capacity price and pays all bid-
ders the price of the last capacity resource reserved.
The energy bids are only used when the reserves
are called, and then all called reserves are paid the
highest energy price of the reserves called. Such a
market design was proven to be incentive compati-
ble, meaning that bidders are induced to reveal their
true marginal energy and capacity costs [9].
1.5 Current US Market Designs
In 2012 the US Department of Energy commissioned
a survey of how the seven major ISOs and RTOs
operate their reserve markets [10]. In general these
ISO/RTO’s require the entities that serve loads to
provide reserves in proportion to their loads. How-
ever, most of these entities do not have generation
resources of their own, so they must acquire reserves
through bilateral contracts or through centrally or-
ganized open markets where they exist. To date,
seven such markets have been organized in the US:
CAISO, ERCOT, ISO-NE, MISO, NYISO, PJM,
and SPP.
None of these markets provide for trading of pri-
mary frequency control or time control. Only sec-
ondary and tertiary control reserves are traded in
open markets. Each of the ISO/RTOs defines which
reserves can be traded in open markets slightly dif-
ferently. In addition, markets often use different
terms to describe similar resources and in some cases
the same term can refer to different services. This
has led to considerable confusion about what, when
and where ancillary services can be provided in mar-
kets. Table 2 summarizes the different terms used
for various secondary and tertiary control reserves.
Each market has individual characteristics that dis-
tinguish it from others. These are summarized in
Table 3.
The procurement of services in all seven ISO/R-
TOs is completed following a co-optimization of
energy and reserve resources. The specific co-
optimization methods used differ; some are inte-
grated, some are coupled, and some are decou-
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Table 1: Control continuum summary
Control Service Timeframe NERC Standards
Primary Control Frequency Response 10-60 Seconds FRS, CPS1
Secondary Control Regulation Reserves 1-10 Minutes CPS1, CPS2,
DCS, BAAL
Tertiary Control Imbalance Reserves 10 Minutes-Hours BAAL, DCS
Time Control Time Error Correction Hours TEC
Table 2: Reserve market terminology in the US
Market Secondary Tertiary Other reserves
CAISO
Reg Reserve: (1)
• Reg up
• Reg down
Spinning Reserve Non-spinning Reserve
ERCOT
Reg Svc: (1)
• Reg up
• Reg down
Replacement Reserve Svc
Non-spinning Reserve Svc
Replacement Reserve Svc
ISO-NE 10-min Spinning
10-min Non-Spinning
30-min Non-Spinning
MISO Reg Reserve
Contingency Reserve: (1)
• Spinning Reserve Supplemental Reserve
NYISO 10-min Spin Reserve
10-min Non-sync Reserve
30-min Spinning Reserve
30-min Non-sync Reserve
PJM
Contingency Reserve: (1)
• Sync Reserve
Quick Start Reserve
Supplemental Reserve
SPP (2)
Regulation: (1)
• Reg up
• Reg down
Contingency Reserve: (1)
• Spin Reserve Supplemental Reserve
Source: Ellison (2012).
Notes:
(1) Categories of reserve markets.
(2) SPP information is based on their proposed market design.
pled co-optimizations. PJM’s co-optimization is
coupled in forward markets with continuous real-
time adjustments. ISO-NE supports a decoupled
co-optimization in forward markets with a coupled
real-time market. ERCOT supports integrated co-
optimization in day-ahead markets and coupled in
real-time. MISO, NYISO and CAISO support fully
integrated co-optimization of energy and reserve re-
source markets.
The settlement practices of the ISO/RTOs have
come under considerable scrutiny from FERC. As of
2014 only ISO-NE and NYISO had any form of pay-
for-performance. The remaining five ISOs pay only
for the capacity accepted by the market. This was
the motivation for FERC Order 755, which requires
compensation for regulation based on actual services
provided [11]. The impact of this order has yet to
be realized in new settlement policies that conform
to its intent.
Finally, FERC Order 745 addresses how demand
response is compensated in wholesale energy mar-
kets (rather than reserve markets). This order re-
quires that dispatch of demand response be subject
to a net-benefits test to determine whether it is cost-
effective, and when it is dispatched that it be com-
pensated at the market price for energy (e.g., the lo-
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cational marginal price) [12]. The order’s objective
is to remove barriers to participation for demand
response, but it has been criticized for not recog-
nizing the nature of demand in organized electricity
markets [14]. For example, the value of the LSE’s
obligation to serve is not reflected properly in the
demand curve, and therefore a demand “negawatts”
should not be priced as supply “megawatts”. Such
issues have yet to be properly addressed by regula-
tors, market designers, market operators, load serv-
ing entities, and regulation service providers.
1.6 Ancillary Services Using Demand
Resources
Modern bulk electric interconnections are con-
strained by the physical requirement that electric
energy is not stored in any substantial way during
system operations. Historically, utility operations
have focused on controlling generation to “follow”
load to ensure that at every moment supply exactly
matches demand and losses. To make electric util-
ity planning and operation economical and manage-
able, the industry divides generation resources into
three principal categories: base load, intermediate
load, and peak load [7].
Base-load generation is the bottom portion of
the supply stack that essentially runs uninterrupted
throughout the year (except during maintenance or
unplanned outages). Intermediate-load generation
runs continuously but only seasonally as the diur-
nal load nadir rises and falls. Peak-load generation
is the supply that must be started and stopped daily
to follow the diurnal load variations. Each of these
types of generation also provides regulation and re-
liability resources to help control frequency and re-
spond to contingencies and emergencies in genera-
tion and transmission operations.
For decades, load had not generally been con-
sidered part of the overall planning and opera-
tions model of electric interconnections except to
the extent that its growth sets the conditions for
capacity planning. But in recent years increas-
ing thought has been given to the role that load
can play as a demand resource that a) reduces the
need for new conventional generation resources, b)
avoids using generation resources in inefficient ways,
and c) enables the addition of generation resources
that exhibit substandard performance characteris-
tics when operating under the conventional load fol-
lowing paradigm [13].
Today the term “demand resource” encompasses
a wide range of products, services, and capabili-
ties related to the control and management of load
in electric systems. Prior to the advent of “smart
grid” technology, demand resources were primarily
considered for planning purposes, such as demand-
side management (DSM) programs, and very lim-
ited operational purposes such as in extremis under-
frequency or under-voltage load shedding programs
(UFLS/UVLS). DSM programs focus on energy ef-
ficiency and other long-term demand management
strategies to reduce load growth so that the need
for significant new generation capacity investments
can be reduced or deferred. Generally these pro-
grams pay for themselves by reducing capital costs
for a number of years, possibly indefinitely. DSM
programs helped the industry transition from its
pre-1970s 7% annual capacity growth to the sub-3%
growth prevalent today in modern electricity inter-
connections.
This section reviews some of the recent trends
and the developments in demand response as a re-
source and how it can address a wider range of op-
erational and economic system needs. The focus is
particularly on the limitations of advanced demand
response programs and the ongoing research to ad-
dress these challenges.
1.6.1 Load as a Resource
Demand response programs have generally been di-
vided into two major categories: incentive-based
programs and price-based programs. Both cate-
gories recognize that there is an essential economic
component to developing demand response capabil-
ities in electric systems, but realize the economic
benefits in very different ways. As a general rule, in-
centive programs are contractual, typically bilateral
arrangements between customers and system oper-
ators to provide direct load control, interruptible
load, or market-based control strategies for emer-
gency reserves and ancillary services. In contrast,
price-based programs use utility rate structures and
energy prices such as time-of-use rates, critical-peak
pricing, or real-time pricing to drive demand to be
responsive to system conditions through economic
signals as a proxy for direct control signals [14].
However, the ability of load to provide resources
that serve system planning needs such as capacity
192
investment deferrals or operational needs such as
ancillary services is limited by (1) the intrinsic na-
ture of the devices and equipment composing end-
use loads and the constraints arising from consumer
behavior and expectations, (2) our ability to control
the loads in an appropriate and dependable manner,
and (3) our ability to validate, verify, and meter
their contributions to system planning and opera-
tion.
1.6.2 Load Modeling
The electric utility industry is extremely risk-averse
because such a high value is placed on system reli-
ability. As a result, new technology is often limited
by the ability of planners to simulate its effect in
the planning studies used to establish system oper-
ating limits, and by the ability of operators to con-
trol these technologies in real-time. In both cases,
the challenge is not only modeling the technology
itself, but also, more critically, simulating how the
technology interacts with the bulk power system.
In the case of loads as resources for system plan-
ning and operation this modeling issue centers on
three fundamental questions: (1) How do electric
loads behave at various times of day, week, year?
(2) How does end-use composition evolve over these
time frames? And (3) how does the control of loads
affect these behaviors in shorter time horizons?
Load behavior is determined by both the electro-
mechanical properties of the devices and equipment
connected to the electric system and by the behav-
ior of the consumers of the services they provide.
As a general rule utilities categorize loads by end-
use, such as cooling, heating, refrigeration, light-
ing, cooking, plugs, washing, and drying in the res-
idential sector. In commercial buildings other end-
uses such as computing, process pumping, convey-
ing, and other services are also considered. Daily,
weekly, and seasonal load-shapes are associated with
each of these end-uses to provide analysts with an
empirical data set from which to estimate load un-
der different conditions. Load shapes have the ad-
vantage of capturing in a single data set both the
electro-mechanical behavior and the consumer be-
havior that gives rise to the overall shape of loads
[15].
However, these load shapes have a serious draw-
back when one attempts to determine the degree
to which a load changes in response to a short-term
signals such as dispatch commands, real-time prices,
frequency or voltage fluctuations: load shapes con-
tain no information about the inter-temporal corre-
lation of the loads’ energy, power and ramping be-
havior. Devising load models that incorporate these
remains an ongoing area of research and tools such
as LOADSYN [16], the WECC Composite Load
Model [17], and GridLAB-D [18] partly address this
problem.
Load composition models were developed to ad-
dress a problem that generally does not arise when
considering load behavior over hours or more. Each
load is composed of electrical subcomponents that
have independently changing sub-hourly electro-
mechanical characteristics. Induction motors of dif-
ferent types, sizes, and control may start and stop;
electronic power drives may be used; and the over-
all mix of static power, current, and impedance may
change very quickly in response to dynamic frequen-
cy/voltage events, economic or dispatch signals,
whether due to the normal internal control behav-
ior or equipment protection subsystems. Although
the overall energy consumption on the hourly time
scale may be described well using load shape data,
the sub-hourly dynamics of power demand may be
quite volatile and are often poorly understood. This
lack of understanding can present system planners
and operators with challenges for which few tools ex-
ist, as has been observed in the case of fault-induced
delayed voltage recovery [19].
Load diversity is an emerging challenge when ex-
ternal control signals are applied to devices and
equipment. Under normal operating conditions,
loads that cycle on and off are assumed to have
high diversity, meaning that their cycles are rela-
tively independent of bulk system conditions. The
difficulty is that diversity is a property of loads sim-
ilar to entropy; it is difficult to directly observe and
it can only be considered when compared to a refer-
ence state, such as the equilibrium state of a class of
loads. Conventional models of loads assume the di-
versity is maximal (at equilibrium). But in practice,
load control strategies reduce diversity, sometimes
to a significant degree. In spite of these challenges,
models that indirectly consider the entropy of cer-
tain load classes have been developed and applied to
load control problems with some success [20, 21, 22].
But a comprehensive and theoretically sound model
for diversity continues to elude load modelers, and
this remains an open area of research.
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Human behavior is a critical consideration when
designing load control programs. Utilities must con-
sider two distinct aspects of human behavior to
determine the viability and success of a load con-
trol program. The first is customer recruiting and
retention (the customer pays for electric services
but may not be the same person as the consumer
who uses the end-use service), and the second is
real-time consumer participation. Customer expec-
tations are set during the recruiting phase when
utilities make a cost-benefit case for customers to
opt into demand response programs. (Demand re-
sponse program marketing is primarily economic in
nature but often includes an environmental com-
ponent.) After customer acquiescence, technology
is usually deployed in the customers’ facilities and
consumers are presented with behavioral choices by
the technology. The frequency of these choices can
range from daily (e.g., postponing a load of laun-
dry) to seasonal (e.g., resetting a thermostat). Ex-
pecting consumers to make choices more than once
a day for any particular end-use is generally re-
garded as impractical and it is also usually inef-
fective to ask consumers to make choices less fre-
quently than seasonally [28]. Mitigating consumer
fatigue and providing continuous education have
also been observed to be factors in ensuring that de-
mand response programs are cost-effective and sus-
tainable [29] [30]. Finally, utilities frequently face
fairness and “free-rider” questions when customers
sign-up for programs but provide no value to the
utilities because either a) customers already exhibit
the behavior sought, or b) the utility never calls
on them to exhibit the desired behavior [31]. Ul-
timately the long-term effectiveness of demand re-
sponse programs and the technologies that support
them hinges on whether the customer benefits out-
weigh the consumer impacts. If there is any discon-
nect between customers/consumer short-term/long-
term value/impacts, they will not remain in the pro-
gram long enough for the program to pay for itself,
let alone provide the anticipated system benefits to
the utilities and system operators [32].
Until the advent of utility deregulation, demand
response programs were the exclusive purview of
utilities and regulated accordingly. However, in
regions where vertical integration has been over-
come, third-party aggregation has become a viable
business model for providing demand response from
many smaller customers as a single homogenous ca-
pability that is easier for a utility or an ISO to inter-
act with. By using on-site control technology, utility
service contracts, and rebate programs, aggregators
can create both arbitrage and value-added oppor-
tunities from which to generate sufficient revenue.
In some cases, monopsony/monopoly conditions can
emerge as a result of regulatory intervention, tech-
nology locked-in high front-end equipment costs and
high back-end system integration costs [33]. A re-
cent additional concern is that demand response
aggregation is potentially subject to FERC juris-
diction to the extent that aggregators acquire and
deliver resources across FERC jurisdictional bound-
aries or interact with ISO and RTO entities subject
to FERC oversight. Indeed, FERC has recently is-
sued orders affecting how demand response is com-
pensated in energy markets, which raises the ques-
tion of whether and how it might intervene regard-
ing demand response compensation in ancillary ser-
vice markets [34].
Finally, load models ultimately are embodied in
the simulation tools utilities use in planning studies
and operational analysis, such as forecasting models
and even billing systems where baseline load mod-
els are part of the contract. New load models can
take a very long time to be adopted by industry and
become commercially available in planning and op-
erations products. For example, the Western Elec-
tricity Coordinating Council’s Load Modeling Task
Force began developing a new load model in 2001
but it was not adopted until the Summer 2013 cases.
In the interim a flat 20% induction motor load was
used after it became apparent that the standard
load model was in part responsible for the discrep-
ancies observed in the August 1996 outage studies
[35]. Such delays can significantly reduce the im-
pact and potential benefits of load control technol-
ogy and approaches to faster load model adoption
are still needed.
1.6.3 Load Control
Demand response as a tool for providing ancillary
services relies on the ability to control aggregate
loads. The time scales over which loads can respond
to dispatch signals, and the return to “ready” state
determine the frequency and magnitude of load re-
sponse as it performs desired ancillary services. The
models for load control (as opposed to load behav-
ior) have yet to be developed. Work to describe the
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frequency and amplitude response of modern loads
and load controls has only recently been undertaken,
and significant research remains to be done in this
area [36].
A fast emerging obstacle to effective deployment
of large-scale load control systems is the lack of
a comprehensive theory of control for distributed
systems. Understanding how we regulate devices
and systems in our environment is a prerequisite
for managing those devices and systems. That un-
derstanding is captured in control theory, the body
of formalisms that explain how we observe, con-
trol and verify key performance characteristics of
engineered systems. The challenge today is that
although controllability and observability are well-
defined for simple systems through the Kalman rank
condition, and stability can be studied using meth-
ods named after such as Ziegler, Nichols, Bode,
Nyquist, and others, the emergent behavior of inter-
connected systems has yet to be considered formally.
As a result, ad hoc models of robustness, security,
and stochastic behavior have been overlayed on con-
ventional control theory. Physical constraints are
often ignored, information flow is assumed instanta-
neous, and evolving network topologies are not well
treated, so that only trivial problems are solved [37].
The paradigm for larger, more complex and re-
alistic systems continues to elude system engineers.
We have yet to understand complex engineered sys-
tems well enough to design and control them, let
alone exploit the new behaviors and possibilities in-
herent when linking previously independent systems
into a more heterogeneous multi-technical complex
of systems. In short, we need a new approach to
controlling the large interconnected multi-technical
complex that is emerging. The new approach must
allow systems to adapt and evolve without indi-
vidual components being redesigned, retested, and
redeployed every time relevant parameters change.
Simply put, a new paradigm of control is needed for
complex systems.
1.6.4 Validation, Verification and Metering
Using demand response as a resource for planning
and operation depends on our ability to ensure that
the tools we use for bulk power system control are
accurate, work as designed for all conditions (both
foreseeable and unforeseeable) and that we can mon-
itor and meter the performance of these resources
for both operational and business objectives.
Model and simulation validation for very complex
models such as the load models currently in use is a
daunting challenge in itself. Empirical end-use and
load composition data collected by utilities degrade
quickly and unpredictably as end-use technologies
change, efficiency standards take hold and consumer
habits evolve. Although utilities know that con-
sumer assessment surveys are essential to main-
taining accurate load models, the cost of conduct-
ing these surveys has been historically prohibitive.
Many utilities and advocates of automated meter
reading technology frequently cite improved con-
sumer behavior data as one of the principal long-
term benefits of automatic metering infrastructure.
However, these benefits have yet to be demonstrated
in practice, particularly as data privacy and security
concerns begin to emerge [38].
Tool validation presents additional challenges,
particularly when tools become multi-disciplinary
and rely on hybrid numerical methods, such as
agent-based solvers. Although these analysis tools
are highly realistic, they rarely have a reference
model or baseline data to compare against. As a
result, confidence in these tools builds more slowly
and the rate of adoption of advanced simulations
is slower than has historically been true from more
conventional power system analysis tools [39].
Control system verification remains an open re-
search area for distributed control systems such as
the large-scale demand response systems being de-
signed and tested today. Utilities historically relied
on strictly hierarchical direct load control programs
that used isolated and simple control structures
and were easy to verify. Systems that rely on au-
tonomous responses or price signals are more likely
to exhibit stochastic behavior that raise concerns re-
garding their reliability under extreme events, when
they may become critical to system integrity [40].
Monitoring and metering are closely related to the
question of verification and present additional chal-
lenges. Utilities must measure how much resource
is available in real-time to ensure that sufficient re-
sources are deployed to provide the required contin-
gency response. So-called “transactive control” sys-
tems have the notable advantage that they provide
resource availability data concurrently with the re-
quired resource cost data. Finally, when events oc-
cur, utilities also need to measure which resources
were actually deployed before compensating cus-
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tomers for their participation. To date the designs
of advanced demand response systems have largely
failed to satisfactorily address either of these issues
[41].
1.7 Demand Response Aggregation
Strategies
In the previous sections, the role of ancillary ser-
vices and the potential for demand response to pro-
vide such services were discussed in detail. As in-
termittent generation becomes a standard element
of the generation fleet, the interest in using demand
response as a substitute for new controllable gen-
eration is expected to grow. In addition, demand
response has long been regarded as necessary be-
cause it reveals the elasticity of demand in a way
that mitigates supply-side market power.
One of the most significant obstacles to us-
ing demand response to simultaneously displace
generation-centric reliability services and mitigat-
ing generator market power is the mismatch in the
characteristic size, time, and uncertainty of loads
relative to generators: there are relatively few eas-
ily observed generators and their characteristic re-
sponse times are relatively slow compared to overall
system dynamics. Loads in contrast are far smaller,
far more numerous and difficult to observe, but po-
tentially far faster acting that the overall system
dynamics [42].
Bulk power system planning, operation and con-
trol have generally been designed to consider the
characteristics of generators and treated loads as a
“noisy” boundary condition. Thus load control re-
mains quite difficult to incorporate into bulk system
planning and operation. In general, the approach to
addressing this fundamental mismatch is to devise
demand aggregation strategies that collect numer-
ous small fast acting devices with high individual
uncertainty into a few large slower acting aggrega-
tions with reduced uncertainty. While not requir-
ing every electric customer to participate in whole-
sale markets, demand aggregation provides a means
of increasing consumer participation in system re-
source allocation strategies—market-based or cen-
trally controlled—and thus can mitigate the price
of energy, capacity, or ramping services [43].
From an economic perspective, aggregating elec-
tricity customers can be viewed as a means of cap-
turing consumer surplus to increase producer sur-
plus by segregating consumers into groups with dif-
ferent willingness to pay. Three general approaches
are usually employed to creating consumer aggrega-
tion for either operational or economic objectives:
1. Economic aggregation is achieved using price
discrimination methods such as different rates
for different customer classes, product differen-
tiation, and product or service bundling strate-
gies.
2. Social aggregation is achieved using various
subsidy programs, and other social group
identification strategies such as environmental,
green or early-adopter programs.
3. Technical aggregation creates technical struc-
tures that either directly aggregate consumers
or indirectly enable economic or social aggre-
gation. Technical aggregation can be accom-
plished using service aggregators, creating tech-
nological lock-in with high barriers to entry or
exit, or constructing local retail markets inde-
pendent of wholesale energy, capacity, and an-
cillary service markets.
This section discusses the motives, principles and
practices generally employed by the electric power
industry in achieving consumer (and demand re-
sponse) aggregation.
1.7.1 Economic Aggregation
Price discrimination is an economic strategy used
by sellers to capture additional consumer surplus.
Surplus is the economic benefit derived by bring-
ing buyer and seller together to trade electricity
products and services. As long as the consumer’s
reservation price exceeds the producer’s they are
both overall better off economically if they com-
plete the trade. The net difference between the con-
sumers’ economic welfare with electric and their wel-
fare without electricity is defined as the consumer
surplus. Similarly, the net economic benefit to elec-
tricity producers between producing electricity and
not producing electricity is defined as the producer
surplus. It is the objective of both consumers and
producers to maximize their respective surpluses,
which in an efficient market results in the total sur-
plus being maximized as well [44].
However producers recognize the some consumers
have a greater willingness to pay for products and
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services. Consequently, producers can devise pric-
ing strategies that divide the consumers in a way
that increases their surplus but does not increase
the total surplus, instead capturing some of the con-
sumers’ surplus. The most common of these is to
create different rate structures for each customer
sector (e.g., residential, commercial, industrial, mu-
nicipal, agricultural). In theory such strategies
have been shown to maximize producer surplus only
when the demand curve is strictly convex toward
the origin, but in practice this limitation is often
ignored. Even though it may seem unfair to con-
sumers that some pay less for the same product or
service, price discrimination is regarded as a stan-
dard practice justified by the cost recovery needs of
a capital intensive industry, and such practices are
regularly endorsed by electric utility regulators [45].
Volume discounts are another common form of
price discrimination that serve to aggregate con-
sumer behavior. In the case of electric utilities,
the most common form is the declining block rate,
which recognizes that customers with a higher de-
mand also have a more predictable peak demand
than smaller customers. The cost of operating elec-
tric power systems is driven in large measure by the
cost of serving unpredictable peaks, so more pre-
dictable customers are offered discounted rates for
the “good” behavior. In effect these customers are
consuming a lower quality product: one that does
not need to vary as much relative to the total and
therefore costs less to produce. An unfortunate side
effect of declining block rates is that they can be a
disincentive to conservation and many utilities are
moving away from such rate structures. Increas-
ing block rates do promote conservation but this
approach requires very careful analysis to predict
the seasonal peak load variations. When signifi-
cant numbers of customers come under such a rate,
utility revenues can become much more sensitive to
weather fluctuations than they already are [46].
Very likely the most well known form of price
discrimination employed by utilities is product dif-
ferentiation, viz., charging residential customers for
energy usage and commercial/industrial customers
for power capacity. This form of customer aggre-
gation recognizes that residential and small com-
mercial customer behavior (e.g., individual appli-
ance and equipment purchases) is more closely cor-
related with energy consumption and large commer-
cial/industrial/agricultural customer behavior (e.g.,
increasing production capacity) is more closely cor-
related to peak power demand. Utilities seek to have
behavior and bills as strongly correlated as possible,
and therefore prefer energy rates for residential and
small commercial customers and power or demand
ratchet rates for large commercial, industrial and
agricultural customers [47].
The final form of economic customer aggrega-
tion, service bundling, is the most ubiquitous in
electricity delivery. The historically regulated na-
ture of the utility business means that product
bundling isn’t thought of as a business strategy to
increase revenues per se (as in the telecommunica-
tions business). Instead the capital-intensive na-
ture of the business combined with the desire for
simple billing (unlike the telecommunications indus-
try) means that energy or power rates must include
capital costs. Service bundling is considered as an
appropriate net revenue volatility risk mitigation
strategy, and regulated as such. Most customers
pay for only one product composed of several under-
lying services; e.g., energy (with capacity and relia-
bility) or capacity (with energy and reliability). All
the underlying services that utilities provide, such
as fuel price volatility hedging, capital financing,
administration, and maintenance are blended into
the simple price that each customer pays. There is
some discussion of utility business models that un-
bundle these services to achieve more economically
efficient operations by revealing the customers’ dif-
ferent demand elasticities and reservation prices for
each service. Utilities would then be able to serve
customers with differentiated reliability services, for
example. Most likely the technical and regulatory
obstacles to this model are why it has not gained
much more than academic interest. Perhaps we can
expect growing interest in areas where distribution
reliability is a significant issue for some customers
or technical solutions like microgrids are prevalent.
But that has yet to be adequately researched at this
point.
1.7.2 Social Aggregation
Social aggregation is based more on human behav-
ior than economic theory and is consequently less
well understood. Utilities typically base their social
customer aggregates on four types of social differen-
tiators: income class, behavioral cross-subsidies, en-
vironmental awareness and early adopters. In many
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areas, utilities and governments provide subsidized
service to low/fixed-income customers in the form
of rebates, small customer rates, and special assis-
tance programs. The reasoning is that electricity
is considered an essential service in modern society
that low/fixed-income customers cannot do with-
out. Regulators generally view low/fixed-income
customer subsidies favorably, especially in commu-
nities where large numbers of such residents live. So
where subsidies are not taxpayer-funded they are
commonly found with investor-owner utilities and
municipals. They may be less common with public
utilities and cooperatives, but evidence appears to
be somewhat anecdotal at this point.
Cross subsidies based on primary consumption
drivers (e.g., energy vs. capacity) are an unavoid-
able feature of electricity services because of the
strong motivation utilities have to maintain a simple
blended rate for each customer class. As a result of
the design of the rates, one customer class is often
effectively subsidizing another customer class, e.g.,
commercial customers subsidize residential or vice-
versa. Environmental/green products are a recent
addition to the portfolio of social aggregations that
utilities may use. Under these programs, customers
are offered the opportunity to pay a premium for
their power if the utility purchases renewable energy
to serve the demand. Ironically, often the marginal
energy cost for resources is very near zero while the
capital costs may be subsidized by tax incentives
to the merchant generators. Regardless, these pro-
grams represent a clear case of price discrimination
based on the customer’s socially-motivated willing-
ness to pay more for a higher quality product.
Early adopter programs are another form of so-
cial aggregation that provides utilities the opportu-
nity to test new products and services before mak-
ing them available to mainstream customers. Early
adopter customers are willing to pay for a product
whose quality is more uncertain in the sense that
it may be better than existing products but it also
might not work as intended by the utility or ex-
pected by the customer.
In all cases social aggregation strategies help utili-
ties manage customer perceptions and expectations
while continuing to meet basic business objectives
such as customer satisfaction, regulatory compli-
ance, environmental goals and research and devel-
opment obligations that help the utilities adapt and
adjust to changing business and technical condi-
tions.
1.7.3 Technical Aggregation
Technical customer aggregation strategies are less
common in the electric utility business than might
be expected for such a technology-intensive indus-
try. Only a few types of technical customer aggre-
gation strategies can be readily discerned in modern
utilities operations. Most notable are direct and in-
direct load control, service aggregators, retail mar-
kets, and technology lock-in strategies.
Direct load control is the oldest and most estab-
lished mechanism used by utilities to aggregate cus-
tomer demand response and make customer behav-
ior “work” for the utility. Although the quid pro
quo is evident and real for direct load control pro-
grams, they are not as common as one might expect
because the technical solutions tend to be rather
intrusive and expensive to deploy. Typical exam-
ples include water-heater and air-conditioning cur-
tailment programs where load control switches are
installed on customer equipment to allow the util-
ity to directly turn off load if needed. Customers
are offered a rebate either for participation in the
program (a reservation price) or for each event (a
call price). The advantage of reservation pricing is
that measurement of individual responses to events
is not required to properly compensate customers
who participate. Unfortunately, free-rider behav-
ior is quite prevalent under reservation pricing, par-
ticularly if the resource is rarely called. Call pric-
ing is more challenging because it requires measure-
ment and verification of each individual customer
response to determine compensation. In addition,
for many types of loads it can be difficult to deter-
mine what the customer would have done had the
load control signal not be sent, especially if calls
are frequent or continual. Hence it is more difficult
to determine the appropriate compensation for each
call.
Indirect load control circumvents many of these
issues by avoiding direct signals to individual cus-
tomers in favor of a common signal sent to all cus-
tomers who have agreed to participate in the load
control program. Under such situations, reservation
pricing is strongly favored, although event/call pric-
ing remains a viable option. The primary advantage
of indirect load control strategies is that they do not
require the utility to determine individual signals to
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send to each customer. A single price or index sig-
nal can be sent to all customers in the program and
control action in response to the signal is left to
the customer, based on either economically rational
expectations or contractual obligations. The chal-
lenge for utilities is to determine the precise value
of the price or index signal needed to achieve a de-
sired level of demand response. This problem can
be addressed by the next two strategies.
Service aggregators are probably the most com-
mon technical customer aggregation strategy em-
ployed by utilities. Service aggregators are inde-
pendent third-party entities that receive a dispatch
objective (e.g., an index) from their utility customer
and determine how to dispatch the participants they
recruited to meet the utility’s objective. The service
aggregators are paid by the utility for their ability
to meet the utility’s objective, and part of the rev-
enue from the utility is shared with the participants
either in the form of added energy management and
control equipment that can help reduce the partici-
pant’s overall energy costs or in the form of an even-
t/call rebate.
Retail capacity markets address the challenges
of indirect load control using pricing signals. The
advantage of retail capacity markets is that they
provide price transparency and technology neutral-
ity. Aside from violating some important assump-
tions regarding load duration and generation screen-
ing curves used in planning capacity expansion [49],
the main disadvantage is that they require signif-
icant infrastructure investments both in the cus-
tomer premises as well as the utility back-office sys-
tems. Retail capacity markets can also present utili-
ties with the same capacity expansion dilemma fac-
ing transmission system operators: In the event a
distribution system constraint causes prices to rise
without a corresponding rise in production cost, the
utility as the market maker collects a share of the
surplus which it presumably uses to finance capac-
ity expansion [50]. However, this scarcity rent is
collected only from customers on constrained feed-
ers and not from customers on unconstrained feed-
ers. This goes against the fundamental tenet that
the electric transmission and distribution system in-
frastructure itself is a public good, access to which
should be priced uniformly. Ironically, any rem-
edy to reinstate the basic nature of the public good
would undermine the very demand response behav-
ior that real-prices offer to elicit.
The final and perhaps most insidious techni-
cal strategy for customer aggregation is technology
lock-in and high barriers to entry. Although in the
rational economic model the cost of the technol-
ogy previously procured by a customer should be
viewed as a sunk cost, customers often remain with
the technology they have in spite of the existence
of an objectively less costly choice going forward.
This often leads to persistent conditions where in-
ferior technologies remain extant and causes signifi-
cantly higher welfare losses than in more innovative
industries [51]. Technology lock-in is often an ex-
plicit business strategy for technology and service
providers to ensure that they capture a dispropor-
tionate share of the producer surplus long after more
competitive technology is available. However, in the
electric power industry the process is implicit in the
capital-intensive nature of the business. That is in
part the argument in favor of government-subsidized
investments and technology transfer incentives in
utility technology overhauls, such as for the nuclear
technology in the late 1960s or renewable generation
and automated metering in the late 2000s.
In the end, technical customer aggregation strate-
gies usually support the economic, social, and busi-
ness objectives of utilities and the government over-
sight that protects the public good portions of
their operations. Technical customer aggregation
is rarely an objective in itself but for various prac-
tical reasons research into technical aggregation is
often divorced from these objectives. Indeed some
aggregation technologies are criticized for not rec-
ognizing these considerations and falling far short
of expectations given the costs [52].
The need for utilities to aggregate customers is
enduring and the methods they use vary greatly.
Utilities can employ economic and social aggrega-
tion methods to establish a robust and engaged base
of customers with a greater willingness to provide
demand response services. These services can be
employed in electric power systems operations for
energy conservation, peak load reduction and relia-
bility services.
Although many of these aggregation methods
have existed for decades, recent technological ad-
vances have enabled some of them to be revisited
and enhanced. In particular, early adopter strate-
gies offer utilities the opportunity to test new tech-
nologies to meet regulated research program invest-
ment obligations and avoid the risk of significant
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capital investments, while operators and customers
have to opportunity to learn how to maximize the
benefits of the programs before the committing to
full-scale deployment.
Price-based strategies provide a balance of eco-
nomic efficiency and risk mitigation by allowing util-
ities to transfer many of the costs more explicitly to
customers and reducing the need to engage in price-
volatility hedging on their behalf through opaque
rate design processes. But regulators remain wary
of price-based aggregation strategies until they can
be shown to be cost-effective and fair to all cus-
tomers.
1.8 Environmental Impacts of Demand
Response
In the previous sections, the role of ancillary ser-
vices, the potential for demand response to provide
such services and the strategies available to aggre-
gate demand response services were discussed in de-
tail. We found that (1) ancillary services provide a
critical capability for interconnection reliability; (2)
demand response has the potential to provide such
services; and (3) demand response resource aggrega-
tion is necessary to integrate such capabilities into
interconnection planning and operations. Variable
(often called intermittent) generation is a growing
fraction of the resource base for bulk power sys-
tems. The variable character of certain renewable
resources in particular is thought to undermine the
overall reliability of the system insofar as forecasts
of wind and solar generation output have greater
uncertainty than more conventional fossil, nuclear
or hydroelectric generation resources. As a result,
the expectation is that while variable renewable gen-
eration resources do displace the energy production
capacity of fossil power plants, they may not dis-
place as much of the power or ramping capacity of
those plants. Consequently, by their variable na-
ture, renewable resources may indicate that they do
not offer as much emissions benefit as expected if
one were to assess their impact simply on energy
production capacity [53].
It seems intuitive that demand response should
be able to mitigate the capacity and ramping im-
pacts of variable generation by reducing the need to
build and commit fossil generation to substitute for
reserves or ramp in place of fast-changing renewable
generation. But this substitutability is constrained
by (1) the nature of variable generation, the role
of forecasting, and the impact of resource variabil-
ity on the emissions and economics of renewable re-
sources; (2) the nature of load variability and how
demand response is related load variability; and (3)
the characteristics of end-use demand and the im-
pact of demand response on energy consumption,
peak power and ramping rates over the various time
horizons that are relevant to the variable generation
question.
Taken together, these constraints and interactions
provide the basis for assessing the economic and
environmental impacts of controllable load and de-
mand response resources on various time scales. It is
by virtue of the downward substitutability of reserve
resources that we can assume the variability impact
of renewable generation is exactly the opposite and
always less than the benefit of the same controllabil-
ity in demand response and we can assess the value
of demand response using this inequality as a guide.
1.8.1 Generation Variability
On the supply side of the reliability equation we find
that variability in renewable resources is the most
significant contributor to uncertainty in the overall
generation production scheduling process. Current
renewable generation forecasting tools are based on
five technologies: numerical weather prediction, en-
semble forecasts, physical models, empirical mod-
eling and benchmarking, which are combined in a
3-step process to product a forecast: (1) determine
weather conditions, (2) calculate power output, and
(3) scale over different time-horizons and regional
conditions [54]. In general, the RMSE of renew-
able forecasting methods grow asymptotically as the
time horizon is extended with the best models hav-
ing an RMSE of less than 5% for 1 hour forecasts
to over 35% for 3-days forecasts. There is high vari-
ability in the reported performance of different fore-
casting tools. Because generation resources are dis-
patched based on these forecasts, the principle com-
ponent of unscheduled generation deviations is the
error in the forecasts of renewable resources [55].
System operators schedule generation reserves
primarily as a function of the amount of genera-
tion scheduled, and secondarily based on the class of
generation scheduled. Regardless of the amount or
type of generation scheduled, only certain types of
generation resources may serve as reserve resources,
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such as hydro-generation or combustion turbines.
In general, base-load thermal resources such as coal
and nuclear are not usable in such a manner and it
is not economical to use intermittent resources such
as combined cycle plants [56]. (Renewable resources
are naturally excluded from consideration because
they are the source of the variability.)
The output of many types of renewable electricity
generation, such as wind, wave and solar, is inter-
mittent in nature. Output varies with environmen-
tal conditions, such as wind strength, over which
the operator has no control. Including these fluctu-
ations has the potential to affect the operation and
economics of bulk systems, markets, and the output
of other forms of generation. It can affect the relia-
bility of electricity supplies and the actions needed
to ensure supply always equals demand. The find-
ings of a review of more than 200 studies on impact
of intermittency provide a baseline of facts upon
which we can evaluate the impact of demand re-
sponse control [57]:
• With additional variable generation, system-
level operating margins must be increased un-
less there is a large amount of response or con-
trollable load. Otherwise the Loss of Load
Probability (LOLP) can be expected to in-
crease. The addition of variable generation or
demand response does not change the funda-
mentals of how LOLP is estimated.
• The contribution of variable generation to re-
liability is measured using the capacity credit,
which describes the percentage of installed ca-
pacity reduction as the share of electricity sup-
ply from variable resources. For system with
less than 20% variable generation, the capac-
ity credit is usually 20-30% of installed capac-
ity, but declines as the share of electricity from
variable sources increases.
• Standby capacity is the amount by which sys-
tem margin must increase in order to main-
tain reliability. This number only has mean-
ing at the system level and should never be
associated with any given variable resource.
There is ongoing debate about whether LOLP
fully captures the changes in reliability arising
from variable generation because the number
of small curtailment events may increase while
the number of large outage events may remain
unchanged or even decrease. This suggests the
same may be true for using LOLP to evaluate
the reliability benefits of demand response.
• In liberalized markets, most of the electric en-
ergy is still traded primarily using medium and
long-term bilateral contracts. The system op-
erators make small residual adjustments using
purchased short-term reserves. The costs of
acquiring these short-term reserves are passed
on to consumers. Variable generation typically
adds up to 20% to the cost of electricity sup-
ply to provide 5-10% of the installed capacity
of wind in additional supplies. In most systems
this cost is typically less than $5/MWh.
• In these markets, there is no single entity that
is responsible for acquiring system margin and
therefore the cost of additional margin required
to mitigate the reliability impact of variable
generation is difficult to estimate. There is also
a need for a common definition of the system
reliability cost of variable generation. Overall
the reliability cost of variable generation is esti-
mated at 10-20% of its direct cost, including the
cost of maintaining a high system margin but
these costs do not consider the externalities of
environmental and emissions impacts. For the
purposes of establishing the impact equivalence
between generation variability and load con-
trollability this may be fortuitous, as it makes
it unnecessary to remove these in order to es-
tablish a solid basis for cost impacts: load con-
trols do not exhibit these same externalities, al-
though they may have their own different ones,
such as consumer behavior impacts.
Variable resources do help reduce the need to
operate fossil-based power plants, and thus reduce
emissions to a first order. But this benefit is not
on a one-to-one basis because the need to contin-
ually adjust fossil plant output can cause second-
order increases in emissions due to decreased plant
efficiency. For 3 MW of wind capacity added, only
2 MW of fossil capacity is decommitted. Additional
startups reduce the emissions benefits of wind by
2%. Part-load operation reduces the emissions ben-
efits by an additional 0.3% in WECC [58]. In ad-
dition, at high variable generation levels, some en-
ergy may need to be spilled because there are no
consumers for it under light load conditions. The
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effective emissions rate for wind due to these sec-
ondary effects relative to a typical interconnection
fossil generation mix is about 1-2%/MWh [59].
The overall emissions penalties for renewable ben-
efits can are shown in Table 4. Based on the variable
resource impacts inequality assumption, we should
assume that demand response benefits cannot ex-
ceed these values.
There are a number of considerations that limit
the equivalence between variable generation impacts
and controllable load benefits. In particular, the ge-
ographic dispersal of variable generation supports
diversity, which is a key assumption in estimating
their collective reliability impacts. For demand re-
sponse, such assumptions may not hold. In addi-
tion, certain regulatory practices such as defining
gate closures (the lead time required to procure re-
serves) may differentially affect how well improve-
ments in forecasting of variable generation reduce
reliability impacts relative to changes in load fore-
casting as more load becomes responsive.
1.8.2 Load variability
Time-series load data is the foundation of all load
analysis. The most commonly available data on
load are metered balancing area, substation, feeder,
premises, and end-use load data (in decreasing order
of availability). Utilities have measured balancing
area to feeder-level load using SCADA systems for
decades and this provides a very clear picture of the
aggregated behavior of load. Most obvious in this
data is the weather and diurnal sensitivity of load,
which are the basis of load forecasting tools [60].
Until recently, premises load data was only mea-
sured monthly, and depending on the rate paid by
the customer it might be only energy use (so-called
interval metering) or peak power (for ratchet de-
mand rates). However the advent of advanced me-
tering technology has offered the possibility for sig-
nificantly more detailed sub-hourly premises load
data that allows analysts to examine many shorter
term behaviors such as devices and equipment cy-
cling at the sub-hourly horizon. Although end-use
metering is still very limited, it does provide addi-
tional insights that contribute important sub-hourly
information to the study of load variability [61].
Recent work has identified a distinctive spectral
signature for power from wind turbines [62]. The
technique was successfully applied to sizing stor-
age for variable generation mitigation [63], reducing
variable generation forecast uncertainty [64], and
studying load control for variable generation mit-
igation [65]. It particular, there appears to be an
opportunity to use variability spectra to create a li-
brary of end-use load signatures that will enable the
study of both load and generation variability and
support the design of demand response control pro-
grams that are better suited to mitigating variable
generation. This area appears to be a potentially
very fruitful topic for research with numerous op-
portunities, including
• End-use signature development for load decom-
position;
• Model identification for both duty-cycle phase
and amplitude of sub-hourly load behavior;
• Identification of human-driven behavior and
demand response sensitivities; and
• Identification of non-cyclic load variability
phases and amplitudes for diurnal and seasonal
behavior.
The response sensitivities based on spectral vari-
ability functions in particular appear to simplify the
evaluation and analysis of variability generation and
demand response impact questions. For example,
the computation of the overall emissions or cost im-
pact of a load shift of hours can be estimated by the
convolution
U(t) =
∫ +∞
−∞
υ(τ)L(t− τ)dτ = (υ ∗ L)(t)
where υ(t) is the cost of emissions at the time t and
L(t) is the load. While in time domain this can
be difficult to compute, in frequency domain it is
relatively simple:
Uˆ(s) = υˆ(s) · Lˆ(s)
where Uˆ(s), υˆ(s), and Lˆ(s) are the Fourier trans-
forms of U(t), υ(t), L(t) respectively. Given a li-
brary of both generation variability and load con-
trol signatures in frequency domain, the optimal
demand response design problem may be relatively
simple to evaluate.
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Table 4: Emission Reductions Relative to the 0% Wind Penetration [23]
Wind CO2 CO2 N2O CH4 CO NOx SOx PM
10% 12% 12% 9% 12% 10% 13% 8% 11%
20% 21% 21% 11% 17% 15% 22% 17% 22%
30% 28% 28% 10% 21% 19% 29% 24% 32%
40% 33% 33% 4% 23% 20% 34% 30% 40%
1.8.3 Characteristics of load
Loads and load control exhibit a peculiar character-
istic that is often not considered in benefits anal-
ysis. The relationship between energy, load, and
ramping is actually quite robust. Most demand re-
sponse programs can exclusively affect either power
demand in the short term or energy consumption in
the long term. In every other respect energy, power,
and ramping are strictly related to each other as
d
dt
Energy(t) = Load(t) =
∫
Ramp(t) dt
and this relationship is not affected by conventional
demand response control strategies. For example,
a DSM program may reduce energy consumption
in the long term, but the power and ramping im-
pact are strictly a function of how the demand re-
sponse program affects energy use. Similarly, an air-
conditioning load curtailment program to cut peak
may reduce power during peak hours, but the natu-
ral tendency of thermostatic devices to make up for
short-term deficits over the long run means that long
term energy use may be relatively unchanged. The
characteristic time of a demand response control
strategy and how the systems it controls respond
are essential to understanding how well demand re-
sponse will mitigate variable generation resources
and the degree to which the demand response im-
pact inequality will apply.
The argument can be made that resources with
greater ramping capabilities should be considered
higher quality reserve resources. In ancillary ser-
vices markets, this characteristic places a premium
on faster resources with downward substitutability.
For this reason, demand response resource that con-
trol the power of loads are at least as valuable as
generation resources with the same net power re-
sponse and often more valuable because of their
greater ramping response (strong downward substi-
tutability). In fact, it seems that the principal (and
perhaps the only) limiting factor on the ramping
rate of demand response resources is the telecom-
munications latency of the control signals. The real-
time market in the Olympic study had a typical de-
lay of a few seconds in response to the market clear-
ing event, but the market itself cycled only once
every five minutes [66].
1.9 Summary of Impacts
The impacts of generation variability hence load
controllability may be summarized as follows:
• Long term load forecasts have lower relative
RMSE than long term than variable generation
forecasts. Thus load can be expected to out-
perform the generation it mitigates, all other
things being equal.
• Load control can be scheduled with greater reli-
ability than variable generation and thus can be
expected to outperform the generation it miti-
gates, all other things being equal.
• The LOLP impacts of variable generation are
mitigated by load control in part by moving
all controllable load out of the load impacts by
outages.
• The capacity credit for controllable load can
be expected to be comparable to the capacity
credit for variable generation, if not better, be-
cause for every 1 MW of load that is control-
lable, 1 MW of generation reserve can be de-
committed.
• The standby capacity reduction associated with
controllable load should in principle be 100% of
the active load under control.
• When controllable load is dispatched under
liberalized markets, consumers become the
providers of resources. This tends to divert rev-
enue from generators to savings by consumers.
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Based on the cost of variability on the supply
side, this can be expected to be about 10-20%
of the direct cost of electricity, and mitigates
the need to provide 5-10% additional installed
capacity.
• The secondary emissions benefits for avoiding
startup and part-load fossil generation are ex-
pected to be 10-20% for modest levels of vari-
able generation (i.e., ¡20%) but may be signifi-
cantly lower for some bulk systems, depending
on conditions.
• The geographic sensitivity of load is different
and very likely less than it is for variable gen-
eration. Loads tend to be more uniform and
better diversified than variable generation.
1.10 Recent Trends
The trend toward a more integrated and inter-
connected complex energy system is inexorable.
Progress on the 21st century’s infrastructure of com-
plex interlocking energy resource, transformation,
information, service, social, and economic networks
is challenging our current understanding of these
systems and our ability to design and control them.
Significant challenges and research opportunities
remain in load modeling and simulation, under-
standing the impact of consumer behavior on de-
mand response, the foundational theory for control-
ling widely dispersed demand response resources,
and the verification, validation, monitoring, and me-
tering of demand response systems in utility opera-
tions.
Overall, it is clear that we are entering a period of
increased electric utility receptiveness and growing
innovation in the methods and strategies for turning
a largely passive customer base into an active part
of electric system operation. Technical innovation
based on sound economic and social objectives as
well as robust engineering design will be instrumen-
tal in bringing about this transformation.
The impact of controllable load on system oper-
ation can be deduced from studies on the impact
of variable generation. The studies to date suggest
that variable generation has both costs and bene-
fits, and that the benefits outweigh the costs for
reasonable mixes of variable generation relative to
conventional resources.
Many of the adverse impacts of variable genera-
tion are positive impacts for controllable load in the
sense that the magnitude of the cost or impact as
a function of generator variability is a cap on the
magnitude of the benefit of load as a function of
load controllability.
Controllable load exhibits the further advantage
of high downward substitutability and thus can be
significantly favored under liberalized ancillary ser-
vice markets. This feature of controllable load
suggests that well-designed ancillary service mar-
kets along with market-based load control strategies
could be a very powerful combination.
Significant further research on how to structure
such energy and ancillary service markets, design
load control strategies, and model the systems in
which they operate is required to further elucidate
the benefits of this approach. Ultimately our abil-
ity to plan and operate bulk power systems that
utilize such resources will depend on our ability to
understand both the system as a whole as well as
the details of the economic, electromechanical and
human components which comprise it.
In March 2017, a study of demand response re-
sources in California’s three investor-owned utili-
ties was published [24]. The authors evaluated the
potential size and cost of future demand response
resources. They addressed two fundamental ques-
tions: (1) What demand response services can meet
California’s future grid needs? And (2) what is the
size and cost of the expected resource base for these
demand response services?
Recognizing that demand response operates
across a range of timescales, they proposed a new
framework for analysis studies such as theirs. They
developed a supply curve modeling framework to
express the availability of system-level grid services
from distributed resources based on automated me-
tering data. They created a taxonomy and a frame-
work that groups these services into four core cate-
gories to facilitate cost/benefit analysis:
Shape: Demand response that reshapes customer
load profiles through price response or on be-
havioral campaigns with advance notice of days
to months.
Shift: Demand response that encourages the move-
ment of energy consumption from times of high
demand to times of day when there is a surplus
of renewable generation. Shift could smooth
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net load ramps associated with daily patterns
of solar energy generation.
Shed: Loads that can be curtailed to provide peak
capacity and support the system in emergency
or contingency events–at the statewide level, in
local areas of high load, and on the distribution
system, with a range in dispatch advance notice
times.
Shimmy: Loads that dynamically adjust demand
on the system to alleviate short-run ramps and
disturbances at time scales ranging from sec-
onds up to an hour.
The study confirmed that the focus on load shed-
ding to reduce peaks should be redirected to focus
more on local and distribution system needs, sup-
porting control technology and business relation-
ships that combine targeted fast shed with shift.
This will likely require integration between policy
at the CPUC and CAISO to ensure that market
designs are matched with the most cost-effective
pathways for demand response services. Continued
work on how integrated energy efficiency, behind-
the-meter storage, and demand response can lead
to value across a range of categories—integrated
demand-side management.
Further development may focus on efforts to inte-
grate benefits at the system scale, on the distribu-
tion system, and at the site level using distributed
resource planning. The authors did not undertake a
detailed study of site-level electric bill impact or ex-
plicit distribution system service modeling dynam-
ics. However, they did include a set of first-order
estimates for the scale of benefits in these areas that
are likely achievable when DR technology provides
multi-scale service. Given the co-benefits for site-
level service, the reported an increase of about 4
GW of additional demand response shedding capac-
ity compared to a model run without co-benefits.
2 Transactive Control
This section presents a more or less chronolog-
ical history of the development of what is now
called “transactive control”, beginning with the
original conception of a homeostatic grid proposed
by Schweppe et al. [25] in which a system of au-
tonomous devices provides support to the grid by
regulating their demand using ambient signals like
system frequency and local voltage. This signifi-
cance of load resources was expanded on by Ihara
[26] when he described the physical basis of cold-
load pickup behavior and showed how the intrin-
sic integral error feedback behavior of thermostats
limits the extent to which thermostatic control of
loads for demand response can be used as a resource
akin to energy storage. The paper also shows how
important consideration of the diversity, showing
that even a first-order thermal model of individual
homes yields a ring-down behavior after load service
is returned. The paper also distinguishes between
load outages (or curtailments) that do not cause
discomfort (i.e., indoor temperatures stay within
the thermostat deadband) and those that cause dis-
comfort (i.e., stray outside the deadband). Finally,
the paper also recognizes the difficulty of connect-
ing individual-based controls to aggregate behavior,
which is a problem that continues to be explored to
this day in a wide variety of ways, e.g., in [21, 27, 28].
Transactive control adopts fundamental ideas
about using pricing as a mechanism to optimally al-
locate energy resources in bulk power systems and
attempts to apply them to distribution systems,
with the objective of facilitating the participation of
retail loads to the same extent that generators par-
ticipate at the wholesale level. The original whole-
sale markets developed in Chile and New Zealand
in the 1980’s were prototypical examples of energy-
only markets. Energy-only markets have since been
augmented significantly in systems such as PJM,
CAISO, and others, where capacity and ancillary
services markets now exist as well. However, trans-
active control researchers have yet to described how
markets for non-energy resources can be developed
and operated at the distribution level.
The problem of pricing energy for electricity net-
works when loop flows are present was address by
Hogan in 1992 [29], but has yet to be completely
addressed in transactive systems. In Hogan’s pa-
per the concept of contract network was introduced
to identify the contract paths that connect short-
term efficient prices for electric energy with long-
term power capacity prices on tranmission systems.
Here the sense of a contract network is somewhat
different from that offered by Smith [30], where a
contract “net” described the mechanism by which
agents negotiated for prioritized access to a con-
strained computation resource. But the differences
arise from the particulars of the resources and the
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system being optimized. The underlying concept of
using a bottom-up approach that respects the phys-
ical limitations of the system is basically the same.
In the case of Hogan’s proposal, payments to the
holder of a long-term capacity contract are just the
amount that make them indifferent to power deliv-
ery or compensation through a settlement. As a re-
sult, the discovery of the price through a real-time
pricing mechanisms produces the same result as a
secondary market would but avoids the necessity of
implementing an explicit capacity trading mecha-
nism.
Huberman and Clearwater at Xerox PARC [31]
extended the contract net concept to commercial
buildings. In a field demonstration they showed
that the mechanism found an equitable solution for
satisfying thermal comfort problems when energy
supply resources were constrained. The computa-
tional mechanism employed a blind double-auction
in which agents bid on behalf of energy suppliers
and consumers at a given price and avoided hidden
costs such as excessive actuation.
These ideas were adopted by the Pacific North-
west National Laboratory in its demonstration for
the US Department of Energy on the Olympic
Peninsula [32, 33]. In this field demonstration,
over a hundred residences, two office buildings, in-
dustrial loads and distributed generation resources
were provided bidding agents to interact with a re-
tail double-auction on their behalf. Devices were
equipped with underfrequency load shedding con-
trols, thermostatic controls, and other end-use con-
trols that interfaced with bid/response controllers.
The results showed significant increases in demand
response as well as improved coordination of dis-
tributed resources. Among the benefits observed,
the most significant were a 60% reduction in short-
term peak load and a 15% reduction in long-term
peak load.
Huang et al [34] describes the design of the Pacific
Northwest SmartGrid Demonstration (PNWSGD)
project, also funded by the US Department of En-
ergy under ARRA in 2009. This project involved
60,000 customers from twelve utilities in five states
in the northwest region of the US. The project im-
plemented an end-to-end system from generation
to consumption, built around an infrastructure of
newly deployed smart meters. The objective was to
demonstrate how transactive control can coordinate
distributed generation and demand response, and
test a hierarchical but decentralized control system
where each node of the power grid used local signals
of demand and price to match supply with demand
at varying frequencies of up to every five minutes or
less.
Melton et al. [35] summarized the transactive
control research under the PNWSGD Project. In
the context of the project transactive control may
be thought of as extending the notion of locational
marginal pricing throughout the power system from
generation to end-use. The transactional nature of
the technique, however, introduces a new element in
the use of a pair of signals to implement an equiva-
lent to market closing distributed in space and time.
This was achieved using a negotiation process, but it
was shown to not always converge. The PNWSGD
project was very ambitious and was largely success-
ful although it did not achieve all its stated objec-
tives. Some utilities were not fully successful in de-
ploying all their technologies, and some deployments
did not provide the expected financial or operational
returns [36]. The final report does not make any de-
termination regarding the causes of problems that
were identified, and made no attempt to diagnose
them.
Modeling and simulations of these systems re-
main a crucial requirement for transactive program
development, and require tools that can model si-
multaneously the markets, the power system, and
the end-use loads. Fuller et al. [37] examined
demand response and dynamic pricing programs,
which have played increasing roles in the modern
smart-grid environment. The authors argue that
price-driven response programs are only a relatively
recent development. While active markets may al-
low customers to respond to fluctuations in whole-
sale electrical costs, they may not allow the utility
to control demand as precisely as more convention-
ally deployed direct load control systems. Trans-
active markets using distributed controllers and a
centralized auction can create an interactive system
that may limit demand during congestion events,
but otherwise does not subject consumers to util-
ity control during normal operating periods. The
advent of computing and communication resources
has created the opportunity to deploy transactive
demand response programs at the residential level,
where the combination of automated bidding and
response strategies, consumer education programs,
and new demand response programs give the utility
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the ability to reduce demand and congestion in a
more controlled manner.
The transactive system protocol and dynamic
control mechanisms require modelers to capture
load variation, stochastic signal losses, consumer fa-
tigue and limits on control signals that arise out of
physical constraints. Jin et al. [38] showed that
the control mechanism can perform adequately in
adjusting the aggregate supply-demand mismatch,
and is robust to steady transactive signal losses.
They developed a large-scale network simulation
model for evaluating such a hierarchical transac-
tive control system as part of their work on the Pa-
cific PNWSG demonstration. In this simulation the
transactive control system communicates local sup-
ply conditions using incentive signals and load ad-
justment responses using feedback signals in a dis-
tributed fashion in order to match the consumer-
desired load to the utility-desired supply scenario.
Transactive technologies include such things as
“micro-tagging” of resources, more use of dis-
tributed intelligence, and dynamic transaction rout-
ing and approval. Ipakchi et al. [39] presents
a broad concept for the Smart Grid of the fu-
ture that requires coordinated management of large
numbers of distributed and intermittent resources,
while maintaining high degrees of grid reliability,
cost-effectiveness and efficiency. This concepts in-
volves a high-degree of information exchange be-
tween operating entities, devices, and users to fa-
cilitate scheduling, dispatching and control of in-
termittend generation, energy storage and demand
response resources using a variety of energy and an-
cillary services markets. The authors call for new
methods that provide real-time end-to-end manage-
ment of the system. They argue that deregulation
of wholesale electricity markets provides a frame-
work in which to consider this more easily. But
they also argue that recent technical advances fa-
cilitate extending this framework to a “transactive
framework” that supports scheduling, dispatching
and control using competitive markets.
Additional resources can be made available in
such systems by using conventional commercial
building automation systems. Transactive control
has been shown to apply to any thermostatically
controlled device with one- or two-way communi-
cation, and shows qualitatively the value of the
market-based controls. Katipamula [40] makes the
case that as electricity demand continues to grow,
traditional approaches to meet the demand would
require significant additional demand response re-
sources, and that transactive control of residential
resources is not sufficient. Part of the solution must
come from “smart” commercial buildings as well.
As with most residential buildings, many commer-
cial buildings lack the necessary infrastructure to
participate in transactive systems. Building on the
work of Huberman [31] and others, the authors de-
scribe market-based transactive controls that can
be implemented in an existing building automation
system (BAS) with little or no additional capital ex-
penditure and show how one can make commercial
buildings more demand responsive.
Pratt [41] presents the key motivations and de-
sign considerations behind the development of a
real-time pricing tariff approved by the Public Util-
ity Commission of Ohio (PUCO) for AEP’s gridS-
MART demonstration project [42]. The design of a
revenue-neutral real-time price rate that reflects lo-
cational marginal prices from the wholesale market
addressed the key desire to combine both wholesale
and retail congestion costs at the distribution feeder
level. This simultaneously and seamlessly managed
peak loads at both the feeder and system levels.
The tariff included an attempt to address key issues
related to equity and providing credits and incen-
tives for congested periods by providing a conges-
tion rebate. The authors estimated the expected
impacts on customer bills, which were considered
by the PUCO when it approved the real-time price
tariff.
In addition to pricing, consumers can be re-
warded for tolerance to service delays and reduc-
tions, especially when engaging micro-grids and
electric vehicle-to-grid services. Scaglione et al [43]
describes Demand Side Management (DSM) and
Demand-Response (DR) programs that are aimed
at revealing the intrinsic elasticity of consumer elec-
tricity demand and make it responsive to the near-
term cost of supplying generation. The authors ar-
gue that DSM and DR are indispensable for bal-
ancing the market power of generators and reduc-
ing the need for reserves. But they also recognize
that the debate on the right approach to integrat-
ing DSM and DR in system planning and operation
is not yet closed, with transactive mechanisms be-
ing a leading contender among approaches that can
aggregate smart loads, properly account for incon-
venience costs, and modulate the total demand time
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optimally while converging to the energy dispatch.
Widergren et al. [44] argue that the most ex-
citing aspect of the smart grid vision is the full
participation of end-use resources with all forms of
generation and energy storage in the reliable and
efficient operation of an electric power system. En-
gaging all of these resources in a collaborative man-
ner that respects the objectives of each resource,
responds to global and local constraints, and scales
to the large number of devices and systems partici-
pating is an unsolved problem. The American Elec-
tric Power Northeast Columbus gridSMART RTPda
project demonstrated distributed decision-making
system approaches. As a multi-feeder extension of
the Olympic project, the Columbus project demon-
strated a scale-up of residential demand response
that uses the bidding transactions of supply and
end-use air conditioning resources communicating
with a real-time, five minute market that balanced
the various needs of the participants on a distribu-
tion feeder. Running as a summer peak-load system
in PJM ISO territory, the project provided valu-
able additional field data that complemented the
Olympic data set.
The problems (and solutions) are not all techni-
cal. Sahin and Shereck [45] classified the costs and
benefits of renewables for all market participants
using the Transactive Energy Framework proposed
by the GridWise Architecture Council in 2013 [46].
They raise some of the concerns that restructuring
the system pose. As renewable generators start to
replace conventional resources and more and more
customers begin to produce their own energy locally,
there is a growing concern over market access parity.
As more consumers become “prosumers” and the
utility is left with a diminished role and must main-
tain the grid with declining revenues. Those who
cannot afford their own renewable sources pay for
critical infrastructure costs with higher rates. They
conclude that the current market mechanisms can-
not properly distribute the costs and ensure grid
reliability.
Many important questions remain outstanding re-
garding the best approach to improving the grid.
Bowes and Beehler [47] make the case that the con-
cept of an integrated grid is the natural next step
in the evolution of bulk power systems. New fast
and ubiquitous digital communications technology
and evolving regulatory policies enable both an in-
tegrated power grid and a transactive energy sys-
tem. The integrated grid uses legacy electric sys-
tems as the platform for incorporating all the new
distributed and renewable resources. But they ask if
consensus is reached on whether and how the legacy
system allows planners and operators to adopt new
technologies that are so physically and financially
inter-dependent at a scale and level of performance
otherwise considered impossible. Is it a safer, more
reliable and more affordable system? Have we estab-
lished the value proposition for a highly integrated
system that makes transactive energy possible and
eventually desirable? Can we leverage all the avail-
able resources to improve the utilization of all the
legacy grid assets?
Syed et al. [48] examined the role of demand
side management in providing ancillary services to
the network. However, the use of demand resources
for ancillary services has traditionally been limited
because of a lack of field demonstrations that test
whether we can rigorously quantify their ability to
support grid reliability requirements. The provision
of fast-acting frequency control from demand-side
resource was simulated using Kok’s PowerMatcher
[49] in combination with real-time power control
hardware. In a parallel study [50] they argue against
assuming that all the flexible devices within the net-
work must be managed and controlled under one
demand-side management scheme. They explore
what happens when two independent demand side
management schemes control a portfolio of flexi-
ble devices. They use their findings to propose a
methodology to analyze the performance of non-
homogeneous control schemes using their real-time
power hardware-in-the-loop co-simulation platform,
and recommend this type of co-simulation as the
basis for investigations of ancillary service benefits.
Sandoval and Grijalva [51] proposed a platform to
coordinate distributed energy resources as part of a
building model framework to help integrate renew-
able resources. The platform is based on a decen-
tralized approach the employs the concept of elec-
tricity prosumers, economic agents that both pro-
duce and consume grid products and services. An
important aspect of their approach is a layered ar-
chitecture reminiscent of the network stack in the
Internet: a physical layer, a local control layer, a
cyber layer, a system control layer for economic dis-
patch and real-time control, a market transactive
layer for integration and a business layer for costs
and revenues. The platform enables coordination
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between spatially and temporally distant systems
with heterogeneous resources. The coordination is
maintained dynamically while accommodating both
end-user and system constraints. Their results show
that using such a coordination platform supports
higher amounts of renewable energy while it reduces
carbon emissions and operational costs.
Such highly interactive coordination requires
more reliable and higher throughput communica-
tion infrastructure. In considering the impact of
the Internet on power systems, Collier [52] quotes
Bob Metcalfe, the inventor of the ethernet and well-
known technology visionary:
Over the past 63 years, we met world needs
for cheap and clean information by build-
ing the Internet. Over the next 63 years,
we will meet world needs for cheap and
clean energy by building the Enernet.
The analogy to the impact of the Internet on in-
formation technolocay has created high expecta-
tions for energy networks. Revolutionary advances
in electronics, telecommunications and computing
technologies, and devices and applications are ex-
pected to transform how we design and operate bulk
electric power systems. What started as an infor-
mation network connecting people is now a system
of systems connecting devices as well—an Internet
of Things. According the Collier, the U.S. electric
utility model is arguably becoming non-viable and
may be supplanted by many smaller interconnected
networks of increasingly autonomous systems with
literally millions of distributed generation, storage,
and energy management nodes. This new more dis-
tributed but still highly interconnected grid of smart
interacting devices is growing more ubiquitous, pow-
erful, economical, and secure. Collier argues that
the Internet of Things is the sine qua non platform
for the future smart grid or, using Metcalfe’s phras-
ing, the “control plane for the smart grid”.
In a lecture to the American Control Confer-
ence in 2016, Jakob Stoustrup [53] described what
he termed an augmented “Transactive Control and
Coordination” framework that builds on Collier’s
model as well as the previously demonstrated trans-
active control paradigm. This operating model was
tested in the large-scale demonstration in the Pacific
Northwest region of the United States [36]. The re-
sults exhibited many of the characteristics predicted
from models and simulations made prior to the start
of operations. But he also argues that such demon-
strations have only served to illustrate the need for
a more rigorous understanding of closed-loop behav-
ior and more systematic approaches for choosing ap-
propriate control parameters in such a framework.
System modelers and designers still lack the theo-
retical underpinnings needed to fully understand the
impact of closing the loop around market-like mech-
anisms using many local conventional autonomous
closed-loop systems built on a large number of ag-
gregated controllable devices.
Behboodi et al. [54] discuss the integration of
plug-in electric vehicles in smart grids from differ-
ent perspectives. In order to achieve a grid-friendly
charging load profile, a strategy is proposed based
on the transactive control paradigm. This charg-
ing strategy enables electric vehicle owners to par-
ticipate in real-time pricing electricity markets to
reduce their charging costs. Then, the impact of
large-scale adoption of electric vehicles on electric-
ity generation and inter-area flow schedules is dis-
cussed. In order to quantify potential changes, an
interconnection-scale optimal scheduling problem is
used to determine hourly tieline flows. Given price
sensitive loads, the objective function of the sched-
uler maximizes the total social welfare. Finally, fast-
acting demand response for frequency regulation is
used to reduce the need for generation ramping.
This supports high penetration levels of intermittent
renewable resources by maintaining the short-term
balance of energy supply and demand.
Galvan et al. [55] developed the concept of “trans-
active energy” as an instance of transactive con-
trol for efficient electric vehicle grid integration and
management. The goal is to minimize the charg-
ing cost of EVs and mitigate the adverse effects of
intermittent generation resources. The study recog-
nized also that electric vehicle charging can result
in undesirable behaviors such as transformer over-
loads and aggravated evening demand peaks. Us-
ing the transactive energy paradigm, a distribution
system operator generates “distribution locational
marginal prices” at constraint nodes that are sent
to each customers house. Consumer needs and re-
source availability are updated allowing the oper-
ator to recalculate prices in response to changing
patterns of supply and demand.
One important benefit of transactive control is an
improvement in the self-healing and self-managing
aspects of system operations. Patterson and Geary
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[56] explore these concepts for distributed networks;
e.g., renewable energy nano-, micro- and macro
grids. Working up from the building level through
utility scale systems, and including aggregators
and system operators, they describe how power
sources, loads and storage of all types that are in-
terconnected can facilitate real-time transactional
power management of power flows in the network
grid. They propose a variety of practical aspects of
real-time transactive energy management, including
software that uses modern communications technol-
ogy to host the development of a new energy mar-
ketplace. They suggest that we require a platform
to integrate system planning and operations, includ-
ing fault detection/location, automated feeder and
line switching, and automated Volt/VAR control. If
such a platform enables market-based transactions
by communicating in real-time with equipment, us-
ing any communication network, then this effec-
tively turns every transactive device in the system
into a revenue-grade point-of-sale terminal.
This concept necessarily should include the grow-
ing number of electric vehicles. Behboodi et al. [57]
argue that smart grids can help Plug-in Electric Ve-
hicles (PEV) manage their load in a grid-friendly
way. They consider the case of PEVs participat-
ing in a retail double auction electricity regulation
market using transactive control. Price-responsive
charging of PEVs are modeled under real-time re-
tail price signals. Then PEVs can defer charging
or even discharge when the retail prices are high
enough, e.g., when feeder capacity constraints are
active. For the most advanced charging strategies,
as the price rises, demand from PEVs drops, and
if the constraint causes further price increases, the
PEVs can begin to supply energy. The results show
that when rooftop solar energy is available, transac-
tive bid-response vehicle charging strategies signifi-
cantly enhance short-term electricity demand elas-
ticity and can reduce consumer energy costs by more
than 75% in comparison to the unresponsive charge
case.
But these strategies do not come without chal-
lenges for the utilities. Localized congestion prob-
lems are expected, particularly as rooftop solar PV
and fast EV chargers become more prevalent. Hu
et al. [58] developed a network-constrained trans-
active control method to integrate distributed en-
ergy resources (DER’s) into a power distribution
system with the purpose of optimizing the opera-
tional cost of DER’s and power losses of the distri-
bution network, as well as preventing grid problems
including power transformer congestion, and volt-
age violations. A price coordinator is introduced
to facilitate the interaction between the distribu-
tion system operator (DSO) and aggregators in the
smart grid. Electric vehicles are used to illustrate
the proposed network-constrained transactive con-
trol method, and the problem is solved using math-
ematical models that describe its operation. Using
simulations, they show the effectiveness of the pro-
posed method, and particularly how it guarantees
optimality.
Rahimi and Albuyeh [59] consider lessons from
transmission open-access with the increasing avail-
ability of distributed energy resources and smart
end-use devices finding their place as transactive
agents in the electric system. As the transactive
paradigm at the retail/distribution level grows to
accommodate new market participants, they see a
number of parallels between the deregulation of the
wholesale transmission sector in the mid-1990’s and
the opening up of the distribution grid to accommo-
date these new participants. This includes new no-
tions such a Distribution Locational Marginal Prices
(DLMP), which function much like wholesale LMPs,
particularly in distribution systems where flow re-
versal and meshed flow are likely to occur.
Amin et al. [60] propose how the installation of
a battery storage system along with a PV system
in transactive systems might reduce a consumer’s
electricity bills. In an approach that parallels other
transactive PV strategies (e.g., [57]) they propose
to control the charging and discharging cycle of the
proposed battery in a transactive system. Using a
new cost-benefit analysis method specifically for so-
lar energy systems when combined with batteries,
they quantify the economic benefit based on real-
time electricity rate and battery cost, to give an ex-
act idea of returns and yearly savings to consumers
on their investment. Using real load and generation
data they show how an integrated 4kW PV unit re-
duces the power mismatch between the load demand
and solar generation. The result shows that storage-
enhanced consumers can maximize their savings
considerably on solar investment.
Most recently, Hao et al. [61] expanded on
the transactive control approach for commercial
building heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning
(HVAC) systems for demand response. They de-
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scribe the system models and parameters using data
collected from a commercial building located on
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory campus.
They show how a transactive control market struc-
ture works for commercial building HVAC systems,
and describe its agent bidding and market clear-
ing strategies. Several case studies are performed
in a building controls testbed and calibrated with
an EnergyPlus simulation model. They show that
the proposed transactive control approach is very ef-
fective at peak shaving, load shifting, and strategic
energy conservation for commercial building HVAC
systems.
3 Hierarchical Control
This section presents a discussion of how demand
response operates in the current hierarchical con-
trol of electric power systems and the requirements
that transactive control systems must meet to help
integrate demand-side resources into system opera-
tion.
The electric power industry has undergone a fun-
damental restructuring over the past 30 years, trans-
forming from a regulated to a market-oriented sys-
tem. Restructuring has entailed unbundling of ver-
tically integrated organizations into independently
managed generation, transmission and distribution
systems. As a result, electric power markets have
been divided into wholesale and retail systems that
interact according to a well-defined, albeit ad hoc
designs.
The wholesale power market design proposed by
the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) in its April 2003 white paper [62] encom-
passes the following core features: (1) central over-
sight by an independent system operator (ISO) or
regional transmission operator (RTO); and (2) a
two-settlement system consisting of a day-ahead
market supported by a parallel real-time market to
ensure continual balancing of supply and demand
for power. The objective of an ISO/RTO is to en-
sure that supply equals demand at every instant,
while maintaining system security and reliability
and minimizing the total cost of serving the sys-
tem demand. Optimization is performed on multi-
ple time-scales. The day-ahead settlement system
is a pure financial market for generators and load
serving entities to create financially binding operat-
ing schedules. The real-time energy market allows
for the physical exchange of power and addresses
deviations between actual real-time conditions and
contracted day-ahead agreements. The ISO solves
security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) and
economic dispatch (SCED) problems in both day-
ahead and real-time markets to determine cleared
supply and demand, and corresponding locational
marginal prices (LMPs), which are reported to mar-
ket participants. Additionally, to maintain opera-
tional balance at any given instant, the ISO runs a
balancing reserve market in parallel with the energy
markets to calculate the cleared reserve capacities,
and the corresponding reservation prices.
Retail markets have not gone through such a re-
structuring process. Hence, there is limited par-
ticipation by distributed assets in wholesale mar-
kets through aggregators and no direct participa-
tion by smaller assets at all. However, this can
be expected to change with accelerated deployment
of new “smart grid” infrastructure such as digital
meters and advanced distribution control systems
as were promoted under the Smart Grid Invest-
ment Grants starting in 2009. Additionally, FERC
Order 755 now requires grid connected short-term
storage devices to be treated equitably as conven-
tional generation units when providing regulation
services [11]. Similarly, FERC Order 745 requires
energy payment of demand response resources at
nodal LMPs [12]. As a result a number of wholesale
markets now allow distributed assets limited partic-
ipation in energy markets, usually to meet peak load
reduction or emergency services for large-scale de-
mand response programs that serve commercial and
industrial users. Feeder level resources still do not
participate in wholesale markets, except when pro-
vided by demand response aggregators and a limited
number of pilot/demo projects, e.g., the Olympic
[32, 33], PowerMatcher [49], Columbus [42], and Pa-
cific projects [35]. In order to realize the vision
of an integration demand response system at the
wholesale level, it will be necessary to consider mar-
ket design changes, the development of more full-
functioning system of retail markets, and the inte-
gration of the two that provides suitable incentives
for wholesale participation by distributed assets.
There are two key elements to any proposed in-
frastructure that will facilitate smooth and reliable
operations. The first is inter-scale infrastructure
that allows devices at various levels to cooperate in
determining the efficient allocation of the available
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resources. The second is the multi-temporal infras-
tructure that allows devices to shape the allocation
they have received within the time horizon in which
it is allocated.
The inter-scale infrastructure addresses resource
allocation and is used to reconcile supply resource
constraints with demand requirement, e.g., feeder
constraints versus consumer comfort settings at the
retail level. This is accomplished by using real-time
prices, such as was demonstrated in the Olympic
and Columbus projects. These systems established
retail markets that discovered the retail price at
which supply equals demand at each feeder in the
distribution system, given the current day-ahead
prices and prevailing conditions on the feeder and in
the homes equipped with price-responsive devices.
The Pacific project used a variant of this design for
resource allocation that relies on mid-term forecast-
ing usage instead of committing to short-term us-
age. This system substitutes an index for a price
to avoid some of the adverse misconceptions asso-
ciated with markets in an area that has none at
present. This index was developed using a negoti-
ation process that was shown to not converge (see
Appendix ?? for one solution to this problem). The
Pacific project also differs from Columbus project
in the way the formulated signal is presented to the
devices.
The inter-scale structure is shown in the verti-
cal dimension of Figure 1, while the inter-temporal
structure is shown in Figure 2. At the interconnec-
tion level we find the wholesale markets and sys-
tem operators who set hourly prices and inter-area
flow schedules by setting control area import/ex-
port schedules that maximize each area’s ability
to maintain system balance without exceeding in-
terarea flow limits. Control areas establish local
prices and respond to deviations in schedules and
frequency by sending control signals (A) to genera-
tors and utilities. These interact with loads and load
aggregators using the local closed-loop bid/response
pricing mechanisms implemented at the distribution
feeder level.
The real-time and day-ahead market-based feeder
and area management systems aim to maximize as-
set participation at every level in the real-time and
day-ahead markets by incorporating the smart grid
resources into standard ISO/RTO market struc-
tures. This is achieved by solving an optimization
problem subject to feeder and area level operational
constraints and uncertainties of intermittent renew-
ables and distributed smart grid assets. At the
wholesale system level, the ISOs and BAs receive
aggregated net load demand, supply bids for dis-
tributed assets from the area management systems
and generator power supply offers from generators
and aggregators. The ISO also runs balancing re-
serve markets in parallel with the energy and capac-
ity markets to procure reserve energy and capacity
to maintain system stability. The cleared or sched-
uled power setpoints and reserve capacity require-
ments are then dispatched to the area controllers,
which in turn dispatch requirements or price signals
to the feeder controllers and distributed assets in
their respective retail markets.
Maintaining operational balance at every instant
requires balancing areas to solve an area-wide op-
timization problem to allocate a portion of their
reserve capacity requirements to each feeder based
on the resources available. This problem is theo-
retically amenable to treatment by a market-based
process because of the primal-dual nature of the
optimization in question. This process must also
maintain adequate area-wide support of frequency
and tie-line flows by committing resources to au-
tonomously mitigate deviations in the area control
error. Feeders bid resources into the area market
and use the cleared prices to dispatch setpoints in
real-time to the distributed assets and primary de-
vices needed to meet the performance requirements
of the area and feeder control systems.
At the device level, decentralized control schemes
for the distributed assets provide both economic
and reliability responses based on self-sensing of fre-
quency, voltage, broadcasts of imbalance signals,
current and future prices, and local device condi-
tions. The distributed assets must be dynamically
influenced via dispatched control set-points that
area reset periodically based on price signals from
the retail markets, while responding autonomously
and instantaneously to events during contingency
operations.
The current standard practice for both direct
and indirect control of thermostatic load relies pri-
marily on so-called “one-shot” or direct load shed-
ding strategies for emergency peak load relief only.
This approach uses a controllable subset of all loads
in a particular class, e.g., water heaters or air
conditioners, which are transitioned to a curtailed
regime that reduces the population average power
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demand of the end-use category. After a time,
these responsive loads are released and return to
their normal operating regimes. This strategy is
known to exhibit fluctuations in aggregate load dur-
ing the initial response as well as demand recov-
ery rebounds after the loads are released, partic-
ularly when thermostatic loads are engaged. To
mitigate this behavior, direct load control strate-
gies are sometimes enhanced by either centralized
diversification mechanisms, such as using multiple
subgroups of the responsive loads dispatched in a se-
quence that smooths the overall response of the load
control system [63], or distributed mechanisms, such
as using stochastic control strategies [64]. Many of
these mechanisms require some knowledge of the ag-
gregate thermal response of the buildings in which
the loads are operating [65]. To solve the more gen-
eral tracking problem where load “follows” inter-
mittent generation [66], these mechanisms must ad-
dress response saturation and loss of diversity [67],
high sensitivity to modeling errors and noise [68],
and stability considerations due to feedback delays
[69, 70].
Aggregating building thermal load is known to
provide a potentially significant resource for balanc-
ing purposes [71]. But the hysteresis of standard
thermostats requires a switched-mode representa-
tion of the individual building thermal response,
which in turn gives rise to more complex aggregate
load models. The hysteresis also requires that mod-
els include so-called “refractory states”; i.e, states
are locked in or out for a certain time after a state
transition [72]. These time-locked states are asso-
ciated with transition delays rather than thermal
parameters. Tractable state space models of aggre-
gate loads can be obtained using model-order re-
duction strategies that linearize the system model
and limit the number of state variables required to
represent responsive loads [21, 73]. These models
depends on knowledge of the rate at which devices
turn on and off and cross the hysteresis band lim-
its, as well as the rate at which the control lockout
times expire. Such a state space model minimally
represents any thermostat with non-zero deadband.
More recent models include the “battery model”
[74], which presents aggregate thermostatic loads as
simple first-order systems. But these models are in-
tended for small signal response such as frequency
regulation, and may not be as useful for sustained
peak load curtailment or emergency load shedding.
An alternative thermostatic controller design
strategy was proposed to overcome some of the mod-
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eling issues arising from the lockout time delays,
while not compromising the role of control hystere-
sis in limiting fast-cycling behavior of thermal loads
[75]. This thermostat design uses a discrete-time
zero-deadband (T∆0) concept that has no refractory
states and synchronizes the state transition times
with an external signal such as a price coming from
a real-time retail double-auction. By using suit-
ably selected sampling rates to limit fast-cycling of
equipment T∆0 thermostats were hypothesized to
give rise to a simple aggregate load model and were
shown to have the same comfort and cost savings
as conventional thermostats when operated under
real-time price tariffs.
Demand response is becoming a more accepted1
and important option for utilities to mitigate the in-
termittency of renewable generation resources [76].
Transactive control is a multi-scale, multi-temporal
paradigm that can integrate wholesale energy, ca-
pacity, and regulation markets at the bulk system
level with distribution operations [77]. Under the
transactive control paradigm, retail markets for en-
ergy, capacity, and regulation services are deployed
to provide a parallel realization of wholesale markets
at the distribution level. In spite of the conceptual
similarity, the behavior of retail markets differs sig-
nificantly from that of wholesale markets and re-
mains an active area of research [78]. In particular,
load behavior usually dominates the behavior of re-
tail systems, which contrasts with wholesale systems
where generation is dominant. In addition, there
are a number of important processes in bulk power
interconnection operations that have yet to be in-
tegrated fully into the transactive paradigm. Two
very important such processes are system frequency
regulation and control area import/export schedule
tracking.
Frequency regulation and schedule tracking are
jointly regulated using a feedback signal called “area
control error” or ACE. The standard mechanism is
based on a computation performed in time-domain
independently in each control area by evaluating
[Q(t)−Qs] +B[f(t)− fs], (1)
where Q(t) is the actual net exports from the control
area at the time t, Qs is the scheduled net exports,
B is the frequency bias, f(t) is the interconnection
1For example, wholesale markets now support demand re-
sponse in several ISOs and jurisdictions, including PJM, Cal-
ifornia, and New York.
frequency at the time t, and fs is the nominal or
scheduled frequency. In most realizations the ACE
signal is updated by the SCADA system about every
4 seconds and further passed through a smoothing
filter so that it changes with a time-constant well in
excess of the generating units’ fastest response; e.g.,
30-90 seconds, with the purpose of reducing wear
and tear on generating unit governor motors and
turbine valves [7].
Numerous studies examining frequency regulation
resource performance using diverse loads have been
conducted in recent years. Lakshmanan et al. [79]
studied the provision of secondary frequency con-
trol in electric power systems based on demand
response activation on thermostatically controlled
loads in domestic refrigerators in an islanded power
system. Observations of household refrigerator re-
sponse time, ramp rate, and consumer impact show
that they provide sufficient fast responsive loads for
DR activation, with a typical response time of 24
seconds and a p.u. ramp down rate of 63% per
minute, which can satisfy the requirements for pri-
mary frequency control.
Vrettos et al. [64] proposed a frequency control
scheme designed to augment generation response
with load responses, and separate fast-acting load
resources from slower responding ones to provide
efficient frequency and inter-area power flow using
loads. By separating autonomous residential refrig-
eration loads from dispatchable waterheaters and
HVAC systems they achieved the desired response
without compromising comfort. The separation of
the loads was based on device characteristics, such
as thermal inertia and significant time-dependent
power variation, if any. Secondary frequency con-
trol is provided by coordinating the runtime of these
heterogeneous resources. The solution shown in Fig-
ure 3 was demonstrated using an optimizer that sat-
isfies the worst-case reserve requirements without
violating end-user comfort constraints. This result
provides a useful existence proof, which is significant
for any transactive approach that relies on similar
mixes of resources but achieves the solution using a
distributed system.
Zhong et al. [80] developed a large-scale coor-
dination strategy for electric vehicles, battery stor-
age and traditional frequency regulation resources
for automatic generation control. Recognizing that
response priorities and control strategies for these
resources vary with different operating states, they
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Figure 3: Area control scheme using loads proposed by Vrettos et al. [64]
showed that a coordinated control approach not
only fully utilizes each resource’s advantages but
also improves the frequency stability and facilitates
the integration of renewable energy.
Falahati et al. [81] examined a model of storage
using electric vehicles as moving batteries in dereg-
ulated power systems as one way to deal with the
frequency regulation problem in a deregulated sys-
tem with a growing share of intermittent generation
resources. They enabled a vehicle-to-grid option
for the control of the frequency using an optimized
fuzzy controller to manage electric vehicle charging
and discharging based on system frequency. The
results illustrated satisfactory performance for fre-
quency control of the grid system and verified the ef-
fectiveness of the approach for reducing the need for
under-frequency load shedding to protect the sys-
tem against large frequency excursions.
Teng et al. [82] proposed a framework to quan-
tify and evaluate the impact of electric vehicles on
island systems like Great Britain. This framework
used a simplified power system model to analyze
the effect of declining system inertia on primary
frequency control and the ability of electric vehicle
chargers and batteries to provide resources to mit-
igate that impact. Using this model they proposed
an advanced stochastic scheduling tool that explic-
itly models the loss of inertia and assesses the costs
and emissions arising from primary frequency con-
trol as well as the benefits of having electric vehicles
provide primary frequency response. The results of
an analysis for Great Britain show that integrat-
ing electric vehicles in the primary frequency con-
trol system can significantly reduce anticipated cost
and emissions growth.
But the results from additional control are not
always ideal. Biel et al. [83] examined the fre-
quency response of commercial HVAC systems by
comparing different control strategies for provid-
ing frequency regulation demand response. Aside
from noteworthy performance impacts from intra-
facility communications delay and control latencies,
the authors also observe reductions in energy effi-
ciency when the frequency regulation controls are
more active, pointing to the necessity for combined
long-term energy cost and short-term regulation re-
sponse revenue to be considered jointly. In a con-
current study, Khan et al. [84] followed up on stud-
ies by Hao [74] and Sanandaji [85] of the storage-
like behavior of thermostatic loads by proposing a
stochastic battery model. This model provides pa-
rameters of the battery model and considers changes
to the hysteretic thermostatic control in response to
frequency. This provides a relatively simple solu-
tion to modeling aggregate load control. However
the approach has not been integrated with transac-
tive approaches, and may not account fully for the
longer-term endogenous energy conserving integral
error feedback that is intrinsic to thermostatic con-
trol in general.
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A number of studies of optimal generation con-
trol design have been previously reported. Bevrani
and Bevrani [86] studied the general frequency con-
trol tuning problem for multiple objectives and pro-
posed three methods for tuning PID controllers to
improve the performance of closed-loop systems, in-
cluding a mixed H2/H∞ optimal design method.
This approach is easily transferable to a static out-
put feedback control implementation, as is the case
with power system area control and any generalized
extension where export schedule tracking is desired.
The H2-optimal design method is particularly inter-
esting when there are significant robustness issues to
consider, although the authors did not present a so-
lution to the synthesis of an optimal area controller.
Jay and Swarmy [87] also recently proposed a re-
inforcement learning-based approach to automatic
generation control that was found to minimize fre-
quency deviations by incorporating thermostatic de-
mand response control strategies.
4 Demand Response in Orga-
nized Markets
FERC issued Order 745 in 2011 to amend its regu-
lations so demand response resources with the capa-
bility to balance supply and demand can participate
in organized wholesale energy markets as an alterna-
tive to generation resources. The order introduced
requirements that (1) dispatched demand response
resources satisfy a net-benefit test, and (2) demand
response resources are compensated for the services
they provide to the energy market at the locational
marginal price (LMP). This approach for compen-
sating demand response resources was intended to
“ensure the competitiveness of organized wholesale
energy markets and remove barriers to the partici-
pation of demand response resources, thus ensuring
just and reasonable wholesale rates” [12].
Critics of Order 745 have pointed out that de-
mand response is essentially unlike generation be-
cause it is exercised as a call option on the spot en-
ergy market, the value of which is the LMP minus
the strike price, which in the case of retail consumers
is the tariff rate [88]. Others contend that the value
of demand response is the marginal forgone retail
rate [89]. However it is valued, the question re-
mains whether FERC Order 745 effectively guar-
antees double compensation for demand response
by providing responsive load both the cost savings
from energy not provided by the retailer and an
LMP payment for not using same increment of en-
ergy. Such a signal might lead a firm to halt opera-
tions even though the marginal benefit of consuming
electricity exceeds the marginal cost at LMP. In his
comments to the Commission during prosecution of
the order Hogan argues that “the ideal and econom-
ically efficient solution regarding demand response
compensation is to implement retail real-time pric-
ing at the LMP, thereby eliminating the need for
[wholesale] demand response [compensation]” [88].
These arguments are largely academic if demand
response cannot be deployed broadly for technical
reasons. To resolve the technical questions regard-
ing the large-scale feasibility of demand response in
the context of smart grid the Olympic and Colum-
bus demonstration studies were conducted in 2006–
2007 and 2013, respectively. The objective of both
studies was to address the technical questions re-
garding the so-called “price-to-devices” challenge
[90] by demonstrating the transactive control ap-
proach to integrating small-scale electric equipment
with utility electric power distribution system oper-
ations as a first step toward integrating distributed
generation and demand response into wholesale
operations. Transactive control thus refers to a
distributed resource allocation strategy that en-
gages both electricity suppliers and consumers using
market-based mechanisms at the retail level for the
purpose of enabling demand response by the utilities
at the wholesale level [91].
A number of problems were identified following
the Olympic and Columbus demonstrations. The
most significant among these were the following.
Short-term Price Stability When demand re-
sponse resources become scarce, price volatil-
ity increased. This creates an undamped feed-
back that resulted in rail-to-rail actuation of
the demand response resources. The oscillation
develop because resource state diversity is de-
feated by the larger price signals, which in turn
drives large price volatility. The individual re-
sources themselves are not adversely affected
by these undamped oscillations. But from the
system perspective this is regarded as an unde-
sirable regime. The oscillations continue until
either sufficient demand resources are returned
online to restore state diversity that overcomes
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the oscillations, or the resource constraint that
drove the price surge goes away.
Lack of Forward Prices The expectation price
and price volatility should be obtained from for-
ward markets. In the demonstrations they were
developed from historical responses of the sys-
tem. This created a form of delayed feedback
that could give rise to long term price instabil-
ity.
Lack of Multi-level Market Integration The
retail markets should not be operated au-
tonomously or in open loop. Although the
wholesale prices were used in formulating the
feeder price bids, at no point was the retail
market used to formulate bid or forecasts for
the wholesale market.
Lack of Integration With Regulation System
The retail market-controlled resources should
be used to arm and reset regulation services,
such as fast-acting demand response with
autonomous controls. These resources should
be controlled by adjusting setpoints based
on resource needed at the system level. For
example, grid-friendly appliance controllers
were set to shed load at 59.95 Hz with a
probability of 1.0. This resulted in a fixed
aggregate control gain that could have been
adjusted based on system need during each
dispatch period.
Despite of these problems, the demonstration
projects were largely considered technical successes.
In fact, it can be argued that our understanding of
these issues is in large part due to the level of com-
plexity attempted by the projects.
Without aggregate load control, introducing
price-responsive demand requires engaging millions
of very small participants in the unit-commitment
and economic dispatch process. This may be im-
practical due to the computational complexity of
the process just for the thousands of larger suppli-
ers already involved. Strategies for addressing this
challenge generally involve aggregation at the retail
level that enables the integration of demand units
by proxy of a reduced number of larger representa-
tive units [64].
Using markets to solve electricity resource alloca-
tion problems at the wholesale bulk system level is
well-understood [92] . But transactive control takes
the idea to the retail level by enabling the resource
allocation problem at the distribution level first be-
fore integrating it at the wholesale level. These
markets are designed to find a Pareto-optimal allo-
cation of distribution capacity, distributed resource
and demand response to resolve how much whole-
sale resource is required, and determine how much
distributed generators produce, and customers con-
sume in the coming time interval. The transactive
control systems demonstrated use distribution ca-
pacity markets to determine the energy price that
minimizes the imbalance between supply and de-
mand for electricity by participating equipment dur-
ing the next operating interval [93]. The system
computes a 5-minute retail real-time price (RTP)
that reflects the underlying wholesale locational
marginal price (LMP) plus all the other distribution
costs and scarcity rents arising from distribution ca-
pacity constraints. The real-time price comes under
a new tariff designed to be revenue neutral in the
absence of demand response.
Distributed generation, load shifting, curtailment
and recovery are all induced by variations in real-
time prices. In doing so, the transactive control sys-
tem can reduce the exposure of the consumers and
the utility to price volatility in the wholesale market
and the costs of congestion on the distribution sys-
tem [94]. Retail prices are discovered using a feeder
capacity double auction that can be used to directly
manage distribution, transmission or bulk genera-
tion level constraints, if any. Distributed genera-
tion is dispatched based on consumers’ preferences,
which they enter into an advanced thermostat that
acts as an automated agent bidding for electricity
on their behalf. Thermostats both bid for the elec-
tricity and modulate consumption in response to the
market clearing price. By integrating this response
with a price signal that reflects anticipated scarcity
the system closes the loop on energy consumption
and can improve resource allocation efficiency by en-
suring that consumers who value the power most are
served first. At the same time, consumers provide
valuable services to the wholesale bulk power sys-
tem and reduced energy costs at times of day when
they express preferences for savings over comfort.
In the California ISO, demand response is ac-
quired using two different products, Proxy Demand
Resource (PDR) and Reliability Demand Response
Resource (RDRR) [95]. PDR bids supply in CAISO
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energy, non-spin and residual commitment mar-
kets for economic day-ahead and real-time dispatch.
RDRR bids supply for reliability purposes as energy
services only and dispatches economic day-ahead
and reliability real-time.
In the eastern interconnection, PJM obtains de-
mand response services from Curtailment Service
Providers (CSP). CSPs are entities responsible for
demand response activities in PJM wholesale mar-
kets [96]. These can be companies that focus exclu-
sively on customer demand response capabilities, or
they can be utilities, energy service providers, or
other types of companies that can provide the nec-
essary services to PJM. PJM uses these services to
obtain two kinds of demand response, economic and
emergency response. Customers can participate in
either or both, depending on circumstances.
PJM treats emergency demand response as a
mandatory commitment which is dispatched simi-
larly to generation when reliability resources are in
short supply or under emergency operating condi-
tions. Four products are generally used: (1) Limited
DR for no more than 6 hours a day on up to 10 days
during summer months, (2) Extended Summer DR
for no more than 10 hours a day for up to 10 days
during extended summer months, (3) Annual DR
for no more than 15 hours a day for any day of the
year, and (4) Base DR for up to 10 hours any day of
the year. Pricing is driven by the capacity market as
defined under the Reliability Pricing Model (RPM),
with payments made monthly for availability during
expected emergency conditions.
In contrast, PJM economic demand response is a
voluntary commitment to reduce load in the energy
market when wholesale prices are higher than the
monthly net benefits price at which the benefit of
reduction exceeds the cost of paying for the demand
response. These resources are used to displace gen-
eration and PJM expects these resources to reduce
load measurably, and impose penalties for loads that
fail to deliver the expected load reductions.
Economic demand response resources can also
provide Ancillary Services to the wholesale market if
enabled with the appropriate infrastructure. These
include (1) Synchronized Reserves that act within
10 minutes of dispatch, (2) Day-Ahead Scheduling
Reserves that act within 30 minutes of dispatch, and
(3) Regulation that follow PJM’s regulation and fre-
quency response signal. Participating in the Ancil-
lary Services market is voluntary, but once cleared
in the market, performance is mandatory.
Demand response programs in New York (NY-
ISO) and Texas (ERCOT) have many similar char-
acteristics and products. But the specifics of their
designs only further demonstrate how no two whole-
sale markets use precisely the same rules and defini-
tions. This only exacerbates the existing Balkaniza-
tion of the North American energy market designs
and presents yet another barrier to the widespread
adoption of demand response as a technology to mit-
igate the reliability impacts of renewable intermit-
tency.
4.1 Retail Competition
Retail competition was introduced in Europe, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand and some US states over the
last two decades. The theoretical rationale for re-
tail competition goes against conventional wisdom
in retailing because electricity is not a storable good
and the infrastructure needed for retail delivery is
largely a natural monopoly. Furthermore, the ho-
mogeneity of electricity limits opportunities for po-
tentially profitable retailing activities such as pre-
sentation, packaging, bundling, and co-branding.
These combine to limit the benefit of introducing
retail competition in three signicant ways [97].
1. The potential demand for a supplier to meet is
limited by the low revenues that retailing ac-
tivities can generate.
2. Retail markets must be created where none ex-
ist today, which requires consumers to engage
in searching, learning, and transaction activi-
ties that are costly barriers to switching from
the incumbent utility.
3. The homogeneity of the products limits the
differentiation and discrimination necessary to
create value-added services for the consumer.
The expectation was that entrepreneurial innova-
tion would provide social benefits and would over-
come these barriers. Retail competition was ex-
pected to reduce market imperfections [98], moti-
vate the discovery of new products and services [99],
stimulate customer awareness, and drive competi-
tion in generation [100]. But the results seem not
to be supported by the data observed initially. One
key indicator is that the percentage of customers
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active in the market remains quite low: no retail
market reports more than 50% participation and a
majority reported less than 10% by 2009 [97]. More-
over, switching costs have not decreased over time,
suggesting that learning effects are not intensify-
ing and customers are not reducing the risks and
uncertainties in their decisions. In Great Britain
and Norway, for example, the costs of switching did
not fall below 10% by 2009 [101], while the rate of
customer switching remains high [102] compared to
other markets.
In California another form of retailing has
emerged called “Community Choice Aggregation”
or CCA [103]. CCAs allow cities and counties to
combine the demand of electricity customers in their
jurisdictions to procure electricity through bilateral
contracts or markets. The advantage a CCA has
relative to a regulated investor-owned utility (IOU)
is threefold. First this gives the community served
more control over the energy sources used and allows
the CCA to market a differentiated product (e.g.,
renewable energy) that the incumbent IOU cannot
provide due to regulatory constraints. Second the
CCA may not be required to purchase the same level
of “firm” resources, which may be a significant cost-
consideration for renewable energy sources. Finally,
a CCA presents consumers with some choice in pur-
chasing electricity under a cooperative structure, in
spite of the fact that it is not individual choice in the
manner envisioned by retail competition advocates.
The result of retail competition and community
aggregation overall is mixed. There is an ongoing
segmentation of the retail market into participating
and non-participating consumers, which is under-
mining any persistent generalization of retail com-
petition and community choice in electricity deliv-
ery. Regulators are justifiably concerned that un-
derserved and low-income communities are not well-
served by retail competition and community choice,
even when they choose not to adopt it for them-
selves, partly because as those who can afford to flee
the regulated utility environment do so, those who
remain behind are left with most of the costs that
are not recovered by these new solutions. Nonethe-
less, the incumbent utilities still retain significant
“brand loyalty” where retail competition has been
adopted, and for those consumers who are unable or
unwilling to participate it is not at all obvious that
they have received much benefit from the transfor-
mation of the retail marketplace.
5 Scheduling, Dispatch and Reg-
ulation
Responsibility for the reliability of electricity inter-
connections is shared by all the operating entities
within each interconnection. In a traditional power
system, these entities are vertically integrated. A
committee process involving all the entities within
each power pool establishes the reliability criteria
utilities used for planning and operations. Typi-
cally, the operating entities belong to larger regional
coordinating councils so that they can coordinate
their criteria with neighboring power pools. Since
1965 these regional councils have been organized un-
der what is now called the North America Electric
Reliability Corporation (NERC), which establishes
the recommended standards for system reliability
[2].
With the evolution toward market-based oper-
ations in recent decades, vertically integrated op-
erating entities have been broken up into gener-
ation companies (GENCOs), transmission owners
(TRANSCOs), load serving entities (LSEs), and en-
ergy traders that do not own assets, all of whom are
collectively the market participants [104]. The re-
sponsibility for ensuring the reliability of a control
area is delegated to independent system operators
(ISO) or regional transmission operators (RTO). In
general market participants have a duty to provide
accurate data about their assets and costs as well
as follow the dispatch orders of the ISO/RTO. The
ISO/RTO has the duty to ensure that each mar-
ket participant meets the reliability rules and de-
termines the dispatch orders necessary for the elec-
tricity supply and demand to match according to
NERC’s reliability standards. This system is pred-
icated on a successful competitive market in which
private decentralized trading and investment design
work to allow substantial commercial freedom for
buyers, sellers and various other types of traders
[4].
The method used to implement such a sys-
tem planning and operating model employs a two-
stage process referred to as the unbundled or two-
settlement approach:
1. Unit-commitment (UC) is a days-ahead process
that determines the hourly operating set points
of the generation assets based on their bid en-
ergy prices and the forecast system load.
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2. Economic-dispatch (ED) is an hours-ahead pro-
cess that determines the real-time generation
schedules and procures additional supply to en-
sure system reliability.
This approach can be used for both regulated and
unregulated markets and the analysis method is
similar for both short-term operations and long-
term planning with only the caveat being that ISOs
must perform the system studies for deregulated
markets to determine whether additional generation
and transmission may be required.
Overall the timeframes for planning and opera-
tions can be separated into the following security
functions [5]:
1. Long term planning (2-5 years) determines
needed investments in generation and transmis-
sion.
2. Resource adequacy (3-6 months) secures gener-
ation to serve expected load and sets long-term
maintenance schedules.
3. Operation planning (1-2 weeks) coordinates
short-term maintenance schedules and long-
lead generation.
4. Day-ahead scheduling (12-24 hours) performs a
security-constrained UC using energy bids.
5. Real-time commitment and dispatch (5-180
minutes) performs real-time security-based eco-
nomic balancing of generation and load.
For time-intervals shorter than about 5 minutes,
the reliability of the system is delegated entirely
to the generation and loads according to reliability
standards promulgated by NERC and coordinated
separately by each interconnection.
Modern bulk electric interconnections are con-
strained by the physical requirement that electric
energy is not stored in any substantial way during
system operations. Historically, utility operations
have focused on controlling generation to “follow”
load and ensure that at every moment supply ex-
actly matches demand and losses. To make electric
utility planning and operation economical and man-
ageable, the industry divides generation resources
into three principal categories: base load, interme-
diate load, and peak load [7].
Base load generation is the bottom portion of
the supply stack that essentially runs uninterrupted
throughout the year (except during maintenance or
unplanned outages). Intermediate generation runs
continuously but only seasonally as the diurnal load
nadir rises and falls. Peak generation is the sup-
ply that must be started and stopped daily to fol-
low the diurnal load variations. Each of these types
of generation also provides regulation and reliabil-
ity resources to help control frequency and respond
to contingencies and emergencies in generation and
transmission operations.
For decades load had not generally been consid-
ered part of the overall planning and operations
model of electric interconnections except to the ex-
tent that its growth set the conditions for capacity
planning. But in recent years increasing thought
has been given to the role that load can play as
a demand resource that (1) reduces the need for
new conventional generation resources, (2) avoids
using generation resources in inefficient ways, and
(3) enables the addition of generation resources
that exhibit substandard performance characteris-
tics when operating under the conventional load-
following paradigm [7].
Today the term “demand resource” encompasses
a wide range of products, services and capabilities
related to the control and management of load in
electric systems. Prior to the advent of “smart
grid” technology, demand resources were primarily
considered for planning purposes, such as demand-
side management (DSM) programs, and very lim-
ited operational purposes such as in extremis under-
frequency or under-voltage load shedding programs
(UFLS/UVLS) [105]. DSM programs are planning
programs that focus on energy efficiency and other
long-term demand management strategies to reduce
load growth so that the need for significant new
generation capacity investments can be deferred or
eliminated. Generally these programs pay for them-
selves by reducing capital costs for a number of
years, possibly indefinitely. DSM programs helped
the industry transition from its pre-1970s 7% annual
capacity growth to the sub-3% growth prevalent to-
day in modern electricity interconnections.
But DSM programs have a number of long-term
limitations that prevent their application to other
system planning or operations objectives. First, en-
ergy efficiency is generally a diminishing return be-
cause every additional dollar invested replaces less
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inefficient load. In addition, DSM programs can
give utilities an incentive to substitute investments
in a few larger (presumably more efficient) base
load units with numerous smaller (generally less ef-
ficient) intermediate units or even (typically very in-
efficient) peaker units. Finally, DSM programs gen-
erally do not provide the capabilities and controlla-
bility needed to address some recent new planning
and operations challenges such as generation inter-
mittency, the lack of transmission capacity invest-
ments, evolving load characteristics, new ancillary
service market designs and short-term/real-time en-
ergy price volatility [106].
In contrast, UFLS and UVLS are strictly opera-
tions programs that focus on very short-term load
curtailments under severe contingencies. They are
used when all or part of the electric interconnection
is threatened by a large unexpected loss of genera-
tion or system separation that creates a power im-
balance which can only be remedied by drastic and
immediate reductions in load.
Load shedding programs also have important lim-
itations because they are pre-programmed actions
armed to respond to specific circumstances iden-
tified during planning studies. They are not the
flexible and graduated responses needed for more
general regulation and balancing operations. Load
shedding programs also tend to indiscriminately dis-
connect loads and do not have the ability to affect
only less critical end-uses such as air-conditioners
and water-heaters.
As intermittent generation becomes a standard
element of the generation fleet, the interest in using
demand response as a substitute for new control-
lable generation can be expected to grow. In ad-
dition, demand response has long been regarded as
necessary because it reveals the elasticity of demand
in ways that mitigate supply-side market power.
But the mismatch in the characteristic size of
loads, their timing, and their uncertainty relative
to conventional generation is a significant obstacle
to using demand response to simultaneously dis-
place supply-centric reliability services and mitigat-
ing generator market power: there are relatively
few easily observed generators and their character-
istic response times are relatively slow compared to
overall system dynamics. Loads in contrast are far
smaller, far more numerous, and for more difficult
to observe. But they are potentially far faster acting
than the overall system dynamics [7]. The physical
and temporal scales of resource variations are shown
in Figure 4, and we can see where demand response
and renewable generation intermittency time scales
match well, while the physical scale does not.
Bulk power system planning, operation, and con-
trol have generally been designed to consider the
characteristics of generators and treated loads as a
“noisy” boundary condition. Thus load control re-
mains quite difficult to incorporate into bulk system
planning and operation. In general, the approach to
addressing this fundamental mismatch is to devise
demand aggregation strategies that collect numer-
ous small fast acting devices with high individual
uncertainty into a few large slower acting aggrega-
tions with reduced uncertainty. While not requir-
ing every electric customer to participate in whole-
sale markets, demand aggregation provides a means
of increasing consumer participation in system re-
source allocation strategies market-based or cen-
trally controlled and thus can mitigate price volatil-
ity whether for energy, capacity, or ramping services
[107].
From an economic perspective, aggregating elec-
tricity customers can be viewed as a means of cap-
turing consumer surplus to increase producer sur-
plus, by segregating consumers into groups with dif-
ferent willingness to pay. Three general approaches
are usually employed to creating consumer aggrega-
tion for either operational or economic objectives:
1. Economic aggregation is achieved using price
discrimination methods such as different rates
for different customer classes, product differen-
tiation, and product or service bundling strate-
gies.
2. Social aggregation is achieved using various
subsidy programs, and other social group
identification strategies such as environmental,
green or early-adopter programs.
3. Technical aggregation creates technical struc-
tures that either directly aggregate consumers,
or indirectly enable economic or social aggre-
gation. Technical aggregation can be accom-
plished using service aggregators, creating tech-
nological lock-in with high barriers to entry or
exit, or constructing local retail markets inde-
pendent of wholesale energy, capacity, and an-
cillary service markets.
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Figure 4: Control and resource variability physical and temporal scales
Variable or intermittent generation is a growing
fraction of the resource base for bulk power sys-
tems. The variable character of certain renewable
resources in particular is thought to undermine the
overall reliability of the system insofar as forecasts
of wind and solar generation output have greater
uncertainty than more conventional fossil, nuclear
or hydroelectric generation resources, or even load.
As a result, the expectation is that while variable re-
newable generation resources do displace the energy
production capacity of fossil power plants, they may
not displace as much of the power or ramping capac-
ity of those plants. Consequently, the variable na-
ture of renewable resources may indicate that they
do not offer as much emissions benefit as expected
if one were to assess their impact simply on energy
production capacity [108].
It seems intuitive that demand response should
be able to mitigate the capacity and ramping im-
pacts of variable generation by reducing the need to
build and commit fossil generation to substitute for
reserves or ramp in place of fast-changing renewable
generation. But this substitutability is constrained
by (1) the nature of variable generation, the role
of forecasting, and the impact of resource variabil-
ity on the emissions and economics of renewable re-
sources; (2) the nature of load variability and how
demand response is related to load variability; and
(3) the characteristics of end-use demand and the
impact of demand response on energy consumption,
peak power and ramping rates over the various time
horizons that are relevant to the variable generation
question.
Taken together, these constraints and interactions
provide the basis for assessing the economic and
environmental impacts of controllable load and de-
mand response resources on various time scales. It is
by virtue of the downward substitutability of reserve
resources that we can assume that the variability
impact of renewable generation is exactly the oppo-
site and always less than the benefit of the same con-
trollability in demand response, and we can assess
the value of demand response using this inequality
as a guide.
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Taken as a whole, this assessment of the current
situation and the benefits of demand resources for
energy, capacity, and ramping response provide a
basis to justify a major investment of load as a re-
source and the infrastructure needed to integrate it
with the system as a whole.
5.1 Technical Requirements
The remainder of this section focuses on the tech-
nical requirements to realize a broad vision of what
is now called more generally “Transactive Energy”,
which is based on the original transactive control
concept but encompasses the entire energy system.
The approach is based on a multitude of market-like
mechanisms used to discover the prices that most ef-
ficiently schedule, dispatch, and regulate system re-
sources. The concept is proposed as the long-term
solution to the challenge of transforming the power
grid into a 21st century system that meets 21st cen-
tury needs.
What is missed by most of the existing literature
is the strong connection between scheduling, dis-
patch and regulation on the one hand, and the de-
generacy of energy, power and ramp control2 on the
other hand. Having recognized this problem, the de-
signers of transactive energy infrastructures suggest
ten key elements required to successfully implement
a complete transactive control system. The breadth
of these requirements reflects not only the high com-
plexity and difficulty of the overall design problem,
but also the broad scope of the concept itself. These
requirements cover the following processes:
1. Incentive policies and market mechanisms;
2. Market-based services;
3. Device-level controls;
4. Retail-wholesale integration;
5. Inter-temporal coordination;
6. Balancing services;
7. Balancing area control;
8. Feeder control;
2Control degeneracy is the recognition that one cannot
independently control the energy use, power level and ramp
rate because each is the derivative of the previous.
9. Integrated autonomous and market operation;
and
10. Off-normal operation.
5.1.1 Incentive Policies and Market Mecha-
nisms
Control policies and market mechanisms should pro-
vide the correct incentives for the full range of dis-
tributed assets. These assets must be able to ex-
press their ability, willingness, and desire to mod-
ify their supply or demand and respond to the sys-
tem’s overall conditions as they change over time.
These policies and markets must lead to the discov-
ery of prices and provide incentives for participants
to share accurate data that leads to a coordinated
device response and precisely meets the needs of the
grid, as a function of time and location, from the
lowest-cost resources available. More specifically, a
range of incentives and resulting bidding strategies
must align with operational and capital costs, appli-
cable in both vertically-integrated and restructured
market environments, to ensure appropriate levels
of customer participation. This must take into ac-
count the utility revenues needed to justify the in-
vestment in, and operation of the interconnection as
a collection of independent financial and operational
entities with both cooperative operational goals and
competing financial goals.
5.1.2 Market-based Services
Current market structures do not support a level
playing field for distributed assets when compared
to conventional generation. The proposed paradigm
seeks to create an equitable market mechanism
for coordinating and controlling all system as-
sets through a distributed, self-organizing control
paradigm that protects customer choice but encour-
ages and coordinates participation. This is the pur-
pose of the so-called “transactive” paradigm. Dis-
tributed smart grid asset participation in the whole-
sale market must be coordinated through a hier-
archical architecture of nested market mechanisms.
This requires the design of retail markets, but leaves
the actual functional control at the device level.
This also allows load-serving entities (LSEs) to play
their natural role as a resource aggregator in the
retail markets and paves the way for independent
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third party aggregators to develop optimal portfo-
lios to sell to the utilities.
This does not necessitate complete structural
changes to current ISO/RTO day-ahead and real-
time structures (system level). Rather it comple-
ments them by providing institutional mechanisms
that integrate retail and wholesale markets using
continuous feedback controls. At each of the hierar-
chical levels (feeder and area), available resources –
whether demand or supply, whether energy, capac-
ity, or ancillary services – are aggregated from the
level below while considering local constraints, such
as energy allocations, capacity limits and ramping
reserves. Device level bids are aggregated by feeder
level management systems while applying local con-
straints by clearing retail capacity markets such as
those demonstrated in the Olympic and Columbus
projects.
The feeder level bids are then cleared by the
area level markets, which submit aggregated or
residual bids into the ISO/RTO wholesale market.
Conversely, the area and feeder markets then re-
ceive the cleared price and dispatch quantities from
the ISO/RTO, which are eventually passed down
to the end-use customers. This forms a feedback
mechanism for a closed-loop, multi-level optimiza-
tion problem that engages distributed assets in the
wholesale market.
The same structural formulation is applied in
both ahead and real-time markets. The only dif-
ference between ahead and real-time markets is the
formulation of agents’ optimization problems and
the source of the information needed to formulate
bids. When using forward markets, each resource
bids using residual allocations of quantities from
longer-term markets.
5.1.3 Device-level Controls
At the lowest level devices use price and other in-
formation to autonomously determine appropriate
actions and apply their own constraints to local
control processes. In the Olympic and Columbus
demonstrations of this approach HVAC loads re-
sponded to changes in normalized prices by adjust-
ing the thermostat set-point utilizing smart thermo-
stat and smart-meter technology, as illustrated in
Figure 5. These devices bid the price point for their
on/off decision as well their power quantities into a
retail market. The price point is a function of the
difference between the desired air temperature and
the current air temperature and the quantity a func-
tion of recent metering. Customers are actively en-
gaged with a simple user interface that allows them
to choose how much demand response they provide
from a range between “more comfort” and “more
savings” with a simple slider control. This param-
eter k allows consumers to determine the level of
market participation. They can always override the
response by either changing the bid response curve
or removing the device from the market altogether,
provided they are willing to pay potentially higher
prices were they to occur. This approach protects
customer choice, while continuously rewarding par-
ticipation. The Olympic project extended this con-
cept to commercial VAV control units, as well as mu-
nicipal water pumping facilities, and various types
of distributed generating units.
Similar device bid and response mechanisms must
be created for other distributed assets, including dis-
tributed storage, distributed generation, and smart
appliances. The US Department of Energy’s Office
of Electricity and General Electric Appliances [109]
showed the benefits of multi-objective controls for
distributed assets for a wide range of devices. The
end result would be an environment and a set of
rules for participation where vendors can create ad-
ditional bidding and control strategies, depending
upon the goals of the customer, ranging from rela-
tively simple to highly complex optimization rou-
tines or predictive algorithms. Design of device
level controls and bidding strategies forms the basis
for their participation in retail markets. Equitable
treatment of distributed assets in the wholesale mar-
kets is accomplished through retail-wholesale inte-
gration as described in the following section.
At the device level, distributed assets should pro-
vide multiple services at different time scales: (1)
respond to market prices both ahead and real-time,
(2) respond to imbalance signals, and (3) respond
autonomously to reliability needs inferred from am-
bient frequency and voltage signals.
Autonomous responses are critical for many re-
liability purposes where there may not be time to
communicate needed actions through a wide-area
network. Appliance and equipment manufacturers
are rapidly moving toward mass production of de-
vices with smart grid capabilities that can be lever-
aged for this purpose. However, utilities and bal-
ancing authorities are hesitant to support such de-
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Figure 5: Thermostatic device control with price-based bid feedback for a cooling regime using comfort
control k.
ployments, because the response of fleets of such de-
vices has not been fully integrated with their control
schemes for grid stability. Distributed assets must
be equipped with autonomous controllers and in-
clude settings to arm them according to instructions
from feeder, area or system levels. In this way, the
autonomous immediate response of devices can be
continuously tailored to system needs, such as low
system inertia due to high on-line renewable gener-
ation and inverter-based loads.
To provide the multiple services, at the device
level, distributed assets must be equipped with
multi-objective control strategies designed to en-
able single resources to provide multiple benefits to
the system. These control strategies must be ac-
counted for in the coordination problem, for exam-
ple, by using receding horizon optimization tech-
niques (viz. model predictive control). Device
level controls introduced in previous demonstrations
must be expanded by including similar easy-to-
use (from the customer perspective), economically
driven responses for all smart grid assets, includ-
ing other smart appliances, storage, and distributed
generation to provide cost-effective, controllable so-
lutions.
5.1.4 Retail-Wholesale Integration
One of the main objectives of this paradigm is to of-
fer a comprehensive framework that fully integrates
retail and wholesale power markets. This frame-
work must provide a way for end-users (distributed
assets) to contribute indirectly in wholesale mar-
kets.
Retail market designs must not only facilitate
interactions between end-users (distributed assets)
and the feeder level management system. The feeder
level management system must coordinate the be-
haviors of the distributed assets within their respec-
tive retail markets, as well as consolidate the net of-
fering for area and wholesale markets. This provides
an avenue to inject local constraints, which are of-
ten overlooked when solving system-wide problems
using distributed resources. Feeder level optimiza-
tion and control for a real-time retail market was
demonstrated during the Olympic and Columbus
projects. In both of these projects, system-wide
constraints (in the form of wholesale market prices
or LMPs) are coupled with local constraints (local
feeder capacity) to clear retail markets and provide
both local and system-wide benefits using demand
response resources, as illustrated in Figure 6. Ef-
fectively, the system enables customers to reduce
their energy consumption during high price events
to reduce energy costs, while coordinating devices
225
E
n
er
gy
p
ri
ce
Power quantity
(1)
(2)
Pretail
Qfeeder
Figure 6: Storage resource allocation using retail
markets. The battery charge bid (1) is accepted
while its discharge bid (2) is not, even though the
feeder appears congested.
responses during localized congestion events to de-
crease demand and deploy local resources, providing
a system for equitably rewarding customers for par-
ticipation. Distributed generation and storage sim-
ilarly bid into the retail market, subject to run time
constraints (e.g., a maximum number of allowable
run hours). While successfully showing that dis-
tributed assets can participate in retail level mar-
kets, the distributed assets in these projects did
not affect the wholesale price—they only reacted to
wholesale prices and local constraints.
The feedback loop is closed by integrating retail
markets through to wholesale energy, capacity and
ancillary service markets. This allows distributed
assets to interact with the wholesale market through
the feeder’s retail market and area level manage-
ment systems. Price and availability information
must flow from the device level to the feeder level
retail aggregators and markets. The feeder level
markets combine individual device bids, including
battery demand/supply bids for charging/discharg-
ing, as shown in Figure 6.
Similarly, aggregators combine the supply bids
from distributed renewables to form feeder level
supply curves. The aggregate net constrained re-
sults of the demand and supply are bid to the
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Figure 7: Aggregate resource allocation using area
markets. Feeders supply and demand curves are
combined to determine resource participation fac-
tors.
area level management systems, which combine var-
ious feeder level bids in a similar manner to the
ISO/RTO’s wholesale market. Once the wholesale
market clears, the cleared prices and quantities are
reported back to the area and feeder level markets,
which apply their local constraints through appro-
priate bids to clear their respective markets.
This successive multi-level clearing process is il-
lustrated in Figure 7 by the feeder level to area
level market integration. Based on the day-ahead
wholesale market LMP, day-ahead feeder bids and
other regional resources, the area market determines
an area day-ahead price and available capacity of
area power and establishes the area’s scheduled net
load and generation commitment. Thus the area
forward market incorporates day-ahead supply bids
from renewables and load bids from feeder to de-
termine the day-ahead area price. The real-time
feeder markets then clear the local supply and de-
mand to determine the feeder price that meets the
area’s scheduled loads, storage and distributed gen-
eration. Storage devices then charge or discharge
depending on the cleared price. In many cases end-
users’ bidding processes may include learning capa-
bilities [110] and must simultaneously report supply
bids to participate in ancillary services markets to
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realize incentive compatibility under the two-part
operation of those markets.
Wholesale markets must be operated by an
ISO/RTO such that they facilitate the interac-
tion between the ISO/RTO operators and the area
level markets. Conventional and grid-level large-
scale renewable generation fleets also operate di-
rectly in the wholesale markets. The ISO clears the
wholesale market using the conventional methods
of security-constrained unit-commitment and eco-
nomic dispatch (SCUC/ED).
At the area level, agents gather multiple feeder-
level resources bids, combine bids and determine
possible area-level resource constraints, and derive
area market prices. At this level, distributed asset
constraints are no longer considered, because they
are embedded in the bids from the feeder level mar-
kets. In response, area controllers produce market
prices that are received by the area level manage-
ment system. The optimal bidding strategies prob-
lem of the area markets must be modeled as a math-
ematical program with equilibrium constraints. The
outer problem of this bi-level problem is the area
level management system’s optimization problem
while the inner problem is the ISO’s optimization
problem. The wholesale market clearing process de-
pends on bids provided by agents and entities at all
levels, but interacts only with area markets at the
next level down. The bids in turn must be formu-
lated based on market clearing processes at both
wholesale and retail layers. The integration of re-
tail and wholesale markets in this manner enables
participation of distributed assets. The design of re-
tail and wholesale markets is the same in both day-
ahead and real-time markets with only the direction
of information flow differing in the two markets.
5.1.5 Inter-Temporal Integration
Day-ahead markets are operated as pure finan-
cial markets, allowing participants to enter finan-
cially binding contracts that hedge against the price
volatility of real-time markets. Because a significant
majority of the energy, capacity and ancillary ser-
vice resources are committed under these financial
agreements, the real-time markets effectively serve
as energy, capacity, and ramping imbalance markets
by determining the price at which the residual must
be acquired. As long as the cost of uncertainty is
sufficiently higher than any emergent arbitrage op-
portunity, the incentive to commit a majority of re-
sources in forward markets will be sustained and the
quantities emanating from those markets will serve
as reliable forecasts of supply and demand for all re-
quired resources and capabilities. The principle of
the two-settlement system will be preserved by this
design and in fact could be extended for longer-term
horizons if desired.
Distributed assets must be induced to enter into
contracts to procure or sell most of their energy, ca-
pacity and ramping resources in the day-ahead mar-
kets. The residual resources and needs are then sub-
mitted in the real-time markets when more precise
information on the prevailing conditions becomes
available. The real-time markets will also serve
to correct the unforeseen imbalances between con-
tracted day-ahead conditions and actual real-time
positions. The horizontal information flow between
retail and wholesale market, and their respective en-
tities; viz., feeder-level and area-level management
systems, must be addressed in a manner similar to
distributed assets.
In the presence of high levels of renewable and dis-
tributed assets, economics cannot be the only objec-
tive for utilizing distributed resources in an effective
manner unless reliability can be directly translated
into costs, which seems unlikely at this time. Mar-
kets and bid/control strategies for balancing ser-
vices must run in parallel with retail and wholesale
energy and capacity markets in both day-ahead and
real-time markets. The market clearing mechanism
used in the wholesale markets clear balancing re-
serves by co-optimizing energy and balancing needs.
The balancing reserves must be determined endoge-
nously, based on energy demand and supply, rather
than set as hard limits, as is the norm in most in-
terconnection operations today.
5.1.6 Balancing Services
The effectiveness of autonomous, grid-friendly re-
sponse by smart appliances in the form of under-
frequency load shedding has been already demon-
strated in the Olympic project. Fifty pre-existing
residential electric water heaters were retrofitted
and 150 new residential clothes dryers were de-
ployed. These responded to ambient signals received
from under-frequency, load-shedding appliance con-
trollers. Each controller monitored the frequency
of the power grid’s ubiquitous 60 Hz AC voltage
227
signal at the outlet. The controllers reduced the
electric load of appliance whenever electric power-
grid frequency fell below 59.95 Hz. The controllers
and their appliances were installed and monitored
for more than a year at residential sites at three lo-
cations in Washington and Oregon. The controllers
and their appliances responded reliably to each shal-
low under-frequency event, which occurred on aver-
age once per day and shed their loads for the dura-
tions of these events, typically about a minute and
never more than ten minutes. Appliance owners re-
ported that the appliance responses were unnoticed
and caused little or no inconvenience.
There are a few more recent demonstrations
of the provision of ancillary services with aggre-
gated distributed assets such as demand response in
buildings. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
teamed with PG&E and SCE/Oak Ridge National
Laboratory to demonstrate how residential air con-
ditioning programs could be used to supply spinning
reserves to CAISO in 250 and 2500 homes, respec-
tively [106]. Ecofys led a demonstration for Bon-
neville Power Administration and utilities in the Pa-
cific Northwest region to show how regulation could
be provided for “firming” wind using water heaters,
thermal storage furnaces, refrigerated warehouses,
and commercial building HVAC [111]. A Steffes wa-
ter heater and three electric vehicles are supplying
regulation for PJM in ongoing demonstrations [112].
PNNL conducted an analysis that showed electric
vehicles could supply all additional ancillary services
for integration of 30% of generation from wind in the
Pacific Northwest region [113].
A reliability safety net created for the ISO/RTO
operation can be very valuable. It would comprise
fast-acting smart grid assets that can be armed
and disarmed based on the clearing of a bulk-level
ancillary service market and area balancing mar-
kets. These distributed assets should be aggregated
into a grid-friendly network of actively managed au-
tonomous devices that self-sense frequency and volt-
age fluctuations, and respond to broadcast set-point
signals from control area regulation markets. These
assets must provide the full range of today’s ancil-
lary services and more: virtual inertia, regulation,
ramping, spinning reserve, and emergency curtail-
ment capabilities.
5.1.7 Balancing Area Control
Balancing area controllers must be able to arm and
disarm distributed autonomous grid-friendly devices
that provide balancing services, to reduce the bur-
den on conventional generation, particularly when
increasing balancing requirements are expected dur-
ing periods of high level renewable variable genera-
tion output. At the area level, the goal of the bal-
ancing supervisor is to minimize the area control
error (ACE) signal, which is a weighted sum of the
deviations of the system frequency and the inter-
area power flow. The balancing supervisor must co-
ordinate with Automatic Generator Control (AGC)
at the transmission level to provide frequency and
tie line interchange support, minimizing balancing
authority ACE. The balancing area control, in co-
ordination with AGC, aims to maintain the system
frequency at 60 Hz during the normal load demand
fluctuation, and restore the system frequency grad-
ually when a contingency occurs in the system. In
particular, the balancing supervisor needs to main-
tain the inter-area power flow at the scheduled level.
The inter-area power flow reference values are cal-
culated based on differences of measured total area
real power references (and reactive power required
to realize the real power transfers) that were cleared
by the real-time area market. The balancing con-
trol must balance the input of these two power ref-
erences according to the current system operating
conditions.
5.1.8 Feeder Control
Feeder control is a critical component in the entire
system because it mediates between the area control
and individual device controls. Its role is bidirec-
tional in the sense that (1) it must convert the bal-
ancing objective specified by the area control into
supply constraints for the retail markets; and (2)
it also must represent elasticity of those assets to
the area control system. Essentially, the feeder con-
troller has two objectives. The first is to minimize
a feeder control error in the local market and the
second is to enable coordination of various local de-
vices to provide reactive power support for voltage
regulation.
A feeder’s real power reference is based on the
power reference cleared by the balance area con-
trol and the power reference from the retail capacity
market. The feeder’s balancing controller must rec-
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oncile these two power references according to the
current system operating conditions. During normal
conditions, the cleared power reference from the re-
tail market will be given more weight. But during
contingencies, the signal received from the balanc-
ing entity must be given more weight.
Additionally, the feeder controller must account
for variability and uncertainty of local distributed
renewable resources such as rooftop photovoltaic
panels, and local constraints such as feeder conges-
tion. After the feeder real power reference is deter-
mined, the feeder control must dispatch optimal set-
points to the autonomous devices that help main-
tain adequate power support. The feeder reactive
power management system must collect real time
feeder voltage information from all the devices in-
volved in voltage support. Then the management
system must coordinate with local device-level con-
trollers by dispatching voltage setpoints and if nec-
essary, suppressing the autonomous local control
signals to avoid excessive voltage regulation.
5.1.9 Integrated Autonomous and Market
Operation
The real-time market management system supports
both area and feeder level control but it must sup-
port one additional function. As part of the co-
optimization problem at each level, ancillary service
contracts must be entered into on the same time
scale as the real-time energy market, and weighted
according to real-time energy market requirements
determined by NERC reliability standards. Dur-
ing normal operations, the control systems will
take a purely economic perspective to maximize re-
turns, by dispatching smart grid assets either to-
wards real-time energy needs, ancillary service needs
(such as frequency or voltage regulation, spinning
reserve, etc.), or a combination of both. But during
disrupted or stressed system conditions, weighting
functions must be adjusted to focus on short-term
system stability requirements rather than long-term
economic objectives. During each real-time market
cycle (e.g., every 5 minutes) the control system must
establish contracts for real-time energy and balanc-
ing/regulation services, and dispatch resources sub-
ject to local constraints and availability provided by
device bidding. This allows the smart grid assets to
participate in multiple market revenue streams un-
der a multi-objective control problem (i.e., storage
devices participating in both energy markets and
frequency regulation), capturing multiple revenue
streams to increase profitability and long-term sus-
tainability. At this time scale, only contracts for
reservation of ancillary services are formed, while
the control itself must be performed at a much faster
rate using autonomous responses, and compensated
at energy, capacity, or ramping market prices.
5.1.10 Off-normal Operation
Distributed smart grid assets must be pre-armed for
instantaneous autonomous response during abnor-
mal conditions, such as loss of communications or
contingency events. This allows each asset to re-
spond to the correct extent, and avoids the amplify-
ing system-wide voltage, power, or frequency oscil-
lations that might follow too many devices respond-
ing. For loads that cannot continuously adjust their
power use (such as water heaters, HVACs), they
must be switched on/off selectively so that the ag-
gregate of a large number of these loads provides the
required droop characteristic. Distributed control
strategies must be designed to coordinate the dif-
ferent devices so they respond autonomously while
maintaining the overall stability of the system. Ap-
proaches to perform this function have yet to be
developed.
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